University of Alberta

The Dialogical Principle in the British Novel

by

Aubrey Roger McPhail ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

"The Dialogical Principle in the British Novel" argues that some prominant British novelists of the 18th and 19th centuries who are usually considered as monologic writers are, in fact, quite dialogical. In particular, Samuel Richardson's *Pamela,* Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice* and *Emma,* and George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* all display complex and compelling levels of dialogism. These novels show a kind of unification of philosophy and fiction in that they manifest and implement a common world-view that underlies the crucial features of "Socratic philosophy." Socratic philosophy is understood as the predominant philosophy found in Plato's early period. Its essential features are a dialogical sense of truth--that truth comes through encounters between people--and an overwhelming focus on ethical matters--on the examined life. These, and other related features, are connected to the dialogical thinking of Mikhail Bakhtin and Martin Buber. Concepts such as heteroglossia, dialogism, monologism, polyphony, double-voicedness, genuine dialogue, and the I/Thou relation are considered in relation to Richardson, Austen, and Eliot. *Pamela* is analyzed in terms of its epistolary style and dialogical rudiments. It is a much more radical novel than critics have granted, and it is permeated with moral philosophy that is Socratic and with dialogical elements that anticipate aspects of the thought of Bakhtin and Buber. Austen's handling of a number of issues in *Pride and Prejudice* corresponds to some of the prominant features of Bakhtin's dialogical imagination and of Socratic philosophy. Notions such as genuine dialogue, dynamic relation, and wonder are treated dialogically in the novel; Jane Austen's own dialogical imagination is revealed. *Emma* shows an unusual kind of pedagogical relation between Mr. Knightley and Emma; it considers the relation between openness and reserve, and it underwrites a peculiar form of self-knowledge: sensitivity. *Daniel Deronda* encapsulates and develops many of the dialogical elements found in Richardson and Eliot. The novel unifies Eliot's philosophy and her fiction in offering a world-view which is thoroughly dialogic in nature, and which may be understood as a culture of the dialogic.

Preface

This is a study of the dialogical principle in some representative novels of Samuel Richardson, Jane Austen, and George Eliot. On one level, this study is a very personal response to these novelists. Criticism, I think, should try to give a reasoned account of why a text moves one in a certain way, or why it does not. In reading Samuel Richardson, Jane Austen and George Eliot, I found a particular kind of appeal that seemed lacking in other novelists of the 18th and 19th centuries, but my study of the criticism of these novelists accounted only for a small part of the kind of personal address and overall attraction these writers held for me. Apart from interesting plots, compelling ideas, and superb individual styles, these very different writers seemed to have something in common, and it was that common quality that neither traditional criticism nor contemporary theory had, in my view, explained very fully. This study is meant to give an account of the common thread that ties these writers together, and that makes them worth reading and worth studying.

What these writers have in common is an underlying philosophical orientation or "world view." This orientation involves much more than a common moral outlook--this commonality has long since been established. I will argue that each writer's orientation involves--in a crucial and unique way --what Mikhail Bakhtin has variously described as dialogism or the dialogic. In one sense, my task here could be viewed as traditional in that I offer a kind of defense of writers who are prominent in the "Great Tradition." But in another sense this study is quite radical in placing these writers among those considered dialogic, and in arguing that their "greatness" may be seen in terms of Socratic philosophy and of the thinking of Mikhail Bakhtin and Martin Buber.

When one thinks of dialogue or of Bakhtinian concepts such as dialogism, heteroglossia, and polyphony, one does not usually think of Richardson, Austen, or Eliot. Colin MacCabe's *James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word* is an apt example of the kind of criticism that sees a writer like James Joyce as an exemplar of the kind of dialogue usually associated with dialogism. Roughly speaking, for MacCabe, a writer like George Eliot (and by extension we could include Richardson and Austen) is an example of the monological in literature. He views George Eliot as a fairly naive realist whose monologism is expressed by her failure to see the transparency of language and by her use of narrative authority to express a *single,* invariable world view. But the world view we find in Richardson, and more fully in Austen and Eliot, entails an openness to various (competing) visions of reality. In fact, these writers rethink dialogue itself, and they offer a *perspective on* dialogue as well as a *use of* dialogue that is much more dialogical than has been heretofore recognized. Indeed, considering the recent explosion of books and articles that are on Bakhtinian dialogism or that employ dialogical concepts, the attention to the novels of Richardson, Austen, and Eliot is conspicuous only by its marked absence. And as a number of discussions with Caryl Emerson--the main translator and prominent scholar and critic of Bakhtin--confirmed, the dialogical elements in these writers remained to be explored. Moreover, we will see that these writers are also much more philosophically orientated and complex than critics have generally admitted. Indeed, in their writing, we see a kind of unification of philosophy and fiction. And as I will show, this philosophical orientation is predominantly Socratic in nature. So, the philosophy found in these writers is not systematic philosophy. We do not find a Kantian categorical imperative that demands that the individual act only in ways that are universalizable. Dialogism does accept the Kantian notion of an unbrigeable gap between mind and matter, but in the ethical realm a unified truth is possible; however, it does not derive from a categorical imperative, but rather, from a variety of perspectives on the unique situation in which the moral event occurs. For Bakhtin, as for Socrates, there is no (Kantian) maxim that could dictate conduct in each and every event; this is a crucial aspect of the dialogical notion of truth.

In the first chapter, I establish the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the thesis. First, I establish the notion of Socratic philosophy, and I reveal its salient features. Secondly, in an original approach to Bakhtin, I connect a number of his most crucial ideas to Socratic philosophy (The result of this effort was presented at the "Eighth International

Conference on Mikhail Bakhtin: Dialogue and Culture," and--surprising to me--met with much interest and approval). And third, I explicate and clarify and number of Bakhtinian concepts, and I further consider the thought of Martin Buber in light of my previous analysis.

The second chapter offers a reading of Richardson's *Pamela* --a novel I chose, in part, because it does *not* initially seem dialogic in the way that *Clarissa* more obviously does. I consider the concept of Epistolarity, and I show how we find dialogical rudiments in *Pamela.* Further, I argue the novel is much more radical than has been granted and that it is permeated with moral philosophy that is Socratic and with dialogical elements that anticipate aspects of the thought of Bakhtin and Buber.

In the third chapter I consider how Austen's handling of a number of issues in *Pride and Prejudice* closely corresponds to some of the prominent features of Bakhtin's "Dialogical Imagination" and of Socratic philosophy. I argue, for example, that notions such as "genuine dialogue," dynamic relation, and wonder are treated dialogically in the novel and that Jane Austen's own "dialogical imagination" is revealed in the work.

In the fourth chapter I offer a reading of *Emma* in light of education and pedagogy. Here, I argue for an unusual kind of pedagogical relation between Mr. Knightley and Emma, and I explore the novel's treatment of the relation between openness and reserve, and I further argue that the novel underwrites a peculiar form of self-knowledge, namely sensitivity. This is all considered in relation to dialogism.

In the final chapter, I argue that *Daniel Deronda* encapsulates and develops many of the dialogical elements we see in Richardson and Austen, and that the novel unifies George Eliot's philosophy and her fiction in offering a world view which is thoroughly dialogic in nature--which may be understood as a culture of the dialogic.

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Chapter One: Introduction

Socratic Dialogue and Bakhtin

"Plato's Dialogues are queer little novels. It seems to me it was the greatest pity in the world, when philosophy and fiction got split."[1] At first glance, D. H. Lawrence's remarks appear a little impertinent, but with some reflection, we can see that Lawrence offered a fruitful insight, not only for students of philosophy, but for students of the novel as well. Lawrence's first remark is correct; Plato's dialogues *are* queer little novels. But if they are strange, they are also strangely familiar to the reader of novels. Lawrence's second idea is false; philosophy and fiction did not separate, at least not for those *novelists* whose work indicates, like Socrates' philosophy, that philosophy is to be connected with human life, and human life is to be concerned with morality.[2] My concern here, then, is not to show in detail how Plato's dialogues are novels, queer or otherwise, but first I will outline in brief how they contain some of the constitutive elements that would figure in some of the prominent novelists of the 18th and 19th centuries, in particular, Samuel Richardson,

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[1] D. H. Lawrence, "Surgery for the Novel--or a Bomb," D. H. Lawrence: *A Selection From Phoenix.* Ed. A. A. H. Inglis. New York: Penguin, 1979. 193.

[2] Similarly, philosophers did not much consider the literary qualities of Platonic dialogues until the 1980s. See especially, G. R. F. Ferraris's *Listening to the Cicadas.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, and Charles L. Griswold's *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986.

George Eliot, and Jane Austen. Secondly, I will argue that the Socratic conception of doing philosophy is much closer to Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogical thinking than either Bakhtin himself or subsequent students of his work have heretofore recognized. First, however, it is necessary to say a little about what has been called the "Socratic problem" or the "Socratic question."[3]

Simply put, the classical Socratic problem deals with the question of how much of the character and "teachings" of the historical Socrates may be retrieved from the literary sources. Following Aristotle's attempt in the *Metaphysics* to isolate Socrates' contribution to philosophy from that of Plato, philosophers have considered how much of the real historical figure, Socrates, they have encountered in Plato's dialogues. But recently the entire field of Socratic studies has been reinvigorated by the work and teaching of Gregory Vlastos, whose studies have firmly established the grounds for treating the philosophy of the historical Socrates as a legitimate subject of special attention. Vlastos' *Socrates, Ironist And Moral Philosopher* (1991) makes a clear and compelling case for a reading of the early dialogues predicated on the hypothesis that

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[3] As P. J. Fitzpatrick notes, the so-called "Socratic problem" first arose when, in 1786, E. Stapfer in his *De philosophia Socratis,* indicates the difficulty of retrieving what is genuinely Socratic from texts such as those of Xenophon and Plato. For a detailed discussion of the history of the hermeneutical controversies vis a vis Socrates, see Fitzpatrick's "The Legacy of Socrates," in *Socratic Questions.* Ed. Barry S. Gower and Michael C. Stokes. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. 153-208.

"through a 'Socrates' in Plato we can come to know the thought of the Socrates of history" (81). Now as Vlastos convincingly demonstrates, "the Socrates of history" is quite different from the character, Socrates, that we get in Plato's middle and latest periods.[4] It becomes clear that the the early Socrates either does not agree with the middle and later Socrates, or that he is just concerned with different issues. The Socrates found in Plato's early dialogues seems to be a reasonably accurate rendering of the master's ideas by the disciple, Plato. The later two periods render Plato's own philosophy using Socrates as a dramatic persona. Vlastos writes: "as Plato changes, the philosophical persona of his Socrates is made to change, absorbing the writer's new convictions, arguing for them with the same zest with which the Socrates of the previous dialogues had argued for the views the writer had shared with the original of that figure earlier on" (1991, 53).

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[4] As Vlastos writes, "a principal topic of inquiry" through much of his book is just "how pronounced and profound are the differences between the philosophy Plato puts into the mouth" of the early Socrates "from the philosophy he expounds through" the later Socrates (47). Vlastos uses a two-pronged argument to defend his hypothesis. The first considers evidence internal to the Platonic corpus, and lists and defends "programmatically ten Theses" each of which specifies traits of Socrates found *only* in one or more of the early dialogues and different traits found *only* in the later dialogues. The second part of Vlastos' argument considers evidence about the historical Socrates which is external to the Platonic corpus (e.g., Aristotle, Xenophon, Aeschines Socraticus, Colotes, etc.,). See also Vlastos' *Socratic Studies* (1994), in which Vlastos, in light of subsequent scholarly reaction to Vlastos (1991), revises and refines some of the views expressed in that work, especially his interpretation of Socratic elenchus and Socrate's profession of ignorance.

So it is the early Socrates, the one whom Vlastos calls "the Socrates of history" that will be the primary focus of my attention with respect to the Socratic dialogue. Hence, I mention the "Socratic problem" in order to clarify my premises with respect to what I mean by philosophy, or more precisely Socratic philosophy, in order to clarify what I mean by philosophy in the novel. In keeping with Lawrence's assertion that Plato's dialogues are "queer little novels," and in order to avoid any misunderstandings or concerns about the veracity of Socrates' words or the authority of Plato's "transmission" of those words, I want to be clear that I consider "the Socrates of history" as itself a dialogical construction between the thought of a genuine historical figure, Socrates, and the creative act of an author, Plato.[5] Vlastos (1991) puts it this way:

> . . . Plato in those early works of his, sharing Socrates' basic philosophical convictions, sets out to think through for himself their central affirmations, denials, and reasoned suspensions of belief by pitting them in elentic encounter against the views voiced by a variety of interlocutors. In doing this Plato is producing, not

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[5] Unless otherwise specified, hereafter my use of "Socratic dialogues," "Socratic philosophy," or "Socrates" will refer to the dialogues, philosophy and person of the dialogues of Plato's earlier period. Listed in alphabetical order, they are as follows: *Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras, Republic I.*

> reproducing, Socratic philosophizing. Employing a literary medium which allows Socrates to speak for himself, Plato makes him say whatever *he*--Plato--thinks *at the time of writing* would be the most reasonable thing for Socrates to be saying just then in expounding and defending his own philosophy. (50)

What, then, are some of the elements of Socratic philosophy that would subsequently figure in the works of Samuel Richardson, George Eliot, and Jane Austen?

A. Moral Philosophy

The first and most salient feature of Socratic philosophy is its singularity of focus on moral matters. Again, it was Aristotle who was one of the first to recognize that unlike Plato, Socrates' central concern was with ethics. In *Metaphysics* he wrote that

> After the systems we have named came the philosophy of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers, but had peculiarities that distinguished it from the Italians . . . these views he held even in his later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters . . . .

(987a29-b1-4)

Socratic philosophy has none of the metaphysical flights of fancy, none of the political theory, and none of the epistemological inquiry of Plato's middle and later periods.[6] Vlastos goes so far as asserting that the early Socrates "is exclusively a moral philosopher" (1991, 47). Of course, Socrates does sometimes touch on other topics, but as Vlastos points out, when he considers other topics such as knowledge, for example, "Knowledge in the moral domain is the sole object of Socrates' epistemic concern" (1991, 237).

Another qualification is in order. Socrates is not a systematic moral philosopher. He holds no "system" in the sense used to refer to the ethics of Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, or Spinoza (who trumpets his system throughout his *Ethics)*. He has no "science" of ethics. In *Dialogue and Dialectic*, Hans-Georg Gadamer points out that in the *Apology* "Plato represents Socrates, not as an expert in modern science at all but on the contrary, as one who himself repeatedly asserts his own ignorance of science and who restricts himself to the moral problems of mankind and self-knowledge" (1980, 23). Similarly, the closest Socrates comes to having anything like a Kantian Categorical Imperative is in his requirement that his interlocutors say only what they truly believe.[7] Socrates simply recognizes honesty as a necessary condition for the kind of moral inquiry that he conducts. Honesty is required because the entire thrust of Socrates' dialogues with others concerns the question of how one ought to live, and this question cannot be answered unless one can evaluate the consistency of interlocutors' beliefs, unless one can be confident that they are being honest about how they think they ought to live. If someone does not say what she believes, she is harming herself, since there can be no way to decide how best to live in light of those beliefs.

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[6] Some philosophers have seen this as a short-coming. For example, Gilbert Ryle (1966) speculates that it was because Plato stopped writing the early dialogues (what Vlastos has shown Ryle mistakenly classifies as eristic) that he begins to create "what we think of as philosophy" such as the Theory of Forms (210-211). In a discussion with the philosopher Julia Annas, she referred to Ryle's notion as "a nice story." But whether Ryle is mistaken or not, my point is that the absence in Socratic philosophy of metaphysical and epistemological theories that would make it "what we think of as philosophy" is precisely part of its unique status as moral philosophy.

In the *Apology,* Socrates explains to the jury that he will "question," "examine," and "test" anyone he meets, "young or old, foreigner or fellow citizen" to see if he has, as he professes, made "real progress toward goodness." If such a person is found wanting, Socrates says he will "reprove him for neglecting what is of supreme importance" (29e7-30a1). So, it is clear that Socrates sees the cultivation of the moral life as the pre-eminent human concern. Later in the same passage he elaborates a little on why this is the case. He says, "For I spend all my time going about trying to persuade you, young and old, to make your first and chief concern not for your bodies nor for your possessions, but for the highest welfare of your souls. . ." (30a7-b1). Again in the *Gorgias* Socrates admonishes Callicles: "And of all the inquiries, Callicles, the noblest is that which concerns the very matter with which you have reproached me--namely, what a man should be, and what he should practice, and to what extent . . . "(487e6-488a1). Similarly, in *Republic* I, Socrates clarifies matters for Thrasymachus by telling him "it is no ordinary matter that we are discussing, but the right conduct of life" (352d5-6). Now I am not claiming that Socrates occupied a unique position in ancient philosophy by his attention to "the right conduct of life": of course, he did not, but I am claiming that it was absolutely central to his conception of philosophy and in his daily dealings with others. In *Reason in the Age of Science,* Gadamer explains that Plato portrays Socrates "as a simple citizen of Athens to whom the knowledge of 'the wise people' who investigated nature promised nothing. Instead he advised concern about one's soul, and he asked the question about the right way to live" (1981, 142). Although it has been generally overlooked, the concern about souls, about spiritual life, was an integral part of much ancient philosophy. In summarizing the work of Pierre Hadot, whose writings had "profound importance" on Michel Foucault's last works, Arnold I. Davidson notes that "in the ancient schools of thought philosophy was a way of life."[8] And quoting from Hadot's *Exercises*

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[7] See *Euthyphro.* 15d1-3; *Cri.* 49c11-d1; *Prt.* 331c4-d1; *Rep.* I.349a4-8; *Grg.* 458a1-b1, 495a5-9, 499b4-c6, 500b5-c1.

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[8] "Spiritual Exercises and Ancient Philosophy: An Introduction to Pierre Hadot," *Critical Inquiry,* no. 16 (1990), 476. Although little known in the English-reading world, Hadot's work seeks to remedy much of the oversight with respect to ancient philosophy's concern for spiritual life; as Davidson points out, Hadot "forces us to rethink our own modern presumptions in reading ancient texts" (480). See also Arnold

spirituels et philosophie antique, Davidson writes that "Philosophy presented itself as a 'mode of life, as an act of living, as a way of being . . . an invitation for each man to transform himself. Philosophy is conversation, transformation of the way of being and the way of living, the quest for wisdom' " (476). Davidson also points out that for Hadot, the figure of Socrates provided the first clear example of philosophy as a spiritual practice. And it is in Socrates' employment of dialogue that we recognize the uniquely spiritual nature of his philosophical vocation. Davidson writes,

> A master of dialogue with others and of dialogue with himself, Socrates should be seen as a master of this practice of spiritual exercises. According to Hadot, a Socratic dialogue is a spiritual exercise practiced in common, and it incites one to give attention to oneself, to take care of oneself, through inner spiritual exercises . . . Spiritual exercises were thus exercises in learning how to live the philosophical life. (476)

So this ancient conception of philosophy as a spiritual exercise, as a concern for the soul, for "the right conduct of life," is a crucial part of the Socratic dialogue. Presumably, this concern for the soul *alone* would not merit our attention with respect to an understanding of philosophy and fiction in the British novel,

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Davidson and Paula Wissing's translation of Hadot's inaugural lecture to the chair of the department of the History of Hellenistic and Roman Thought, College de France, February 18, 1983: "Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy," *Critical Inquiry,* no. 16 (1990), 483-505.

but closely connected to the spiritual exercises, in fact, integral to them, is the dialogical nature of the Socratic dialogues.

B. Socratic Dialogism

A distinctive feature of the Socratic dialogues as opposed to Plato's middle and later dialogues is their dialogic bearing. Certainly, the Socratic notion of the philosophical life as an unfinished task had a profound influence on the constitution of Socratic dialogue. The examined life is an ongoing task for Socrates. It is never finished because the need to make moral decisions is never finished. Each new day requires spiritual exercises in the moral arena; new problems and unique contingencies arise and must be addressed. Hence, the repudiation of an ethical system in Socratic philosophy. And if there is no system sufficiently efficacious to meet the demands of daily moral life, then where is truth to be found? Socrates' answer is that it is to be found between people. Seen in this light, Socrates' celebrated professions of ignorance are not at all ironic in the sense touted by dictionaries as "Socratic Irony." There is no *pretence* of ignorance simply to expose logical fallacies in an interlocutor's claims.[9] In fact, a case can be made that Socrates does not merely test propositions but people's lives.[10] Nicias, an old acquaintance of Socrates, makes this very clear:

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[9] See Vlastos' discussion of "complex irony." He writes, 'When he [Socrates] professes to have no knowledge he both does and does not mean what he says. He wants it to assure his hearers that in the moral domain there is not a single proposition he claims to know with certainty. But in another sense of 'knowledge,' where the word refers to justified true belief. . . there are many propositions he does claim to know" (1991, 32).

> . . . anyone who is close to Socrates and enters conversation with him is liable to be drawn into an argument, and whatever subject he may start, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until at last he has to give an account both of his present and past life, and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him. (*Laches*. 187e5-188a2)

Now, as we have seen, Socrates is interested in the conduct of life in the moral domain. So what he "sifts" is people's lives, not simply their claims. Similarly, *how* one ought to live not *what* one does for a living is paramount for Socrates. He never condemns any walk of life as inherently evil or misdirected. Whether a soothsayer like Euthyphro, an intellectual like Hippias, or a soldier like Laches, Socrates seeks to have his interlocutor examine his own life in light of his own beliefs. So Socrates is no teacher in the common sense of the word. Of course, he does have beliefs and he does make claims, but he does not have any preconceived doctrine that he aims to impose on his interlocutor. Through discussion, through dialogue, through question and answer, Socrates seeks to bring his interlocutors into a state of self-examination. Socratic dialogue is an invitation to self-reflection. Consider what Socrates says to Callicles in the *Gorgias* :

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[10] Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith note that "Socrates does not say that untested propositions are not worth believing or that unexamined beliefs are not worth holding; he says that the unexamined *life* is not worth living . . . Socrates is interested, not merely in the truth or falsehood of these propositions, but rather in the lives whose values these propositions characterize." *Plato's Socrates*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 13.

> You must either prove against her [philosophy], as I said just now, that to do wrong and evade punishment for wrongdoing is not the worst of all evils; or if you leave this unrefuted, then, by the dog that is god in Egypt, Callicles himself will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be at variance with you throughout your life. (482b2-7)

We see that Socrates does not expect that what he has said per se will alter Callicles' view, but he expects that with due consideration, Callicles' *own* mind, "Callicles himself," will convince him of his error. Socrates does not say to Callicles "this is the truth and you simply must accept it;" he says "if you leave this unrefuted, your own mind will be at variance with your own self." Socrates recognizes that consistency between private values and professed beliefs is necessary for congruent subjectivity.[11] Without consistency, the person would be a divided self. Now, one can reveal inconsistency, but one cannot make an other whole. So, Socrates does not "teach" simply as one in a position to know; he creates conditions conducive to self-examination so that his interlocutor comes to know himself.[12] As Jurgen Mittelstrass notes, "What is at stake in philosophical dialogue are not particular problems but the subjects who are to acquire philosophical knowledge."[13] This is why Socrates' philosophy does not come down as a pontifical pronouncement but across as an educative exchange. This salient feature of Socrates' exchanges with others is one key factor in characterizing his "method" as dialogic.[14] There is a kind of teaching in Socratic dialogue, but it is of a very special sort. Socrates often explicitly denies that he is a teacher at all. In the *Apology,* for example, he says, "I have never set myself up as any man's teacher, but if anyone, young or old, is eager to hear me

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[11] Consider, for example, Socrates' discussion with Crito about whether or not Socrates should escape from prison. Socrates and Crito eventually decide Socrates should not escape, for to do so would be inconsistent with moral values they both share. For Socrates, wholeness or congruence of the person is predicated on consistency between inner values and

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outer actions. This is so important for Socrates that life would not be worth living if one were morally inconsistent.

[12] As Brickhouse and Smith put it, ". . . Socrates, as Plato depicts him, is not a teacher at all; he is a seeker after moral wisdom who encourages others to engage in the same search. Socrates' interlocutors are invited to join him in the pursuit of wisdom, rather than to be passively 'instructed' in whatever Socrates has already learned himself" (1994, 4).

[13] Jurgen Mittelstrass, "On Socratic Dialogue," in *Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings.* Ed. Charles L. Griswold, JR. New York: Routledge, 1988. 127.

[14] I use the quotation marks to denote a recognition that Socrates does not seem to acknowledge what he does as having a method in the sense of a specific methodology. He says he "inquires," or "searches," or "examines," etc. As Vlastos (1983) notes, Socrates never names a special "method."

conversing and carrying out my private mission, I never grudge him the opportunity" (33a6-8). Socrates' "mission" is to assist the genesis of spiritual life, not to assert the revelation of absolute knowledge. Even in Plato's middle period, he gave voice to Socrates' role as an assistant. Socrates tells Theaetetus:

> My art of midwifery is in general like theirs; the only difference is that my patients are men, not women, and my concern is not with the body but with the soul that is in travail of birth . . . I am so far like the midwife that I cannot myself give birth to wisdom, and the common reproach is true, that, though I question others, I can myself bring nothing to light because there is no wisdom in me. (*Theaetetus.* 150b5-7)

Here, we have not only an allusion to Socrates' role as moral midwife who does not assert his own authority with respect to knowledge, but also an indication of the cooperative nature of Socratic philosophy. This cooperative element is the second factor in characterizing Socrates' philosophy as dialogic. Mittelstrass puts it this way: "In Socratic dialogue the beginnings of reason do not have their origins in reference to someone else's or to one's own authority. 'To orient oneself in thought (in dialogue) means finding together with others the place where reason resides' " (134). For Socrates, philosophy is not a conferring of knowledge from a privileged epistemic position; it is a shared venture, a pursuit of wisdom with others. For example, as Vlastos indicates, "when Laches offers himself to Socrates for instruction (189c) he is welcomed--not to have knowledge poured into him by someone else, but to join with Socrates in 'common counsel and search'. . . " (1991, 37). Socrates himself recognizes that unlike authorative discourse, dialogic philosophy requires that the participants in dialogue reach a consensus by themselves, since there is no external judge to adjudicate their discussion.[15] In the *Gorgias,* for example, Socrates distinguishes the kind of discussion he is having with Polus from those in the law courts. He tells Polus,

> you are trying to refute me orator-fashion, like those who fancy they are refuting in the law courts. For there one group imagines it is refuting the other when it produces many reputable witnesses to support its statements whereas the opposing party produces but one or none. But this method of proof is worthless toward discovering the truth . . . But if I cannot produce in you yourself a single witness in agreement with my views, I consider that I have accomplished nothing worth speaking of in the matter under debate; and the same, I think, is true for you also, if I, one solitary witness, do not testify for you. . . . (472e2-c3)

For Socrates the participants in dialogue must produce a "witness" in the other, as well as "testify" for the other (as we will see, this notion of a "witness" anticipates Bakhtin's concept of "innerly persuasive" discourse). For truth to obtain, there must be a mutual exchange between the partners in a dialogue without relinquishing to external authorities or "witnesses" for support. Now, it must be noted that this mutual exchange does not necessarily entail agreement. Indeed, *both* agreement and disagreement may be dialogical. As Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson point out, ". . . agreement , no less than disagreement, is a dialogic relation."[16] Truth is not always born out of dialogue. In fact, as Socrates explains, dialogue may fail to achieve its goal; it may engender annoyance or anger (*Apology.* 21d1, 21e1-3, 22e5-23a4, 23c8-11). Cooperation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the attainment of truth in the moral arena. Like the examined life, agreement is a goal, not a given. But the common goal is unattainable without mutual exchange. As Socrates says to Callicles,

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[15] A similar point is made by Jochen Mecke in "Dialogue in Narration (The Narrative Principle)," in *The Interpretation of Dialogue.* Ed. Tullio Maranhao. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990. 207.

> . . . I think we should all be contentiously eager to know what is true and what is false in the subject under discussion, for it is a common benefit that this be revealed to all alike. I will then carry the argument through in accordance with my own ideas, and if any of you believe that what I admit to myself is not the truth, you must break in upon it and refute me. For I do not speak with any pretence to knowledge, but am searching along with you, and so if there appears to be anything in what my opponent says, I shall be the first to yield to him.

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[16] Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, *Mikhail Bakhtin, Creation of a Prosaics.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990. 151.

(*Gorgias.* 505e3-506a6)

This passage reveals a number of interrelated characteristics of Socratic philosophy. It is part of a discussion of how one ought to live, a search for moral truth. We see that dialogue, discussion, question and answer are the adopted means for the attainment of this goal. We see Socrates' disavowal of any authorative knowledge, an implicit rejection of any prescribed doctrine. His stance is not as a teacher but as a fellow searcher. We see that mutual exchange, even if it is disagreement (a breaking in upon the other's claims), is required for progress in the common search. And we see a concern for the philosophical subject--the congruity of the person--for Socrates is not so much worried about what a person says qua proposition as what that reveals about what they "admit" to themselves. That is, Socrates often helps reveal to his interlocutors that their propositions entail consequences contrary to what they really think.

Notice also, then, that these characteristics of Socratic philosophy make it diametrically opposed to rhetoric.[17]

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[17] We may note that in the *Phaedrus* Plato does recoup some philosophical credibility for rhetoric by connecting it to medicine (or *pharmakon*), but the *Phaedrus* belongs to Plato's middle period, and therefore the views suggested there cannot be considered "Socratic philosophy." Similarly, philosophers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Stanley Rosen have recognized a positive view of rhetoric in Plato, but again, they refer to the *Phaedrus* as evidence for Plato's favorable discussion of rhetoric. See Stanley Rosen, *The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry.* New York: Routledge, 1988. 17, and Gadamer (1981, 119). I would also add that *if* philosophers were to argue that the Socrates of the early dialogues sometimes engaged in

Socrates himself pejoratively connects sophistry and rhetoric. In the *Gorgias,* Socrates tells Callicles that the rhetorician and the Sophist "are the same thing, or pretty nearly so . . . But you through ignorance consider the one thing, rhetoric, to be something very fine, and despise the other" (520a2-b1). Rhetoric, as taught and employed by the Sophists, was a means of winning arguments, especially in political matters. For the Sophists, the concern was with what was said qua proposition rather than what one really thought. Rhetoric was particularly insidious since it was not concerned with the truth, but was, for Socrates, a form or "part" of flattery (See, *Gorgias.* 464b2-466a8). Instead of an honest and cooperative search for the truth, rhetoric is designed to appeal to another's desire--to create an illusion--in order to establish the rhetorician's own view. Richard McKim explains:

> . . . Socrates always insists as a matter of elentic principle that his answerers be frank about what they believe. Plato repeatedly confronts him with answerers predisposed to approach the elenchus as a sophistic debate in which their objective is to protect their thesis, true or false, from refutation in order to avoid "losing." Thus they are tempted to answer Socrates' questions contrary to their beliefs if they feel that an honest answer might enable him to refute

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rhetoric, given our understanding of the Socratic notion of the philosophy as task, then this would simply be an example of Socrates temporarily falling away from or coming short of the philosophical task that he set for himself and others.

> their thesis and "win." Socrates . . . wants a cooperative inquiry in which each partner is grateful to the other for disabusing him of false beliefs[18]

Also, as McKim's comments suggest, Socratic philosophy can be beneficial for *both* parties involved in the dialogue. The disabusing of false beliefs is, for Socrates, an undertaking of mutual advantage. Dialogic exchange has the potential to improve both parties. For example, in the *Apology,* Socrates tells the jurors:

> If on the other hand I tell you that to let no day pass without discussing goodness and all the other subjects about which you hear me talking and examining both myself and others is really the very best thing that a man can do, and that life without this sort of examination is not worth living, you will be even less inclined to believe me. Nevertheless that is how it is, gentlemen, as I maintain, though it is not easy to convince you of it. (37e8-38a7)

Socrates recognizes that in talking to others he is simultaneously examining himself as well. Further, Socrates not only expects that his conversation with another will be valuable just for his interlocutor and himself; he also thinks it will be beneficial to all. Consider what he says to Critias: "And at this moment, I assure you, I pursue the argument chiefly for my own sake, and perhaps for the sake of my other friends. For would you not say that the discovery of things as they truly are is a good common to all mankind" (*Charmides.* 166d1-5).

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[18] Richard McKim, "Shame and Truth in Plato's *Gorgias,*" in *Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings.* (34-5). For further discussion on sophistry and rhetoric, see Barry Gower's "Introduction" and Malcolm Schofield's "Socrates Versus Protagoras" in *Socratic Questions.* See also, Rosen (1988. 47-53).

Clearly, Socrates trusts that he, himself, will benefit from the exchange, but he also feels that the exchange has the potential to benefit all mankind by revealing reality--"things as they truly are." Socrates is convinced of the efficacy for others of seeing reality. We may confidently infer that Plato recognized this sorting out of reality from illusion as part of his master's "mission," and as his analogy of the cave in Book VII of the *Republic* indicates, he certainly thought it was part of the task of his own philosophy. There, Plato represents the task of philosophy as taking people out of the darkness of a cave, where they see only shadows on a wall, into the sun where they see things as they are. This is a journey from illusion into reality. Iris Murdoch explains, "Plato pictures human life as a pilgrimage from appearance to reality. The intelligence, seeking satisfaction, moves from uncritical acceptance of sense experience and of conduct, to a more sophisticated and morally enlightened understanding."[19]

Now notice again Socrates' words to Callicles cited above; he says, "we should all be contentiously eager to know what is true and what is false in the subject under discussion . . ." (*Gorgias.* 505e4-5). This is another way for Socrates to express his mission: it is the task of separating what is true from what is false, what is real from what is illusion. This is a task that would also be taken up, in various degrees and ways, by Richardson, Eliot, and Austen. But as we have seen, Socrates is not merely interested in propositions or ideas but lives. In itself, separating reality from illusion *as an epistemological function* is no guarantee of *moral* improvement; however, since Socrates' "sifting" is of people's beliefs--of how they think they ought to live--his appeal is almost exclusively to beliefs they hold to be true. Invariably, Socrates is interested in revealing the discrepancies between reality and illusion on the moral plane. Unlike Plato, this is the primary focus of Socratic philosophy. He seeks to change people's minds by showing them the contradictions between their own beliefs: "Callicles himself will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be at variance with you throughout your whole life" (*Gorgias.* 482b5-7). Showing his interlocutors that their beliefs are inconsistent is one way that Socrates is able to help them reject the false and embrace the real. As Socrates' remarks to Callicles indicate, inconsistent beliefs will cause "variance" within the person. Inner turmoil is sure to attend those who are unable to be morally consistent in their own eyes. This is what modern psychologists would call a failure in "self-esteem," but Socrates sees it as a failure in self-knowledge. When Callicles admits to making a claim "To avoid inconsistency" (495a4), Socrates warns: "you can no longer properly investigate the truth with me, if you speak contrary to your opinions" (495a7-8). And when Callicles asks rhetorically whether or not Socrates agrees with his claims, Socrates replies, "He does not, and I think Callicles will not either when he comes to know himself aright" (495d6-e2). Similarly, in explicating *Gorgias* 472b6 and following, Brickhouse and Smith explain that "Socrates shows that Polus had failed to grasp what he, Polus, really believes about the value of justice . . . Socrates thinks that in 'refuting' Polus, Socrates shows Polus something Polus did not know about himself. For Polus, the benefit is self-knowledge" (18). For Socrates, self-knowledge is the reward of seeing reality aright.

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[19] Iris Murdoch, *The Fire and The Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. 2.

Socrates also helps his interlocutors separate reality from illusion by revealing the ridiculous or repulsive consequences which their beliefs entail. Brickhouse and Smith note, "If Socrates is to succeed in freeing persons from their pretense of wisdom regarding how best to live, he must . . . diminish the appeal of false moral beliefs" (12). When necessary, Socrates achieves this emancipation from illusion by the use of shame.[20] Like the inner turmoil that arises out of inconsistent beliefs, shame originates from an incongruity between our deepest held values or beliefs and our outward actions or pretensions. Socrates sometimes facilitates the feeling of shame in his interlocutors by bringing them to see that their claims entail conclusions that they, themselves, find objectionable. This, of course, diminishes the appeal of the false beliefs that led to those conclusions. Clearly, showing the repulsive consequences of asserted beliefs is closely connected--in method, purpose, and effect--to showing the inconsistency between beliefs, but shame is more likely to attend the former since practical conduct is more front and center. Shame compels one to face up to the moral consequences of one's actions. But not only is this the case for the characters in the dialogue, but it is also the case for readers of the dialogue. This brings me to a few final remarks concerning the reader and Socratic dialogue.

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[20] See for example, *Gorgias.* 461b4-7, where Polus admits Gorgias was "ashamed"; 482c4-d3, where Callicles says Polus was "shamed"; and 494d3-4, where Socrate's explicitly states of Gorgias and Polus that he "put them to shame."

Why did Plato write dialogues? Surely, one answer is that he understood that unlike discursive or systematic writing, the dialogue form best approximated the Socratic practice of philosophy. And as Plato knew from his own experience, this practice involved others in an immediate and compelling way. He understood that showing rather than telling was at the heart of Socratic philosophy. As Jurgen Mittelstrass writes,

> Dialogical knowledge can only be presented in a dialogue. Whereas textbooks and philosophical treatises have to be systematically comprehensive, the (philosophical) dialogue "transports" experiences with thinking and with a philosophical orientation in a way that is both exemplary and makes the universal concrete. (139)

Socratic philosophy was, by its very nature, *dramatic* and *dialogic.* Because of its dramatic quality, the dialogue is able to attract the reader's attention since, unlike "academic" philosophy, it depicts human beings--with their motives, vanity, failings, and misconceptions--in lived situations, discussing and debating issues of common human interest. Plato represents the concrete world of everyday experience, and this representation helps facilitate the reader's identification with that world. Thus, the address of one character to another becomes an address to the reader as well. By portraying concerns within ordinary situations, the reader is able to see himself in the text.

Moreover, the reader is also able to see the other in the text. The voice of the other addresses the reader as the reader situates himself through agreement or disagreement, vis a vis the voice of the other. But it is not merely critical appraisal of view-points that situates the reader; it is, even more, an invitation to self-examination that encourages the reader's active involvement with the text. Whether the voice of the other is that of Socrates or of one of his interlocutors, it is a voice that invites a dialogic response *of the person*. This is an invitation to join in the common search that is enacted before the reader. As Socrates' comments to Critias and Callicles indicate, the dialogues are designed for the common benefit of all mankind (*Charmides*. 166d1-5; *Gorgias*. 505e4-5), and the reader is, *de facto,* included in this group as an addressee. As Richard McKim writes, "Plato dramatizes them [Socrates' arguments] in order to communicate implicitly with us *about* them . . . "(34). In its dramatic address to the reader, then, Socratic dialogue again anticipates the novel--the genre, as Bakhtin intimates, that most fully develops the dialogic potentialities found in Socratic dialogue.

C. M. M. Bakhtin

Like D. H. Lawrence, Mikhail Bakhtin recognized a connection between philosophy and fiction. In particular, he saw the Socratic dialogue as the first step on the road to the fully polyphonic novel.[21] According to Bakhtin, the Socratic dialogue fell short of the polyphony of Dostoevsky and "remained a syncretic philosophical-artistic genre." However, he goes on to say that its basic characteristics "justify our considering this genre one of the starting points for that line of development in European artistic prose and the novel that leads to the work of Dostoevsky."[22] But not only is the Socratic dialogue a starting point for the polyphonic novel, it seems also to be an important precursor for Bakhtin's own thought. Bakhtin's reservations concerning Socratic dialogues notwithstanding, a significant number of Bakhtin's own notions closely resemble the salient features of Socratic philosophy.

First, like Socrates, Bakhtin is interested in moral matters. This is an aspect of Bakhtin's thought that has received little attention. As Morson and Emerson (1990) point out, the initial critical response to Bakhtin focused on the carnival aspects of his thought: freedom, license, clowning, and the rejection of authority and "official culture."[23] But Bakhtin's work as a whole shows a telling preponderance of concern with morality and personal responsibility. To quote Morson and Emerson (1990), "Judged by the entirety of his work, Bakhtin is, if anything, an apostle of constraints. For without constraints of the right sort, he believed, neither freedom nor creativity, neither unfinalizability nor responsibility, can be real" (43). As Morson and Emerson's remarks suggest, consistent throughout Bakhtin's works is a firm commitment to the moral dimension of human activity. Like Socrates, Bakhtin's primary interest lay in the field of actions rather than ideas per se. For Bakhtin and Socrates, one thinks in order to understand how to live a better life. And this, or course necessitates ethical evaluation; as Bakhtin notes, "Understanding cannot be separated from evaluation."[24] In fact, Bakhtin would never stray from his early conviction that "A philosophy of life can only be a moral philosophy."[25] He maintained this view consistently, and in his last jottings he wrote that "Our *thought* and our *practice,* [are] not technical but *moral* . . . ."[26]

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[21] As Morson and Emerson (1990) note, "Bakhtin's reference to the 'world symposium' suggests his approach to Socratic dialogues. In a rudimentary way, this genre goes some distance toward representing the world dialogically" (60).

[22] M. M. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.* Edited and Translated by Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. 112.

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[23] It must be noted, however, that Bakhtin's concern with moral matters is also very much in evidence in *Rabelais and His World*. For example, Bakhtin sees carnival laughter as a feature of a higher kind of morality; he writes, "Laughter purifies from dogmatism, from the intolerant and petrified; it liberates from fanaticism and pedantry, from fear and intimidation, from didacticism, naivete and illusion . . . ." M. M. Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World.* Translated by Helene Iswolsky. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. 123. See also the above where Bakhtin's moral tone is clear in repeatedly referring to aspects of carnival as defeating "false seriousness" and "preparing a new sober seriousness." 376, 380, 426, 439, 448, 453, 454.

[24] M. M. Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays.* Ed.

Similarly, like Socrates, Bakhtin rejects any systematization of ethics. Further, he gives credit to Socrates for the dialogic means of seeking the truth--a notion that would figure so prominently in his own thought. In *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* Bakhtin explains,

> At the base of the genre lies the Socratic notion of the dialogic nature of truth, and the dialogic nature of human thinking about truth. The dialogic means of seeking truth is counterposed to *official* monologism, which pretends to *possess a ready-made truth*, and it is also counterposed to the naive self-confidence of those people who think that they know something, that is, who think that they possess certain truths. (110)

Bakhtin's use of italics to emphasize "official" suggests that not all monologism is official. Bakhtin is intimating a distinction between kinds of monologism--those that pretend authority to prescribe truth--and those that may arise out of ignorance or

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Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austen: University of Texas Press, 1986.

[25] Originally from an unpublished manuscript. Cited in Clarke and Holquist, "The Influence of Kant in the Early Work of M. M. Bakhtin," in *Literary Theory and Criticism.* Ed. J Strelka. New York: Peter Lang, 1984. 306.

[26] *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays.*168.

naivety. The former or "official" kind of monologism is, in its philosophical presumptions, equivalent to systematic ethics. Like systematic ethics, official monologism claims or "pretends" to possess a truth which can be applied, like a formula or rule, to any given situation. Like Socrates, Bakhtin found such moral knowledge claims dubious. In moral matters, official monologism\systematic ethics privileges epistemic claims or propositions over actual lived situations. Both Socrates and Bakhtin seemed to recognize that particular moments are impoverished by general rules. As Bakhtin notes, such systematic thinking fails to recognize that morality concerns "the historical concreteness of the individual fact, and not . . . the theoretical truth of a proposition."[27] Bakhtin's strong aversion to what he called "theoretism" centered not only on linguistic or political theories, for example those of Saussure or Marx, but on any mode of thought that explains events in terms of specific rules they follow or by general structures that they exhibit.[28] This aversion to theoretism is very similar to Socrates' rejection of the Sophists.[29] They too were theorists in Bakhtin's sense in that they sought to apply preconceived formulas and rules--rhetoric and logic--not only to the realm of political art, but also to the area of public communication.

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[27] M. M. Bakhtin, "K filosofii postupka" [Toward a philosophy of the act]. In the 1984-85 issue of *Filosofia i sotsiologiia nauki i tekhniki*, a yearbook of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Moscow: Nauka, 1986, pp. 80-160. Cited in Morson and Emerson (1990), 177.

[28] See Morson and Emerson (1990), 49-50.

[29] It must be noted that Bakhtin's notion of "theoretism" is not equivalent to all theory. Tom Cohen, for example, makes the mistake of conflating the two when he writes, "Bakhtin opposes all 'theoretism' (read, that is, contemporary 'theory'). . . ." *Anti-Mimesis from Plato to Hitchcock.* Cambridge: Cambridge

This, of course, helps explain Bakhtin's clear and consistent repudiation of rhetoric. In *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* Bakhtin writes that "The Socratic dialogue is not a rhetorical genre" (109), and he distinguishes between the "stylistic unity" of "the epic, the tragedy, high rhetoric, the lyric" and genres which exhibit a "deliberate multi-styled and heterovoiced nature . . ." (108). Similarly, in *Rabelais and His World,* Bakhtin connects rhetoric with dogmatism and claims that ". . . Socrates, was directly linked with the carnival forms of antiquity that fertilized the Socratic dialogue and freed it from one-sided rhetorical seriousness" (121). Later in the same book, he pejoratively connects rhetoric to official speech (431), and argues that "We must therefore seek Rabelais' last word, not in the direct rhetoricized episodes of the novel [*Pantagruel*] in which speech has in most cases only one single meaning and is nearly always completely serious" (454). In *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* Bakhtin contrasts "The rhetorical argument and dialogue . . . victory or mutual understanding" (150). Here Bakhtin sees rhetoric as little more than verbal combat that undermines the dialogic potential of discourse. He goes on to

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University Press, 1994, 14. "Theoretism" is monological in character; it claims epistemic authority and finalized explanatory power. Theory that is open-ended or recognizes its own unfinalizability would not be seen as "theoretism" by Bakhtin.

explain that

> In rhetoric there is the unconditionally innocent and the unconditionally guilty; there is complete victory and destruction of the opponent. [And] the destruction of the opponent also destroys that very dialogic sphere where the word lives. (150)

Similarly, in *The Dialogic Imagination* Bakhtin defines rhetoric as "the art of argument" (339), and he notes that "rhetorical discourse tries to outwit possible retorts to itself . . ." (353). Here, we see that Bakhtin seems to share Socrates' understanding of rhetoric as basically a tool designed not for facilitating exchange but for winning arguments. Further, Bakhtin asserts that "All rhetorical forms [are] monologic in their compositional structure" (Ibid, 280), and later he comments more fully on the monologic limitations of rhetoric even in double-voiced discourse:

> Double-voiced discourse is very widespread in rhetorical genres, but even there--remaining as it does within the boundaries of a single language system--it is not fertilized by a deep-rooted connection with the forces of historical becoming that serve to stratify language, and therefore rhetorical genres are at best merely a distanced echo of this becoming, narrowed down to individual polemic . . . such poetic and rhetorical double-voicedness, cut off from any linguistic stratification . . . sufficient to a single and unitary language and to a consistently monologic style, can

> never be a fundamental form of discourse: it is merely a game, a tempest in a teapot. (325)

Bakhtin's description of rhetorical genres as "a distanced echo," "a game" and "a tempest in a teapot" is telling. Given his conception of rhetoric as essentially monologic, Bakhtin's description above suggests that he sees rhetoric as a kind of poor shadow of dialogism that plays on, or echoes, its surface qualities without drawing on the source of its real power to illuminate the understanding--"victory" (at the "game") or "mutual understanding" ("of becoming"). In *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,* Bakhtin makes a similar point: "The narrow understanding of dialogism as argument, polemics, or parody. These are the externally most obvious, but crude, forms of dialogism" (121). By this account we may infer that much of Bakhtin's antipathy toward rhetoric is derived from his belief that it stifled "becoming." That is, his comments suggest that he saw rhetoric as substituting a static appearance--winning an argument--for a dynamic reality: mutual understanding. And it is worth noting that Bakhtin asserted that "Even understanding itself is dialogic" (Ibid, 121), and that he conceived of it as, unlike rhetoric, fundamentally dynamic in character. In a passage that could well be a thinly veiled chiding of rhetoricians, Bakhtin explains that

> The person who understands must not reject the possibility of changing or even abandoning his already prepared viewpoints and positions. In the act of understanding, a struggle occurs that results in mutual change and

> enrichment. (Ibid, 142)

Now in all fairness, it must be clarified that Bakhtin certainly does not lump all rhetoric together; he does allow some forms of rhetoric a measure of utility insofar as they can give solutions to limited kinds of questions. Bakhtin writes,

> The rhetorical dispute is a dispute in which it is important to gain victory over the opponent, not to approach the truth. This is the lowest form of rhetoric. In all higher forms one can reach solutions to questions that are capable of temporal, historical solutions, but not to ultimate questions (where rhetoric is impossible). (Ibid, 512)

It is unclear precisely what Bakhtin has in mind when he refers to "temporal, historical solutions," but given our understanding of Bakhtin's overall position with respect to the monologic constitution of rhetoric, it seems safe to surmise that these "solutions" are limited and static. Such solutions would not address "ultimate questions" in that these questions have to do with human "becoming," and this requires a dialogical approach. Bakhtin's comments on the travel novel provide a useful analogy. He writes,

> The travel novel typically involves a purely spatial and static conception of the world's diversity. The world is a spatial contiguity of differences and contrasts, and life is an alteration of various contrasting conditions: success/failure, happiness/unhappiness, victory/defeat, and so on . . . Temporal categories are extremely poorly

> developed. In this type of novel, time in and of itself lacks any significance or historical coloring [historical dynamics] the world disintegrates into individual things, phenomena, and events that are simply contiguous or alternating . . . This novel does not recognize human emergence and development. (Ibid, 11)

Given these comments, it seems clear that Bakhtin sees serious limitations even for the "higher forms" of rhetoric.[30]

As suggested above, like Socrates and unlike the Sophists\rhetoricians, Bakhtin recognized the dialogic nature of truth. In *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* he writes, "Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born *between people* collectively searching for the truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction" (110). It must be noted that this conception of truth does not entail relativism. In discussing polyphony, Bakhtin explicitly repudiates relativism: ". . . the polyphonic approach has nothing in common with relativism (or with dogmatism)."[31] Bakhtin recognized the possibility of a unified (non-relative) truth that arises out of a meeting of various consciousnesses:

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[30] Predictably, Bakhtin's critique of rhetoric has not gone unchallenged. Paul de Man's essay "Dialogue and Dialogism," although not a frontal assault on Bakhtin's critique of rhetoric, does cast dialogism as a "formal method" that really only shows a "desire" for dialogue. See, Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, eds. *Rethinking Bakhtin.* Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1989. In "The Ideology of Dialogue: The Bakhtin/De Man (Dis)Connection" (*Cultural Critique,* Spring, 1996), Tom Cohen asserts that "ignoring the rhetorical side of Bakhtin's performance has been costly," and that "Bakhtinian 'dialogue' may be read as a wildly agonistic scene of power, positioning, deception, seduction . . ."(44). Cohen's argument (like de Man's) offers *very* little analysis of Bakhtin's texts; rather, it basically amounts to an *ad hominem* attack on Bakhtin's American translators and popularizers, whom he describes as "neoconservative[s]," that are connected to "mimetic" and "fascist" ideologies, and who are trying "to control interpretive or ideological options" (48).

For an attempt by rhetoricians to appropriate Bakhtin's work for rhetoric, see *Rhetoric Society Quarterly,* Vol 22, #4, Fall 1992, which published papers from "Bakhtin and Rhetorical Criticism: A Symposium."

> It is quite possible to imagine and postulate a unified truth that requires a plurality of consciousnesses, one that cannot in principle be fitted into the bounds of a single consciousness, one that is, so to speak, by its very nature *full of event potential* and is born at a point of contact among various consciousnesses.[32]

For Bakhtin, a recognition of the dialogic nature of truth was essential for defeating monological forms of thought such as theoretism. And again, Bakhtin saw the germ of this recognition in Socrates: "Overcoming the monologic model of the world. The rudiments of this in Socratic dialogue."[33] But not only did Bakhtin understand Socrates' basic insight, he refined its implications and augmented its applications. Bakhtin also felt that in comparison to Dostoevsky's "internally dialogized world," Socratic dialogue "was mere dialogue, little more than an external form of dialogism."[34] For Bakhtin, the dialogic nature of truth *and of existence itself* would become one of the central pillars of his thought, and this pillar would be subsumed under the encompassing notion of dialogue.

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[31] *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.* 69.

[32] Ibid. 81.

[33] *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.* 292.

Now as we have seen, for Socrates, the examined life is an unfinished task that requires daily spiritual exercises, and for Bakhtin, like Socrates, this daily task can only be conducted in dialogue with others. Indeed, the entirety of Bakhtin's work is enlivened and regulated by the notion of dialogue; dialogue is the life-blood of his thinking. But Bakhtin's concept of dialogue bears much more semantic weight than the idea of dialogue as mere verbal exchange or "compositionally expressed dialogue."[35] Of course we usually think of dialogue as conversation between two people, but for Bakhtin, dialogue entails a special kind of *relation*, one in which there is a dialogic harmony between distinct elements; he wrote "Unity not as an innate one-and-only, but as a dialogic *concordance* of unmerged twos or multiples."[36] Michael Holquist explains Bakhtin's position as follows:

> But what gives dialogue its central place in dialogism is precisely the kind of *relation* conversations manifest, the conditions that must be met if any exchange between different speakers is to occur at all. That relation is most economically defined as one in which differences--while still remaining different--serve as the building blocks of

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[34] Ibid. 291.

[35] See Morson and Emerson (1990), 49.

[36] *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.* 289.

> simultaneity . . . the mutuality of differences makes dialogue Bakhtin's master concept, for it is present in exchange at all levels . . . .[37]

Now we need to understand that Bakhtin uses the term "dialogue" in two distinct senses.[38] As Holquist's remarks intimate, in the first sense of dialogue, all discourse is dialogic since it is necessarily involved in some way, shape, or form in exchange. More specifically, all discourse is orientated to some other discourse, either as a rejoinder to some other discourse or as an invitation to response. In *The Dialogic Imagination,* Bakhtin writes that,

> The dialogic orientation of discourse is a phenomenon that is, of course, a property of *any* discourse. It is the natural orientation of any living discourse . . . The word is born in a dialogue as a living rejoinder within it; the word is shaped

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[37] *Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World.* New York: Routledge. 1990. 40-41.

[38] Morson and Emerson argue that "Bakhtin used the term *dialogue* in at least three distinct senses . . . " (130). However, I feel their first sense of dialogue, according to which every utterance is by definition dialogic, may be reasonably subsumed under their third sense of dialogue as a "Global Concept"--a view of truth and the world. Similarly, their requirement that the first sense involves addressivity, a turning to some person, could be reasonably subsumed under their second sense of dialogue, according to which some utterances are dialogical and others monological. Hence, my analysis of Bakhtin's use of dialogue conflates Morson and Emerson's first and third senses, but sees the notion of addressivity as belonging to the dialogical aspect of their second sense. See Emerson and Morson (1990), 59-62; 130-133; 146-149.

> in dialogic interaction with an alien word that is already in the object . . . The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, orientated toward a future answer word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the answer's direction. (279-80)

Further, all utterances are thought to be necessarily dialogic since human life itself is dialogic. For Bakhtin, human life is dialogic since the very possibility of consciousness rests on otherness. Human consciousness is not an autonomous, unified whole; it is born, grows, and exists in relation, in constant responsive interaction, between the self and the other. This is a rejection of the Hegelian collectivist view which sees the individual ego or consciousness as a working out or appearance of the universal ego or spirit. It is closer to the Kantian view that sees a necessary interaction--a dialogue Bakhtin calls it--between the mind and the world, or between spirit and matter. Unlike Kant, however, Bakhtin rejects any a priori transcendental category that shapes perception in a repeatable manner; rather, he is interested in the unique, unrepeatable elements of acts and contexts that give meaning to a particular experience. Dialogue then is the epistemic paradigm for human life.

In this first sense of dialogue, there can be no nondialogic or monologic utterances since it is the nature of consciousness to be in constant interaction, conflict, and relation with other consciousnesses, utterances, and conditions. Dialogue in this sense is, by its very nature, dialogical; whether in a conversation or a novel, any utterance is never in and of itself original or autonomous since every utterance is, in some measure, a response to being addressed in some way. Bakhtin explains,

> The dialogic nature of consciousness, the dialogic nature of human life itself. The single adequate form for *verbally expressing* authentic human life is the *open-ended dialogue*. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in a dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium.[39]

By this account, even thought or "inner speech," is a kind of dialogue with oneself. So the structure of being, with its myriad of aspects whether of language or of thought, is dialogical. As Bakhtin writes in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,*

> Dialogic relationships are a much broader phenomenon than mere rejoinders in a dialogue laid out compositionally in a text; they are an almost universal phenomenon, permeating all human speech and all relationships and manifestations of human life--in general, everything that has meaning and significance. (40)

This interrelation between words in language or people in conversation indicates a reality that consists of a meeting of simultaneous differences. But again, this meeting is not mere interaction, verbal or otherwise; it is not reducible to any theoretical formulation that could verify or predict its occurrence; it is never finished in the sense that we could say Newtonian physics is finished or complete. Any theoretical assertion of finality would entail a reification of the dialogic nature of existence: "Reified (materializing, objectified) images are profoundly inadequate for life and for discourse."[40] For Bakhtin, the event of existence is an ongoing dialogue. As Bakhtin puts it in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, "The very being of man (both external and internal) is the *deepest communion. To be* means *to communicate"* (287).

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[39] *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.* 293.

Now, in the second sense of dialogue, there may be both dialogic and monologic utterances. Language that is dialogical in the second sense entails a responsiveness to or a recognition of the other as having meaning. To fail to respond to or recognize the other is monological. To be dialogic entails a semantic relationship, a convergence of meaning. This convergence may take the form of agreement or disagreement, but it will not take the form of indifference. In this sense, there is a recognition that what has been exchanged has meaning. Thus, dialogue that is dialogic in the second sense is an essentially human, and, therefore, a broadly social relation. Consequently, this dialogue entails a focus on the relation with the other as a subject whose address has meaning for me (as another separate subject). This kind of dialogue manifests the more general dialogue of the first kind, but it occurs by different means on different levels, always with an eye to the meaning of the other. Although all the levels in this kind of dialogue are conceived by the relation between self and other, the other is not necessarily contained in one human being at one specific time and in one specific place. The other may be a word, a look, a social convention, a tradition that addresses me in a way that has meaning for me. Thus, some utterances exploit the dialogic nature of language to the fullest, but others deny or reduce the dialogic nature of language by failing to address an other.

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[40] Ibid. 293.

One way to fail to address another dialogically is to espouse what Bakhtin calls "a ready-made truth"; a truth that is not born out of dialogue between two subjects; a truth that comes down from a position of authority rather than across from a position of equality. So, in the second sense, there may be dialogic or monologic relations between persons. To espouse a ready-made truth would be to enter a monological relation with the other since it would be to treat the other as an object that receives, rather than a subject worthy of mutual exchange and recognition. Like Bakhtin's notion of explanation, the espousal of a ready-made truth entails a failure to see and comprehend another alien consciousness and his world--another subject with his own perceptions, views, and truths. With respect to authors, for example, Bakhtin writes:

> To see and comprehend the author of a work means to see and comprehend another, alien consciousness and its world,

> that is, another subject ("Du"). With *explanation* there is only one consciousness, one subject; with *comprehension* there are two consciousnesses and two subjects. There can be no dialogic relationship with an object, and therefore explanation has no dialogic aspects (except formal, rhetorical ones). Understanding is always dialogic to some degree.[41]

This failure to see and comprehend another as a full and equal consciousness is a kind of bad faith, treating another as an object. Similarly, much of Bakhtin's immense regard for Dostoevsky derived from his apprehension that the affirmation of another as a subject is the hallmark of Dostoevsky's thought: "To affirm someone else's "I" not as an object but as another subject--this is the principle governing Dostoevsky's worldview."[42]

But viewed from another perspective, we may describe this failure to fully recognize another as an autonomous, equal consciousness as a collapse in *addressivity.* Although Bakhtin argued that any utterance involves an addressee, he recognized levels of address. For example, in *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,* he notes that "The choice of *all* language means is made by the speaker under varying degrees of influence from the addressee and his anticipated response" (99). This suggests that Bakhtin saw the nature of an address as, in some measure, affected by the speaker's responsiveness to her addressee or audience. Bakhtin makes a similar point a little earlier: "the most complex and ultra-composite work of a secondary genre as a whole (viewed as a whole) is a single integrated real utterance that has a real author and real addressees whom this author perceives and imagines"(Ibid, 98-99). Hence, for Bakhtin, real (dialogical) address involves a particular attitude or sensitivity toward another's reception of what is being said. As he puts it in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* "Dialogic relations presuppose a communality of the object of intention (directionality)" (292). Bakhtin also explains that "addressivity, the quality of turning to someone, is a constitutive feature of the utterance; without it the utterance does not and cannot exist" (*Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,*99). Although Bakhtin is primarily concerned here with speech genres, a dialogical notion of affirmation seems ingrained in his thinking. So seen in this light, the failure to turn to someone as an equal subject worthy of respect as a real, autonomous consciousness is a failure in dialogical address. Again, such a failure in address constitutes a denial of the other, and is, therefore, the paradigm of a monological approach to the world. This notion of affirmation of another as an equal consciousness as integral to dialogical address can be seen in what is probably Bakhtin's most succinct delineation of the concept of monologism. In an appendix entitled "Towards a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book," which was added to the 1963 Soviet edition of *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* , Bakhtin writes:

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[41] *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays.* 111.

[42] *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.* 10.

> Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another *I* with equal rights (*thou*). With a monologic approach (in its extreme or pure form) *another person* remains wholly and merely an *object* of consciousness, and not another consciousness. No response is expected from it . . . Monologue is finalized and deaf to the other's response, does not expect it and acknowledge it in any *decisive* force. Monologue manages without the other, and therefore to some degree materializes all reality. Monologue pretends to be the *ultimate word.* It closes down the represented world and represented persons. (292-293)

So the failure to acknowledge another consciousness--to expect no response--is a kind of failure to address them properly. We might characterize this failure as merely talking *to* someone rather than *with* someone. Bakhtin writes, "The consciousnesses of other people cannot be perceived, analyzed, defined as objects or as things--one can only *relate to them dialogically.* To think about them means to *talk with them; otherwise they immediately turn to us their objectivized side* : they fall silent, close up . . . ."[43] Hence, a dialogical address necessitates a certain *orientation* towards an other that allows them their full measure of responsiveness--an orientation that does not deny another consciousness its "equal rights and equal responsibilities." Conversely, we need to be orientated toward the other, since, as Bakhtin often reiterates, the other is absolutely necessary for our experience of human life. As he writes in "Author And Hero In Aesthetic Activity,"

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[43] Ibid. 68.

> It is only in the other human being, in fact, that a living, aesthetically (and ethically) convincing experience of human finitude is given to me, the experience of a human being as a delimited empirical object . . . In the unitary world of cognition, I cannot find a place for myself as a unique *I-for-myself* in distinction to all other human beings without exception--past, present, and future--as *others* for me.[44]

And although Bakhtin never explores the nature of this orientation much beyond what we have already considered, we may note that his comments on monologism above suggest his connection to Martin Buber's dialogical thinking. Bakhtin was most certainly influenced by Buber, but as I have intimated, he never pursued the quintessential focus of Buber's thought, in particular his well-known I-Thou formulation of relation and his apprehension of "genuine dialogue."[45] Indeed, this lack of analysis with respect to the nature and manifestation of the I-Thou relation and of genuine dialogue is, perhaps, one of the shortcomings of Bakhtin's dialogical imagination. Sensing the advantages of augmenting Bakhtin's thought with some of Buber's concepts, Nina Perlina concludes that "The inclusion of Buber's 'relation to the *Du*' into the framework of Bakhtin's dialogic imagination amplifies the multidirectional aspects of Bakhtin's theory; it reveals the latent harmonizing and unifying power of polyphony."[46] Furthermore, students of Bakhtin have given only superficial attention both to these aspects of Bakhtin's thought and to the potentialities of extending his points in light of Buber's work.[47] Consequently, in order to augment Bakhtin's account of these special kinds of relation, I will briefly turn to

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[44] In M. M. Bakhtin, *Art and Answerability.* Ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunow. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990. 36-37.

[45] For further discussion of Bakhtin's familiarity with and connection to the writings of Martin Buber, see Nina Perlina's "Bakhtin and Buber: Problems of Dialogic Imagination," *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* Vol. 9, No. 1 (Fall, 1984) 13-28. In citing Bakhtin, Perlina notes that "Bakhtin intended to introduce 'dialogicality as a special form of interaction among autonomous and equally-signifying consciousness' (*Estetika*

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309)" (23).

[46] Ibid, 25.

[47] For example, Emerson and Morson (1990) state in passing that dialogue for Bakhtin "is different from Buber's I-Thou relation" (49). Similarly, In *The Dialogics of Critique: M. M Bakhtin and the Theory of Ideology* (1992), Michael Gardiner alludes only twice to the I-Thou relation when he refers to the "subject-subject relation" in Bakhtin's hermeneutics (105), and when he writes "Bakhtin's intention is . . . to facilitate the mutual recognition of 'I' and 'Thou' through dialogue and moral persuasion . . . "(178). In *Mikhail Bakhtin: Between Phenomenolgy and Marxism* (1994, 33-35), Michael Bernard-Donals does give an account of dialogue and dialogism in terms of the notions of "I-for-myself" and "I-for-the-other", but his focus is on the problem of exotopy raised by Paul de Man in *The Resistance to Theory* (1986). He concludes that "dialogue does not solve the problem of exotopy" or the "radical exteriority or heterogeneity" of the other, and so he fails to consider that Buber's notion of I-Thou could be invoked as an answer to the problem of exotopy.

the writings of Martin Buber himself.

D. Martin Buber

Martin Buber focused more on what was to become the second sense of dialogue for Bakhtin. Unlike Bakhtin's first sense of dialogue, Buber did not see dialogue as a "model of the world." Buber was most interested in what made for authentic human relation with respect to dialogue. In a conversation with the American psychologist Carl R. Rogers, Buber remarked, ". . . what interests me more than anything: human effective dialogue."[48] Buber saw the *longing* for relation as primary and innate, and he asserted that relation itself is a necessary condition for full and authentic human life--"Human life and humanity come into being in genuine meetings" (*The Knowledge of Man,* 59). Similarly, Buber's dialogical philosophy did, like Bakhtin's, have a basic epistemological structure that offered a dichotomous or relational account of reality. Buber's *I-Thou/I-It* dichotomy, which parallels Kant's noumenal/ phenomenal distinction, suggests an epistemology similar to Bakhtin (and Socrates') notion that knowledge is a relational matter.[49] Indeed, it is not surprising that Buber saw Socrates as an exemplary teacher of dialogic relations. In *I and Thou,* his most celebrated and well-known book, Buber writes,

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[48] Martin Buber, "Appendix Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl R. Rogers," in *The Knowledge of Man.* Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc, 1988. 165.

[49] It must be noted, however, that Buber did want to split reality into the phenomenal and noumenal realms as did Kant. Rather, he begins with man as having a two-fold movement: "distance" and "relation."

> But how beautiful and legitimate the vivid and emphatic I of Socrates sounds! It is the I of infinite conversation, and the air of conversation is present in all its ways, even before his judges, even in the final hour in prison. This I lived in that relation to man which is embodied in conversation. It believed in the actuality of men and went out toward them. (115-116)

But, as is the case with Bakhtin, it would be erroneous to speak of Buber as espousing a systematic philosophy. Like Bakhtin and Socrates, Buber is primarily interested in the relations between human beings rather than in the relations between ideas.

It is probably, in some measure, because Buber did not see dialogue as a fundamental structural principle of the world that he thought "genuine dialogue," in Bakhtin's second sense of dialogue as dialogical, was rare and fleeting. Similarly, in *I and Thou* Buber writes that "Every You in the world is doomed by its nature to become a thing or at least to enter into thinghood again and again" (69, 147). For Buber, the authentic I-Thou relationship deteriorates into an I-It relationship when the other becomes a mere object for us. This is a break from the mutuality of recognition of subject to subject into a state in which the other becomes merely an object of experience or an instrument of use. As Buber writes,

> The man who has required an I and says I-It assumes a

> position before things but does not confront them in the current of reciprocity. He bends down to examine particulars under the objectifying magnifying glass of close scrutiny, or he uses the objectifying telescope of distant vision to arrange them as mere scenery. In his contemplation he isolates them without any feeling for the exclusive or joins them without any world feeling. (*I and Thou,* 80-81)

Buber also feels that this I-It relation is much more prevalent in human affairs, and that most dialogue is, therefore, "an underworld of faceless spectres of dialogue" (*Between Man and Man,* 28). It must be understood, however, that Buber does not conflate genuine dialogue with the I-Thou relation. On Buber's account, the I-Thou relation may occur between a person and a tree, a person and an animal, or even a person and an inanimate object. The I-Thou relationship is one directness, openness, and presence. Let me explain. The relation would be direct in that the I would not consider an other through conceptual means of analysis or comparison, and so forth. It would be open insofar as the I would meet the other in its own uniqueness and particularity. It would be present in its being there before the I, not as an object of contemplation (aesthetic or otherwise), but as a present subject of concrete being. The I-Thou relation is unmediated--whether by thought, or desire, or feeling. Buber explains that

> The relation to the You is unmediated. Nothing conceptual intervenes between I and You, no prior knowledge and no

> imagination; and memory itself is changed as it plunges from particularity to wholeness. No purpose intervenes between I and You, no greed and no anticipation; and longing itself is changed as it plunges from the dream into appearance. Every means is an obstacle. Only where all means have disintegrated encounters occur.
> (*I and Thou,* 62-63)

On the other hand, genuine dialogue entails the *desire for mutuality* with another human being (although this may be present to some degree with animals). There is a responsiveness or a kind of reciprocity in genuine dialogue that may be absent in the I-Thou relationship.[50] In genuine dialogue, each recognizes the uniqueness of the other, and without trying to limit the other, seeks to affirm the otherness of the other and be affirmed by her. Like Bakhtin's catholic notion of the other as that which meaningfully addresses me, Buber affirms that a look, a gesture, or the word of another may constitute sufficient mutual address to permit genuine dialogue. As Buber puts it, "There is genuine dialogue--no matter whether spoken or silent--where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the *intention* [italics mine] of establishing a living mutual relation . . . " (*Between Man and Man,* 37). So, genuine dialogue would not include an I-Thou relationship, and an I-Thou relationship would not necessarily entail genuine dialogue. They are two different modes of relation, but one may follow the other at any time.

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[50] A clarification is in order here. Buber insists there is *a kind* of reciprocity in the I-Thou relation, but he never explains the precise nature of this reciprocity; he does, however, suggest that this reciprocity is not a matter of consciousness but an ontological relation of pure being. In *I and Thou,* for example, in referring to this relation to a tree, he states "One should not try to dilute the meaning of the relation: relation is reciprocity. Does the tree then have a consciousness, similar to our own? I have no experience of that" (58). Later, he explains that "It is part of our concept of the plant that it cannot react to our actions upon it, that it cannot 'reply.' Yet this does not mean that we meet with no reciprocity at all in this sphere. We find here not the deed of posture of an individual being but a reciprocity of being itself--a reciprocity that has nothing except being" (173).

Now, given Buber's concern with genuine dialogue, it is not surprising that he shared Bakhtin's fundamental regard for the other. Since genuine dialogue (in Bakhtin's second dialogical sense) is necessary for full and authentic human life, the role of the other is crucial: "Genuine conversation, and therefore every actual fulfilment of relation between men, means acceptance of otherness" (*The Knowledge of Man,* 59). Similarly, it is only through the other that one may realize the inner potential of the self: "for the inmost growth of the self is . . . accomplished . . . in the relation between the one and the other . . . " (Ibid, 61). Conversely, Buber points out that it is also through relations with the other that one realizes community and humanity: "Man exists anthropologically not in his isolation, but in the completeness of the relation between man and man; what humanity is can be properly grasped only in vital reciprocity" (Ibid, 74). Further, like Bakhtin, Buber believed that one's affirmation of the other does not presuppose agreement with the other, but rather an acceptance of the other as "the very one that he is," as the personal bearer of a conviction which has grown out of his definite being. Thus, like Bakhtin, Buber would affirm the right of each other to the full expression of his voice. In fact, Bakhtin's acute attention to the voice of others is one of the most trenchant features of his thought. This will lead me to a brief examination of two other concepts in Bakhtin's writing that will figure in my consideration of unification of philosophy and fiction in the British novel, but first I want to qualify my use of the terms "dialogical" and "genuine dialogue."

For the sake of clarity, I will employ the term "dialogical" primarily in the sense in which Buber uses it, and in the first sense of dialogue for Bakhtin. As Buber writes, "the sphere of the interhuman is one in which a person is confronted by another. We call its unfolding the dialogical" (*The Knowledge of Man,* 65). Thus, dialogical refers to that condition where there is an unfolding, on some level, of one being confronted by an other. This other may be an object, an idea, a glance, a word, or a statement, and so forth. It may include an I-Thou relationship; it may not. The dialogical does require a discovery of the other and an exchange with the other, but not necessarily an affirmation of the otherness of the other. The dialogical entails a conversation with the other, but not necessarily a full meeting of subject to subject. The dialogical entails the interaction, juxtaposition, or even struggle of characters, ideas, words, or traditions that have meaning and, sometimes the potential to transform one's life. Thus, it is the unfolding of the sphere where epistemic concerns about the nature of the self and the other are invited, investigated, or developed.

I will employ the term "genuine dialogue" in the sense most used by Buber, but compatible with Bakhtin's second sense of dialogue. By this account, genuine dialogue entails a recognition of the otherness of the other as a full and autonomous subject. It entails a reciprocity in address, a responsiveness to the other. Further, it is an entering into of a mutual relation with the other that entails an acceptance of the other "as the very one that he is" as Buber put it. Genuine dialogue is an opening of oneself to the other, an affirmation of the other wherein one reveals the significance of the other to the other by a willingness to address him in an open, honest, and spontaneous manner. The participant in genuine dialogue *desires* a reciprocity or meeting based on this attitude. Again, this may come about through a look or gesture, and not necessarily through conversation. Genuine dialogue regards differences as mutual invitations to development; it does not deny differences, but gives closest attention to them as a source of new possibilities for each. Genuine dialogue is a goal, then, and not a given. For Buber and (and Bakhtin) it is rare and fleeting, but absolutely necessary for full and authentic humanity. It is also a condition under which truth--especially moral truth--may be arrived at between people. Now, we will see how the novelists under consideration explore and express this goal, but to do so requires attention not merely to the explicit manifestations of genuine dialogue, but to elements like the implicit complexities of language and the subtle nuances of voice--to the metalinguistic features of language--that help give the novels in question their dialogical orientation. This again is the terrain of Mikhail Bakhtin's thinking, so to him I return.

One aspect of Bakhtin's notion of dialogism that requires further explication is his concept of an utterance's "task" or "aim." As Emerson and Morson (1990) explain, "Roughly speaking an utterance's tasks are the complex of purposes it is designed to serve" (146). The task or the aim of the utterance determines, more or less, the monologic or dialogic nature of the utterance. We may recall how the attitude of the speaker toward the addressee determines the monologic or dialogic nature of the utterance on the ontic level of relation; here we are concerned with the kinds of words that determine the monologic or dialogic bearing of the utterance on the semantic level of discourse. In order to understand Bakhtin's characterization of "task" or "aim" it most helpful to look at his classification of types of discourse. In *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* Bakhtin divides novelistic discourse into three general categories:

I. Direct, unmediated discourse directed exclusively toward its referential object, as an expression of the speaker's ultimate semantic authority

II. Objectified discourse (discourse of a represented person)

> III. Discourse with an orientation toward someone else's discourse (double-voiced discourse) (199)

Bakhtin is careful to explain that this classification is not exhaustive or static and that it "is of course somewhat abstract in character" (199). He explains that

> A concrete discourse may belong simultaneously to different varieties and even types . . . interrelationships with another person's discourse . . . are of a dynamic and not a static character: the inter-relationship of voices in discourse may change drastically, unidirectional words may turn into vari-directional ones, internal dialogization may become stronger or weaker, a passive type may be activized and so forth. (199)

Bakhtin further subdivides the second and third categories, with special attention to and elaboration of the third category--double-voiced discourse. Essentially, Bakhtin's discussion of discourse comes down to a consideration of single-voiced words and double-voiced words, and it is finally active double-voiced words that most interest him since they manifest the most intricate sorts of "internal dialogization" and correlatively the least amount of "objectification of the other's discourse."[51] As Bakhtin put it, "The chief subject of our investigation, one could even say its chief hero, will be *double-voiced discourse,* which inevitably arises under conditions of dialogic interaction . . . " (185). In active double-voiced discourse, the word of the other permeates the discourse as a possible rejoinder; active double-voiced discourse "cringes" in the face of an unspoken reply; it speaks with a consciousness, a "sideward glance," towards an other's response. The task of a work involves its consciousness of the other's word, and, hence, a reduction in the authority of the speaker or the author. The "task" or "aim" of a work, then--its monologic or dialogic bearing--may be revealed by ascertaining the scope and degree of its double-voicedness. So, the levels of double-voiced discourse in the works of Richardson, Austen, and Eliot will serve as one of features by which to map the degree of dialogism in their novels.

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[51] For Bakhtin's detailed discussion of the kinds of discourse, see *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* (181-269). See also Emerson and Morson (1990) for an adaptation of Bakhtin's chart of discourse on page 199 of the above, and for an excellent elucidation of his discourse types (146-149).

Two other important concepts in Bakhtin's writing that require brief consideration are polyphony and heteroglossia. They are also two often misunderstood concepts, especially polyphony. Morson and Emerson (1990) remind us that ". . . Bakhtin never explicitly defines polyphony" (230), and this, coupled with his fragmentary method of exposition, has led to numerous misunderstandings of the concept.[52] As Emerson and

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[52] For example, in "Introduction: Bakhtin and cultural theory," in *Bakhtin and cultural theory.* Eds. Ken Hirschkop and David Shepard. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989, 11, Ken Hirschkop attributes to Bakhtin a "relevant confusion" in his concept of polyphony. Hirschkop writes, "Two different programmes are thereby conflated under the name of polyphony: the separation of the author's voice from those of the characters . . . and the representation of the linguistic stratification of a society." Hirschkop's evidence for the

Morson (1990) further point out, "polyphony is not even roughly synonymous with heteroglossia. The latter term describes the diversity of speech styles in language, the former has to do with the position of the author in the text" (232). Heteroglossia denotes those forces or conditions--psychological, social, historical etc.,--that give an utterance its unique meaning and status at the place and time it is uttered; heteroglossia ensures the unsystematic alterations that occur in language over time.

Polyphony denotes the organization of language (especially in the novel) such that the author or narrator renounces the right to the last word or final totalizing perspective that guarantees epistemic authority. Polyphony involves a dialogue between characters and between world-views; it grants full and equal authority to the words of the other insofar as they constitute an

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conflation is Bakhtin's connection of the concept of "double-voicedness" with "socio-linguistic heteroglossia," but not only is Hirschkop's formulation of the first "program" (separation of author and character's voice) a somewhat narrow simplification of polyphony, he fails to recognize that double-voiced discourse is not a homogeneous concept, that there are gradations of double-voicedness. Bakhtin distinguishes between double-voiced discourse that draws on the heteroglot richness of language and double-voiced discourse that remains "within the boundaries of a single hermetic and unitary language system, without any underlying fundamental socio-linguistic orchestration . . . ." *The Dialogic Imagination,* 325. Bakhtin sees the first kind of double-voicedness as polyphonic and the second as monologic. See, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* (72-3) and *The Dialogic Imagination,* (324-7). Morson and Emerson (1990) formulate this distinction as "Passive double-voiced words," which include stylization and parody, and "Active double-voiced words" which display "the most complex kinds of 'Internal dialogization' . . . " (147).

impenetration of voices rather than the imposition of a single voice. Bakhtin sees Dostoevsky as the prime exemplar of the polyphonic novel and writes that "*A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky's novels*" (*PDP,* 6). Further, Bakhtin explains that "Dostoevsky's major heroes are, by the very nature of his creative design, *not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own directly signifying discourse*" (*PDP,* 7). Although the characters are created by an author, once they exist, they take on a life of their own to some extent, and escape the author's full control and absolute knowledge of all their future words. Two elements seem crucial for the constitution of a polyphonic novel. The first is a dialogic sense of truth; the second is the special situatedness of the author in order to envisage and convey that truth.[53] Suffice it to say that the works of Richardson, Austen, and Eliot display much more polyphony than has been generally recognized.

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[53] See Morson and Emerson (1990), 234.

Chapter Two

Samuel Richardson's *Pamela*: Dialogical Rudiments in the Epistolary Novel

A. Epistolarity

By now the sources and history of the epistolary novel have been well documented.[54] The sources of and influences on Richardson's fiction in particular have been traced to aspects of seventeenth and early eighteenth-century domestic drama, conduct books, familiar letters, and spiritual autobiography. However, very little attention has been given to the dialogic features of Richardson's novels. Janet Gurkin Altman defines "epistolarity" as "the use of the letter's formal properties to create meaning" (4), but in examining the dialogic orientation and philosophical aspects of Richardson's *Pamela,* my interest will lie not so much in the formal properties of the letter as on Richardson's use of the "genre not in its formalistic sense, but as a zone and a field of valorized perception, as a mode of representing the world" (*The Dialogic Imagination,* 28). Part of Richardson's "mode"--the use of letters--entails a kind of dialogue between the self and the self, and the self and the other that manifests a dialogic conception of the truth and a dialogic emergence of the subject. By the same token, it is also important to note that the very form of epistolary fiction--the letter--lends itself to a dialogic interaction between characters in a way that is virtually inaccessible to other kinds of narrative form. As Mikhail Bakhtin rightly noted in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* "A characteristic feature of the letter is an acute awareness of the interlocutor, the addressee to whom it is directed" (250). Richardson himself remarked that his fiction was "A Species of Writing . . . that may be called new,"[55] and in characterizing one of the primary features of the epistolary form, he wrote that "Ye World is not enough used to this way of writing, to the moment. It knows not that in the minutiae lie often the unfoldings of the Story, as well as of the heart; & judges of an action undecided, as if it were absolutely decided. . . ."[56] It is primarily this "writing to the moment" that enables Richardson to convey to the reader the complexities of dynamic (undecided) subjectivity and psychological realism in his characters. The importance of external actions and events is reduced, while the inner workings of the heart and mind are rendered with their conscious and unconscious designs, analyses, and reflections. This clear emphasis on insight over incident is one of the hallmarks of Richardson's fiction. Ian Watt put his finger on this feature of Richardson's novels; he writes,

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[54] For some ground breaking studies on the origins of epistolary fiction see Helen S. Hughes' study "English Epistolary Fiction before *Pamela."* In *The Manly Anniversary Studies in Language and Literature,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1923, and Robert A. Day's *Told in Letters: Epistolary Fiction before Richardson.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966. For more recent studies see Janet Gurkin Altman's *Epistolarity: Approaches to a Form.* Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1982, and Linda S. Kauffman's *Discourses of Desire: Gender, Genre, And Epistolary Fictions.* Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1986. See also the first four chapters of Margaret Anne Doody's *A Natural Passion: A Study of the novels of Samuel Richardson.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.

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[55] John Carroll, ed., *Selected Letters of Samuel Richardson.* Oxford: 1964. 316.

[56] Carroll, *Selected Letters,* 289.

> What is distinctive about Richardson's novels is not the kind or even the amount of emotion, but rather the authenticity of its presentation . . . There are many equally probable and perhaps more interesting characters in literature before Pamela, but there are none whose daily thoughts and feelings we know so intimately.[57]

In general, this "writing to the moment" and its attendant potentiality to realistically convey the inner workings of the mind--its "daily thoughts and feelings"--is dramatic in the way that Socratic philosophy is dramatic. For example, in revealing the motives, hopes, failings, and misconceptions of Pamela as she writes, the letters in *Pamela* parallel the dialogues in Plato where human beings are depicted in lived situations, discussing and debating issues of common human interest. And like Plato's representation of the concrete world of everyday experience, Richardson's representation of the inner workings of Pamela's mind facilitates the reader's identification with her problems, feelings, and choices. Moreover, this identification entails a kind of dramatic address to the reader similar to the dramatic address to the reader's of Socratic dialogues.[58] Not only does the reader become aware Pamela's of states of mind, but because of Pamela's "writing to the moment," we are often more aware of her states of mind than she is herself. Not only do Pamela's letters embody her heart, they reveal it as well.[59] At one point, Pamela tells Mr. B "I don't remember all I wrote, yet I know I wrote my heart . . . ."[60] As we read her writing, we become readers of her reading of her own heart *at the time of writing*; we are invited to participate in a dialogue with her reading of herself, and at times, this dialogue does not produce the simple confirmation of her reading that one would expect from the majority of didactic fiction wherein the reader is merely expected to uncritically identify with the moral stance of the hero or heroine. A dialogic relationship emerges wherein openness of heart produces honesty of response. So, "writing to the moment" has the advantage of immediacy in that the action is related in the chaotic and unfinalized way that it occurs in everyday life, and it similarly has the advantage of authenticity in that it allows the writer to think on paper and convey thoughts without the formal ordering of retrospection.[61] Indeed,

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[57] Ian Watt, *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding.* New York: Penguin, 1981. 197,199.

[58] In a very recent study, Alexander Nehamas emphasizes the

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feature of address in the Platonic dialogues. He writes, for example, that "Socrates' irony is directed at Euthyphro only as a means; its real goal are [sic] the readers of Plato's dialogue." See, *The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, 41.

[59] This point is made by Roy Roussel in "Reflections on the Letter: The Reconciliation of Distance and Presence in *Pamela." ELH* 41 (1974), 387.

[60] Samuel Richardson, *Pamela.* New York: Everyman, Vol 1, 1955. 203.

[61] See Robert Adams Day (1966), 7-8.

Richardson himself was aware of the merits of his method; in his 1759 preface to *Clarissa* he wrote,

> All the letters are written while the hearts of the writers must be supposed to be wholly engaged in their subjects (The events at the time generally dubious) : So that they abound not only with critical Situations, but with what may be called *instantaneous* Descriptions and Reflections, (proper to be brought home to the breast of the youthful reader); as also, with affecting Conversations; many of them written in the dialogue or dramatic way.
>
> "*Much more* lively and affecting, says one of the principal characters [Belford: Aug. 4] must be the Style of those who write in the height of *present* distress; the mind tortured by the pangs of uncertainty (the Events then hidden in the womb of Fate); than the dry, narrative, unanimated Style of a person relating difficulties and dangers surmounted, can be; the relater perfectly at ease; and if himself unmoved by his own Story, not likely greatly to affect the Reader."[62]

In summary, as Richardson's comments indicate, he clearly understood that his epistolary method allowed for the hearts of his characters to be revealed in an immediate way at a critical time; that it allowed for a kind of dialogue that could reveal the authentic present states of mind of the characters; that it allowed for a dramatic (and often didactic) address to the reader which called for moral evaluation and affective response. Again, in *Pamela* these elements come together in a number of specific ways that reveal the dialogical and philosophical orientation of the novel. The first element to be considered is the novel's moral philosophy.

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[62] Samuel Richardson, *Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1962. xx.

B. Moral Philosophy

It is nothing new either to readers of Richardson nor to students of his work that he is a didactic writer. But in *Pamela* the form of this didacticism is more complex and its expression less one-sided than has generally been acknowledged. Moreover, although it seems counter-intuitive to our understanding of didacticism as essentially monologic, Richardson's didacticism in *Pamela 1* is frequently characterized by dialogical elements. In fact, because of these dialogical elements, Richardson's form of didacticism may be termed moral philosophy.

Although there have, of course, been numerous interpretations of *Pamela* , the novel has been most often treated as being about class, gender, social relations or even property. Never, however, has it been treated in light of Socratic philosophy, and only rarely has it been treated in terms of moral philosophy in the sense of offering a model of the human struggle for authentic relation.[63] In *Pamela,* Mr. B and Pamela are not

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[63] One notable counter-example to this general trend is to be found in Roy Roussel's discussion (1974). Roussel sees much of the action in *Pamela* as focused on the force of love as it manifests itself in Mr. B and Pamela as they seek to transcend the socially sanctioned separation between them. Roussel

"finished" characters; rather, the novel reveals them as dynamic characters whose consciousnesses alter as they deal with each other. Clearly, both Mr. B and Pamela are initially presented as fairly static types--he is a rich rake, she is a virtuous servant--but to see them only or primarily in these terms is to ignore that very complex humanity that Richardson is interested in investigating. As in Socratic philosophy, no systematic ethics is to be found in the novel; rather, its yardstick for evaluation will be centered on the conduct of the characters as they relate to one another. And it is this emphasis on the consideration, evaluation, and meaning of conduct *through dialogue* that connects Richardson's novel to one of the salient features of Socratic philosophy. Indeed, Socrates' words in the *Apology* could well have been Richardson's words for describing his primary concern in *Pamela*. Recall again, in more detail, Socrates' words to the jurors:

> 'For I spend all my time going about trying to persuade you, young and old, to make your first and chief concern not for your bodies nor for your possessions, but for the welfare of your souls, proclaiming as I go, Wealth does not bring goodness, but goodness brings wealth and every other blessing, both to the individual and to the state.' (30a7-b1)

Certainly those critics who see *Pamela* as primarily about the heroine keeping her virginity (concern for the body) in order to

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recognizes that this involves moral relation; he writes, "Love is the emergence of a need to be present to another and to be confirmed by another in an immediate way" (378).

"win" a prize of a wealthy husband (possessions) have seen only the bare bones of the story with none of the flesh that covers it, never mind its pulse, its internal organs and workings.[64]

Of course, most of Mr. B's soul-affecting changes will occur in his reading and consideration of Pamela's letters. And similarly, Pamela's most telling thoughts concerning Mr. B will be revealed in her letters to her parents. Hence, the crucial moral dynamics of the novel are rendered when the characters are essentially alone. But this isolation is not at all solipsistic in nature, for it is the occasion for expressing the desire for dialogue--the hunger for relation--that the letter encapsulates. So it is important to recognize that isolation is the starting point for the crucial exchanges to be found between Mr. B and Pamela.[65] But, clearly, the isolation of Mr. B and Pamela is not merely spatial; as we will see, it is also ontological, even spiritual. It takes various forms with diverse intensities; at times it may reveal itself as mere insecurity; sometimes it manifests itself as alienation; at other times it takes the form of disconnection or even distrust. So, one of the tasks of the novel will be to examine the nature and implications of this isolation, to explore its levels and degrees, to reveal how it is to be overcome, and to suggest how genuine relation may be achieved.

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[64] For example, see K. G. Hall's discussion of *Pamela* in *The Exalted Heroine and the Triumph of Order: Class, Women and Religion in the English Novel, 1740-1800.* Lanham, MD: Barnes & Noble Books, 1994. 39-53. Hall says that Pamela equates honesty or virtue primarily with "sexual virginity" and argues that the novel basically upholds the status-quo in showing how Pamela's deference and virtue bring her "socio-economic rewards." Similarly, Ann Louise Kibbie emphasizes how *Pamela* is concerned with Pamela as "sexual property." See "Sentimental Properties: *Pamela* and *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure.*" *ELH,* Vol 58, #3 (1991), 561-577.

[65] My view about isolation here is in keeping with Roussel's (1974) and contrary to J. Paul Hunter's general claim that "Somehow the novel has always communicated the breakdown of the relationships between individuals." *Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century Fiction.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1990. 40. On the contrary, *Pamela* communicates the establishment of relationships between

It is fairly clear that *Pamela* is, in some very important ways, concerned with isolation and relation. Indeed, Richardson himself seemed aware that letter-writing involves the relationship between isolation and relation, although he preferred to phrase it in terms of absence (or distance) and presence. For example, in a letter to Sophia Westcomb, he wrote, "Who then shall decline the converse of the pen? The pen that makes distance, presence; and brings back to sweet remembrance all the delights of presence; which makes even presence but body, while absence becomes the soul. . . ."[66] Given Richardson's remarks, we ought first, then, to explore precisely how Pamela is isolated and in what way this affects her.

The first letter in *Pamela* initially suggests some of the ways in which Pamela is isolated, and it also serves to introduce

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individuals. Anthony Kearney has also noted that the letters in *Clarissa* constitute a study in isolation. See "*Clarissa* and the Epistolary Form," in *Essays in Criticism,*.Vol 16, #1 (1966), 45.

[66] Carroll, *Selected Letters.* 65.

aspects of her position that will figure in her future relations with her new master. Pamela begins as follows:

> Dear Father and Mother,
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> I have great trouble, and some comfort, to acquaint you with. The trouble is that my good lady died of the illness I mentioned to you, and left us all much grieved for the loss of her . . . Much I feared, that as I was taken by her ladyship to wait upon her person, I should be quite destitute again, and forced to return to you and my poor mother, who have enough to do to maintain yourselves . . . and otherwise qualified above my degree, it was not every family that could have found a place that your poor Pamela was fit for . . . .[67]

The very act of writing to her parents suggests the most basic level of Pamela's isolation; she is simply removed from those she most loves and trusts. We know, however, that this rather basic isolation existed before the writing of the first letter in the novel, as she has been with Lady B for some time and has written to her parents previously, as she "mentioned." But Pamela's simple spatial isolation is now exacerbated by her lady's death and the concomitant complications it brings. The results of Lady B's death have weighed on Pamela's mind; not only has she been left "much grieved"; she has also "feared" much that she would be "destitute again," without a secure position, and "qualified above [her] degree" for a place in another family. Pamela's present position and future prospects are tenuous. With Lady B's death, she is no longer fully "at home" where she is, nor can she readily return to her parents who have "enough to do to maintain" themselves, nor have her improvements at Lady B's made her fit to be a simple servant elsewhere. Pamela is, therefore, in a position that approximates what anthropologist Victor Turner, drawing on Arthur van Gennep's discussion of *"rites de passage,"* termed a "liminal" state. Not only are her grief and fear a source of psychic turmoil, she is, to use Turner's phrase, "betwixt and between" any stable, clearly specified position or identity. She is, in a fundamental sense, between states--a "state," as Turner defines it, meaning "a relatively fixed or stable condition."[68] Certainly, the liminal aspects of Pamela's isolation are not clearly conspicuous (to Pamela herself or to the reader). However, they are present and perceptible, and will figure prominently in Pamela's future dealings with her own heart and with Mr. B.[69]

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[67] Samuel Richardson, *Pamela,* New York: Everyman, Vol 1, 1955, 1. All subsequent references to *Pamela* will be from this edition and noted parenthetically in the text by page number.

This, of course, is only half the matter. Pamela's letter also contains an optimistic note, "some comfort" as she puts it. Although some of Lady B's last words to her son--" 'remember my poor Pamela,' "--vaguely intimate a need or lack in Pamela that Mr. B presumably has been given charge over, Mr. B seems to have taken the words to heart in a positive way. Pamela writes,

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[68] Victor Turner, *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual.* Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1967. 93.

[69] Like the opening paragraphs to Jane Austen's *Emma* and *Pride and Prejudice,* the opening letter in *Pamela* suggests much of the grounds for the thematic concerns that the book will explore. As Ian Watt pointed out, in the opening paragraph of *Pamela,* "all the themes of the story are sounded, and sounded in a way that expresses the nature of their eventual conflict." "Samuel Richardson" in *The Novelist as Innovator.* London: British Broadcasting Company, 1965. 4.

> For my master said, "I will take care of you all, my good maidens. And for you Pamela," (and took me by the hand; yes, he took my hand before them all), "for my mother's sake, I will be a friend to you, and you shall take care of my linen" . . . and gave me with his own hand four golden guineas, and some silver . . . and said, if I was a good girl, and faithful and diligent, he would be a friend to me. . . . (2-3)

Now on the surface, Mr. B's response does seem to hold the promise of a remedy to Pamela's precarious position, but his inordinate attention to her (and perhaps his choice of her new duties) raises a vague spectre of suspicion in the reader. Similarly, Mr. B's taking of Pamela's hand and his promise of friendship on the condition of her being "a good girl" subtly raises further suspicions as to the purity of his motives. The spectre soon becomes more concrete as the letter continues. Pamela goes on to write,

> I have been scared out of my senses ; for just now, as I was folding up this letter in my late lady's dressing-room, in comes my young master ! How was I frightened ! I went to hide the letter in my bosom ; and he seeing me tremble,

> said smiling, "To whom have you been writing Pamela ?" . . . He took it, without saying more, and read it through . . . he took me by the hand, and said, "You are a good girl, Pamela, to be kind to your aged father and mother. I am not angry with you for writing such innocent matters as these; though you ought to be wary what tales you send out of a family. Be faithful and diligent ; and do as you should do, and I like you the better for this." (2)

Here, the reader's misgivings about Mr. B's apparently dutiful concern increase as the form and intensity of his attention to Pamela increase. Mr. B's motives are suspect insofar as his deportment towards Pamela lacks discretion and respect. He enters the dressing-room without knocking, causes her substantial fear, and seeing Pamela trying to hide the letter in her "bosom," he smilingly asks a question that is certainly none of his business. Further, he takes and reads the letter without leave; he gives her a thinly veiled warning about her communicating to others about what happens in the house, and again he promises his favor if she does as he wishes. Here it becomes more apparent that Pamela's situation vis a vis Mr. B is, perhaps, not as reassuring as Pamela herself thinks. And as Pamela ends her letter by declaring that "Indeed he is the best gentleman, I think . . ." (2), the afterthought is telling, as it may subtly intimate submerged inklings of doubt, even within her naive heart.

Pamela's optimism notwithstanding, Mr. B's conduct has shown her to be vulnerable to his will, and this tends to increase her insecurity--one of the forms of isolation. Pamela is not secure with Mr. B, as the novel will show, nor is Mr. B secure with Pamela, as his remarks about her writing and being "a good girl" attest. Of course, the way in which each of them is insecure is, on the surface, quite different, but as we will see, there is no equivocation here as the underlying grounds of their insecurity are similarly connected to considerations of trust. On the face of it, it appears as though Mr. B's desire for Pamela is simply a desire to possess her body--and it is that, in part--but as I have suggested, this is only a corporeal manifestation of a more fundamental desire for relation on Mr. B's part. Indeed, Mr. B's first reading of her letter (and his subsequent interceptions and readings) are not, as has been claimed, symbolic merely of his attempt to access Pamela's body, but rather, they are indicative of an attempt to access her authentic person, her essential self.[70] Just as the first part of Pamela's epistle affirms the function of the letter as a mode of extricating oneself from isolation through dialogue, the second part of the epistle affirms the importance of reading a letter in order to establish a relation through dialogue. Granted, Pamela's first letter is not overtly (or even consciously) designed to deal with insecurity or isolation, but her gradual movement in the progress of the novel towards diaristic writing with no assured addressee seems to confirm the underlying function I have noted. This will become even more apparent when double-voiced passages are considered. Similarly, Mr. B's reading of the letter seems more of an illegitimate breach of privacy than a covert desire for meaningful relation, but again, the novel will bear out this underlying dynamic in many of Mr. B's actions. More about this later.

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[70] For example, Kibbie (1991) writes, " . . . B's desire for the heroine's person is diverted to the letters that come to stand for her body. The identification of the letters with the female body becomes most explicit . . ." (576).

We may notice, also, that the reply to Pamela's letter by her parents also reaffirms the reader's suspicions, but the reply is doubly noteworthy because it is one of the rare moments in the novel when the addressee gives a full and measured response to the writer.[71] Here we see some of the rudimentary aspects that make for genuine dialogue. There is an address and an answer, but more importantly, there is an attentive responsiveness to the address of another that reveals a desire for reciprocity.[72] There is a willingness in the reply to address another in an open, honest manner that confirms another in a mutual relation. Indeed, the close relation of the writer and the addressee is intimated in the parallel structure and content of the first line of the reply. Just as Pamela wrote, "I have great trouble, and some comfort, to acquaint you with," so her father replies, "Your letter was a great trouble, and some comfort, to me and your mother" (3). However, we soon learn that her parents' primary concern is not for Lady B's death, but for Pamela's moral welfare: "But our chief trouble is, and a very great one, for fear you should be brought to anything dishonest or wicked, by being set so above yourself." Probably unaware, Pamela has not been explicit about where the real trouble for her may lie. However, her parents have been attentive enough to the nuances of her letter to understand something of the moral dangers to her person:

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[71] I am indebted to Marijke Rudnik-Smalbraak, for this observation. *Samuel Richardson: Minute Particulars within a Large Design.* Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1983. 61.

[72] One might object that this is simply a given in the relation between a child and her parents, but as one can see in the exchanges between Clarissa and her parents in *Clarissa,* this is not the case.

> But what avails all this, if you are to be ruined or undone? . . . what signify all the riches in the world, with a bad conscience, and to be dishonest? . . . and, oh ! that fatal word, that he would be kind to you, if you would do *as you should do,* almost kills us with fears . . . why should he smile so kindly upon you? why should he take such a poor girl as you by the hand, as your letter says he has done twice? Why should he stoop to read your letter to us, and commend your writing and spelling? And why should he give you leave to read his mother's books? (3)

Now, this reply reveals an open responsiveness to the address of another not only in its attention to the explicit details given, but also to the implicit, and largely unrecognized, implications of those details. As we saw earlier, this bringing to the attention of another the moral implications of their statements is integral to Socrates' intention in doing philosophy. Mr. Andrews' letter to Pamela also shows a dialogic orientation towards Pamela's address since it has been influenced, not only by her address per se, but also by the response from Pamela that Mr. Andrews expects his words will elicit. As Bakhtin points out, "The choice of *all* language means is made by the speaker under varying degrees of influence from the addressee and his anticipated response" (*SG,* 99). The reply also bears striking similarity to a number of other features of Socratic philosophy and Bakhtin's thought.

Like Socratic philosophy, the reply is focused almost exclusively on moral matters--on how one should live. In avowing the paramount importance of the moral life, Mr. Andrews' statement that "we had rather see you all covered with rags, and even follow you to the churchyard, than have it said, a child of ours preferred any worldly convenience to her virtue" (4), recalls Socrates' reply to Crito's escape plan:

> If it becomes clear that such conduct is wrong, I cannot help thinking that the question whether we are sure to die, or to suffer any other ill effect for that matter, if we stand our ground and take no action, ought not to weigh with us at all in comparison with the risk of doing what is wrong. (*Crito,* 48d1-5)

Mr. Andrews seems to share Socrates' ranking of morality above all else. But there are more similarities than this. Mr. Andrews' questions to Pamela also approximate Socrates' method of questioning his interlocutors in order to promote self-examination. There is very little authoritative *telling* of what Pamela should do; rather, there is question and intimation. Mr.

Andrews' questions, his comments, and his repetition of conditional clauses using "if," all parallel Socrates' mode of exchange with others. Further, Mr. Andrews' use of questions and conditionals not only parallels Socrates' *procedure,* they also reflect Socrates' *purpose.* Mr. Andrews does not, with epistemic certainty, claim to know the final state of affairs in Pamela's situation. Much of his letter, although cautionary in nature, urges Pamela to consider various points in order to come to a fuller understanding of herself and of her circumstances. In his honest responsiveness to Pamela, in his method of relating to her, and in his purpose to find out the truth, Mr. Andrews' reply echoes Socrates' words to Callicles: " . . . I think we should all be contentiously eager to know what is true and what is false in the subject under consideration, for it is a common benefit that this be revealed to all alike" (*Gorgias.* 505e3-506).

So, like Socrates, Mr. Andrews is in the position of a teacher of wisdom. And it is, perhaps, no little coincidence that Mr. Andrews was a teacher. Even John, as Pamela writes, "wonders that you, my father, who are so well able to teach . . . succeeded no better in the school you attempted to set up" (6). And like Socrates, Mr. Andrews does have particular beliefs, but his questions, like those of Socrates to his interlocutors, invite Pamela to come to self-knowledge. Not that Pamela does not hold moral beliefs herself; of course, she does. However, her naivete with respect to Mr. B's motives seems to be a form, not of moral poverty, but of moral stupidity. And in a sense, this is a kind of failure in self-knowledge--a failure with which Socrates was so concerned. Indeed, later in a letter to Pamela, Mr. Andrews echoes Socrates' sentiments when he writes, "O my child ! temptations are sore things ; but yet, without them, *we know not ourselves* (italics mine), nor what we are able to do" (15). Like Socrates' interlocutors, Pamela thinks she has some wisdom, and yet her naivete attests to her need for education. In effect, Pamela's process of education is one of the central concerns of the novel.

Furthermore, Pamela's lack of self-knowledge seems, in large part, to derive also from a latent sense of pride to which she is vulnerable. Mr. Andrews' seems cognizant of this danger, as his fear was for the moral harm that might come to Pamela "by being set so above [her]self." Later, in a telling moment of candor to her mother, Pamela writes, ". . . I have nothing to say but what will make me look more like a vain hussy than any thing else: however, I hope I shan't be so proud as to forget myself" (5). Indeed, it is a measure of vanity in her appearance and pride in her spirituality that, if given quarter, would result in Pamela's "forgetting herself" in a more important sense than she intends here. Pamela must not forget that she is human and, thus, subject to all the vagaries of human imperfection. Later, as Pamela muses over her future prospects of doing "plain work" when she returns to her parents, she admits "It may be a little hard at first ; but woe to my proud heart if I find it so on trial !" (63). Although Pamela does recognize that she has a kind of pride that might rebel at menial labor, this recognition seems rather shallow. The very next paragraph of her letter subtly reveals a deeper and more serious kind of pride--a pride of which she appears to be unaware:

> I have read of a good bishop that was to be burnt for his religion : he tried how he could to bear it, by putting his fingers into the lighted candle : so I, the other day, tried, when Rachel's back was turned, if I could not scour a pewter plate she had begun. I could do it by degrees ; it only blistered my hands in two places. (63)

Pamela's intimated comparison of her brief venture at menial labor with the sufferings of a martyr--"a good bishop"--shows more clearly the perverse nature of her spiritual pride. She equates her little domestic adversity with a great spiritual trial. As yet, Pamela's mettle has really not been tested in the area that really counts--in the area of moral relation with others. Of course, she will have *real* spiritual trials, but they will involve more than the doing of menial labor or even the rejection of sexual advances.

So that the point is not lost on us, we are given another scene which dramatically suggests the convergence of Pamela's personal vanity with her spiritual pride. Earlier, Pamela describes in detail the new set of clothes that she has prepared for her return to her parents and their lowly status.[73] Again, her remarks are telling; after looking in the mirror "as proud as any thing," she writes, "To say Truth, I never liked myself so well in my life. O the Pleasure of descending with Ease, Innocence and Resignation ! " (42). Pamela's pleasure in descending and her pride in how she will look in her new condition reveals her lack of self-knowledge in that she too easily assumes that external appearances are evidence of inner realities. As she emphatically confesses to her parents, "your *poverty* is my *pride*"(41). Her mistake is innocent enough; however, Pamela recognizes neither her own petty vanities nor certain aspects of her own heart. She has humbled herself materially, but it is spiritual humility that she needs to learn.[74] She has knowledge of good and evil, but it is self-knowledge that she lacks, and this knowledge will come only through exchanges with others.

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[73] For a discussion of the significance of clothes in *Pamela*, see Carey McIntosh, "Pamela's Clothes," *ELH*, Vol 35, #1 (1968). 75-83. See also, Barbara Belyea, "Romance and Richardson's Pamela," *English Studies in Canada*, Vol 10, #3, (1984). 409-

C. Monologic Beginnings and Dialogic Bearings

Pamela's initial correspondence with her parents, and even more, her future exchanges with Mr. B also reveal, in a rudimentary way, a dialogical conception of truth. This further connects *Pamela* to Socratic philosophy (and to Bakhtin's thought). We have seen above how Socrates repeatedly emphasizes that truth in the moral domain is to be found in

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[74] Marijke Rudnik-Smalbraak (1983) makes this point as follows: "It is that very self, however, with all its simple vanities, which must be tested and chastened: in confronting her destiny Pamela need not descend socially but spiritually . . ." (77).

"common counsel and search," and Pamela's replies to her parents do indicate the floundering emergence of this dialogic dynamic in her own thinking. Pamela's initial reaction to her father's letter holds little surprise. She says, "your letter has filled me with trouble : it has made my heart, which was overflowing with gratitude for my master's goodness, suspicious and fearful" (4), and she adds "But what gives me most trouble is, that you seem to mistrust the honesty of your child." Pamela further assures her parents that she would never do anything to bring them sorrow. What is interesting about Pamela's reply is not so much that she is now somewhat "suspicious and fearful," or that she assures her parents of her steadfast "honesty"--evidence of dialogical interaction--what is interesting is that she *also* maintains her authority as a final judge of the situation. The exchanges with her parents reveal two levels of interaction; one is dialogically orientated; the other is monologically orientated. Let me explain.

On one level, her father's letter has succeeded in bringing Pamela to some consciousness of another's view of her version of the truth; hence, even her reaction of fear and suspicion, while not the most desirable response, does show a measure of seeing reality through an exchange with another--a dialogical orientation toward truth. On this level, something important has begun in Pamela in that she has taken one of the first steps toward a dialogical conception of truth. Her fear and suspicion--in themselves not laudable--do, however, show a primitive change in consciousness in response to the words of another.

Again, as Bakhtin points out, "Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born *between people* . . . in the process of their dialogic interaction" (*PDP*, 110). On another level, however, Pamela's response to Mr. Andrews' epistle reveals a lack of dialogical interaction.

Briefly, we may recall that Bakhtin intimates a distinction between kinds of monologism--the kinds that arise out of ignorance or naivety, and the kinds that pretend authority. As Bakhtin explains, "The dialogic means of seeking truth is counterposed to *official* monologism, which pretends to *possess a ready-made truth,* and it is also counterposed to the naive self-confidence of those people who think that they know something, that is, who think that they possess certain truths" (*PDP*,110). Through the exchange with her parents, Pamela has begun to overcome the kind of monologism that arises out of ignorance or naivety, but she has not begun to overcome the second kind: "official monologism". Pamela continues to adhere to the authority of her own perceptions. She is, in fact, a kind of moral empiricist; she trusts almost only in what she sees, and she fails to look under the surface of things, especially into her own heart. In this sense, Pamela's orientation is like official monologism. Pamela does not really seek truth in a dialogical way; rather, she adheres to a kind of ready made truth--the authority of her senses.

Now it is a good thing that Pamela, in response to her parents' epistle, has begun to become suspicious of Mr. B's actions; she should have been more attentive to the moral implications of *his* address. However, at the same time, Pamela continues to have a monological orientation in that she fails to be suspicious of her own epistemic authority. After telling her parents of her suspicion and fear, Pamela then writes, "As yet I see no cause to fear any thing" (4), and she judges, "Sure they cannot all have designs against me, because they are civil !" (4-5). Similarly, after Mr. B is more explicit in his advances and kisses her, Pamela writes, "At last I saw some reason to *suspect* . . ." (11). The previous emergence of one aspect of a dialogical orientation in Pamela notwithstanding, her judgement of Mr. B remains based almost entirely on the authority of what she sees. Just as her previous trust in Mr. B was founded merely on external appearances--that he is her "master," a "gentleman," and that he "continues to be very affable to [her]" (4)--so now her mistrust is founded primarily on how his actions look to her: "O how poor and mean must those actions be, and how little must they make the best of gentlemen look, when they offer such things as are unworthy of themselves . . ." (12-13). Initially, Pamela needed to overcome the kind of monologism that expressed itself as moral naivete which ignored the sexual aspect of Mr. B's attention to her. Now she needs to overcome the kind of monologism that expresses itself as a moral empiricism that bases judgement only on how actions "look," thereby ignoring the possibility of anything deeper than the sexual aspect of Mr. B's advances (and of the unacknowledged feelings of her own heart). Victory over this second kind of monologism will come, not through an exchange with her parents as was the case with the first type, but through exchanges with Mr. B himself.

In addition, Pamela's monological orientation further resembles official monologism in that her judgements of others tend towards a definitive extreme rather than a measured balance. In a sense, Pamela adheres to ready-made truths insofar as she tends either to deify or to demonize others. The demonization of Mr. B is a case in point. At first Pamela considers him "the best of gentleman," later he is deemed a "black, perfidious creature" who is an "implement . . . in the hands of Lucifer" (72). Indeed, Pamela almost considers him a literal demon when she refers to him as one of Lucifer's "votaries" (177), and later the demonic transformation seems complete when says to Mr. B, " 'to be sure you are Lucifer himself, in the *shape* of my master, or you could not use me thus' " (184). This tendency of Pamela's is not lost on Mr. B; early in the novel he remarks to Mrs. Jervis that Pamela has written letters " ' . . . in which, representing herself as an angel of light, she makes her kind master and benefactor a devil incarnate' " (24). Similarly, Mr. B argues that Pamela's mistrust of him and his behavior towards her are due, in large part, to her type-casting of him as a demonic character:

> "Pray, Sir forgive me."--"No," said he, "rather say, 'Pray, Lucifer forgive me : ' and now, since you take me for the devil, how can you expect any good from me? How can you

> expect any thing but the worst treatment from me?--You have given me a character, Pamela; and blame me not that I act to it." (185)

For Pamela, the other tends to be either an angel or a devil, good or evil. In this sense, the truth about others is "ready-made" for her. It is already there. In tending to see others as types, Pamela denies others their dynamic moral autonomy, and consequently, she also denies herself any real dialogic relation with them. Bakhtin's remarks are relevant here:

> Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another *I* with equal rights (*thou*). With a monologic approach (in its extreme or pure form) *another person* remains wholly and merely an *object* of consciousness, and not another consciousness. No response is expected from it that could change everything in the world of my consciousness . . . . (*PDP*,292-93)

Now, although Pamela's approach to the other is not an extreme form of monologism, her overall proclivity to deify or demonize the other does tend to make others more of an *object* of her consciousness than another consciousness with equal rights and responsibilities. Take, for example, her telling description of Mrs. Jewkes as virtually a nonhuman thing: "She is a broad, squat, pursey, *fat thing,* quite ugly, if any thing human can be so called . . . " (97). Pamela's excessive description of the "hideous" foreigner, Monsieur Colbrand, is similarly revealing:

> He is a giant of a man for stature ; taller by a good deal

> than Harry Mawlidge . . . and large-boned, scraggy, and has a hand !--I never saw such an one in my life. He has great staring eyes, like the bull's that frightened me so ; vast jaw-bones sticking out ; eyebrows hanging over ; two great scars upon his forehead, and one on his left cheek; two large whiskers, and monstrous wide mouth ; blubber lips, long yellow teeth, and a hideous grin . . . . (145)

Like her view of Mr. B and Mrs. Jewkes, Pamela sees Monsieur Colbrand more in terms of an animalistic or demonic object than another human being. Again, Mr. B is aware of this monological tendency in Pamela; he tells her, " 'All your confederates are good, every one of them ; but such of my servants as have done their duty, and obeyed my orders, are painted by you as black as devils ; and so am I, I dare say' " (206). In any case, part of Pamela's education will involve her overcoming of her monological world-view. This will entail a dialogical movement toward relation with others, and through others, a simultaneous coming to an understanding of her own heart--her real self.

As mentioned earlier, issues of trust are central in *Pamela*.[75] Both Pamela and Mr. B need to come to a recognition of each other's essential centre of self. Each needs to learn to trust the other--to be willing to look beyond external appearances into the heart of the other, and thereby into their own heart as well. For example, Pamela's frequent invocation of the social "distance" between her and Mr. B is used by her as a justification of mistrust--first to deny that Mr. B could want her sexually, then to deny that he could want her for anything else. Pamela's initial response to Mr. B's attentions is to reject the idea that he could desire her sexually; she says, "I am sure my master would not demean himself so as to think upon such a poor girl as I for harm" (6-7), and she further reasons, "for what good could it do him to harm such a simple maiden as me ?" (8). Again, Pamela' conviction is based, largely, on her apprehension of the social separation or "distance" between her and Mr. B. Indeed, she comments that others would think her "presumptuous, vain, and conceited, to have any fears about the matter, from the great distance between such a gentleman and so poor a girl" (10), and she complains B's attentions have "lessened the distance that fortune has made between us" (12).[76]

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[75] Roussel (1974) emphasizes the overwhelming importance of trust in *Pamela*; he writes, "The failure of B's various strategies . . . marks the real extent of the self's mistrust of others in Richardson's fiction . . . It is this fear which prevents Pamela alone in the novel from recognizing the true nature of B's feelings for her. It prevents her from seeing B as anything but an encroacher . . . and it inhibits Pamela's love for B, a love which has always been there potentially, from actualizing itself" (386).

Similarly, when Mr. B says he was jesting about Pamela suffering the same fate as Lucretia, Pamela replies that " 'it is not a jest that becomes the distance between a master and servant' " (23). But later, when she does recognize the sexual aspect of Mr. B's advances, she uses the same grounds to reason that sex is *all* Mr. B could desire of her. She says to Mrs. Jervis, " 'let me ask you, if he can stoop to like such a poor girl as me, as perhaps he may . . . what can it be *for* ? He may condescend, perhaps, to think I may be good enough for his harlot . . ." (29). Indeed, even after Mr. B's open and frank declaration of love, Pamela still uses the distance between them as grounds of mistrust. Although Mr. B exclaims, " 'Strange damned fate . . . that when I speak so solemnly, I can't be believed !' " (70), Pamela reasons, "But then when I again reflected upon the distance between him and me, and his now open declaration of love . . . I should be *less* armed, maybe, to withstand him" (71).

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[76] Roussel (1974) notes that "Altogether, the term "distance" or some variation of it is used in this context 16 times in the first 50 pages, a frequency which suggests how important this separation is for Richardson and how it overshadows any reciprocity which might exist between classes" (377).

Pamela needs to see Mr. B in a more balanced light, one that recognizes the potential for more than just selfish desire in the other. This will mean a recognition of the moral complexity of another's conduct and an affirmation of the other as an equivalent centre of self. It will mean overcoming her excessive mistrust of another person. And although their respective kinds of *isolation* have moral and ontological underpinnings, the *distance* between them is primarily social, not moral or ontological. Pamela will need to overcome her own spiritual pride--in order to begin a mutual relation with an "other," alien self--and in order to begin to understand her own heart more fully. Similarly, Mr. B will need to come to a recognition of his own pride, his lack of trust, and of his real, but submerged desire for authentic relation with another. And also like Pamela, Mr. B must overcome a monological orientation towards the other in order to achieve genuine relation with the other. Mr. B and Pamela's interactions with each other bring about these dialogic transformations.

Although we do not have an ongoing epistolary exchange between Pamela and Mr. B, close scrutiny of Pamela's own rendering of their exchanges reveals an unrealized desire for relation in each of them. Early in the novel, Mr. B says to Pamela, "you are your own worst enemy" (19), and later in the novel, after the critical pond scene, Pamela writes:

> though I should have praised God for my deliverance, had I been freed from my wicked keepers, and my designing master, yet I have more abundant reason to praise him, that I have been delivered from a worse enemy, *myself.* (152)

And although Mr. B and Pamela have not reached a fully realized relation of mutuality at this point; nevertheless, this is a crucial turning point for Pamela, and hence for her potential relation with Mr. B. How, then, did she move from considering herself only as the "victim" of the "lawless attempts" (104) of the other to her own "worst enemy"?

All along, Pamela has had unrecognized feelings toward Mr. B which would remain unacknowledged until her own mistrust and spiritual vanity could be overcome. It is, I think, no accident that Pamela repeatedly hides from Mr. B and his servants those things that are dear to her. Her first real act in the novel is to hide the four guineas she sends to her parents, and her first act in meeting with Mr. B in private is an attempt "to hide the letter in [her] bosom" that she had written to her parents (2). Later, of course, Pamela's hiding of her letters seems absolutely necessary to her, but we must remember that Mr. B is privy to her early letters through the duplicity of his man John, and to her later journal by Pamela's own consent. Much of what Pamela "hides" is uncovered by Mr. B. And Pamela's attempts to hide her letters do not arise simply out of her modest desire for privacy or out of her continual fear of Mr. B's actions. Her attempts to hide her letters signify her attempts to hide her own feelings since her letters manifest her "heart" (203). Hence, Pamela's concealment of her letters is not so much an attempt to protect her privacy or her virtue as to protect her identity. That Pamela is prone to hiding her feelings is revealed early in the novel when she admits to her parents that "there is a secret pleasure one has to hear one's self praised" (5). But even more telling are Pamela's own reactions to her encounters with Mr. B since they further disclose her unrealized feelings for him.

Pamela's encounters with Mr. B are often accompanied by physical reactions from her. These reactions expose, in some measure, the hidden depths of her heart. And interestingly enough, they often involve the fluttering of her heart, or at critical times, the loss of her consciousness. For example, when Mr. B says " 'Don't run away, I tell you. I have a word or two to say to you,' " Pamela notes how her "heart went pit-a-pat !" (18), and as Pamela waits for her appointment with Mr. B, she asks rhetorically, "Don't your heart ache for me? I am sure mine fluttered about like a new caught bird in a cage" (21-22). Again later, when Mr. B declares "I cannot live without you" and kisses her, Pamela muses in her room, "Lie still, lie still, my poor fluttering heart !" (169). Although such reactions may indicate fear, a heart that goes "pit-a-pat" and flutters is more indicative of stirring passion than sudden fright. Recall, for example, that on the joyous morning of her marriage to Mr. B, Pamela writes, "Fie upon it ! my heart begins to flutter again !" (306). And similarly, Pamela often reacts to Mr. B's attentions with "confusion" (2, 8, 11, 18, 43, 187, 189), which again may indicate not only moral trepidation, but emotional excitement. Mr. B himself seems to take Pamela's confusion as one of the signs of her own ambivalent feelings. After telling Pamela that he must have her but that he cannot "endure the thought of marriage," he asks her to reveal her own mind with "like openness and candour," since, as he puts it, "I see yours is big with some important meaning, by your eyes, your blushes, and that sweet confusion which I behold struggling in your bosom . . ." (188).

Furthermore, when Mr. B (figuratively and literally) comes too close to Pamela's hidden "heart" by putting his hand in her "bosom," Pamela's reaction is to faint--to lose consciousness temporarily (50, 179). Now, when Pamela faints it is not merely a feminine ruse to thwart the carnal advances of Mr. B, nor is it simply a melodramatic expression of a too precious prudery. Rather, Pamela loses consciousness because it is the door to her heart. That is, access by the other to her "heart"--her "bosom" and her "inner self"--is closed by Pamela by losing consciousness.[77] Consequently, no "other" is permitted to probe the depths of her heart, and no feelings are permitted to come to the surface. Paradoxically, Pamela's fainting effectively prevents the possibility of exposure of anything *more* profound than her body. Pamela's fear of physical penetration helps her close the door to any metaphorical penetration of her inner self. So, in order for Pamela to permit her real feelings to be exposed to the look of the other, she would have to trust in the other not to use those hidden desires against her--not to use psychological penetration as an instrument of physical penetration. Pamela herself seems aware of her vulnerability to the other were her private thoughts to be known. This is another one of the reasons for her initial reluctance to let Mr. B read her letters to her parents. For example, she writes,

> and yet I would have sent you such a letter as he might see, if I had been sure my danger was over. But that I cannot; for he now seems to take another method, and what I am more afraid of, because he may watch an opportunity, and join force with it, when I am least prepared : for now he

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[77] Although his emphasis is different, Roussel (1974) makes a similar point about Pamela's fainting spells; he writes, "Those moments when B seems on the point of actually forcing the barrier of Pamela's reserve are precisely the moments when her consciousness disappears. Pamela's fainting spells . . . reflect the extent to which, for Richardson, the self is initially something ephemeral. This interior consciousness is, it seems, so sensitive and so insubstantial that it cannot willingly stand the direct light of another's gaze" (385).

> seems to abound with kindness, and talks of love without reserve . . . . (183)

Here we see Pamela's apprehension of revealing herself to another who has revealed himself to her. She cannot, as of yet, trust Mr. B to access her heart through her letters since they contain her essential self--her "private thoughts" and "all [her] secrets" (199). His exposure of himself and his kindness to her constitute an address, the response to which would require a similar exposure on Pamela's part. This, in Pamela's mind, is a present danger as it would give Mr. B an "opportunity" to use her own desire against her. Hence, Pamela fears the exposure of her own submerged love as it would make her vulnerable to one who she believes cannot return that love *in kind.*[78] So, to return to Pamela's fainting, this closing of the two-way door to her heart is her means of preventing that exposure which might lead to the relation she has previously discounted. But it is more.

Another curious feature about Pamela's fainting spells is that they are also, in another sense, an opening up of herself to the other. By fainting, Pamela puts herself totally into Mr. B's hands--again, both literally and figuratively. When Pamela becomes unconscious she is in the power of an other, her body totally at the mercy of another's prerogative. But in surrendering her body to the will of the other, Pamela is also, on an unconscious level, trusting the other not to violate her person. By surrendering to Mr. B on this level, Pamela also reveals an elemental trust in his desire--not for sexual gratification, but for authentic relation. And this fundamental trust is not unfounded as Mr. B never follows through with his "resolution" to violate her. This, then, anticipates the submission of herself to Mr. B in marriage once she is consciously able to trust in him--once she accepts the true nature of his desire for relation. The same kind of deep trust in Mr. B that would allow Pamela to sleep beside him as his wife--to be unconscious with him--is prefigured in her fainting spells. Understood in this light, it is quite appropriate, then, that Pamela faints. It is a paradoxical reaction that simultaneously suggests both her conscious mistrust of Mr. B and her unconscious trust in him--her fear of relation *and* her desire for relation. But not only do Pamela's physical reactions betray her submerged feelings for Mr. B; her ambivalent reasoning about him is also telling. Let's look briefly at a couple of salient examples.

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[78] This line of interpretation is indebted, in part, to Stanley Cavell's reading of *King Lear* in his essay, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear." Cavell argues that Lear's motivation for the "bribe" of his kingdom is to avoid truly revealing himself to Cordelia since he believes he will be unable to return her real love in kind. See *Disowning Knowledge: in Six Plays of Shakespeare.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Pamela's early voicing of her thoughts about her uncomfortable connection with Mr. B is, at times, revealing. Although these thoughts about Mr. B do not transparently indicate her warm feelings for him, nevertheless, they are often telling. Take for example Pamela's discussion with Mrs. Jervis about whether or not to stay at Mr. B's after his first two "attempts" on her virtue (the reason for the quotation marks will be clarified later). Here, Pamela delivers a compelling case as to why she should not stay at Mr. B's estate. Over the space of two pages she marshals an attack on Mr. B's conduct, a veritable litany of his past offences and his potential transgressions. When Mrs. Jervis assures Pamela that Mr. B "is vexed at what he has done," Pamela quickly replies, " 'yes . . . and so he will be vexed, I suppose the *third* and the *fourth* time too, till he has quite ruined your poor maiden . . .' " (30). Mrs. Jervis goes on to point out that Mr. B has done her "no hurt," and she swears that he will never offer Pamela "any force," but Pamela continues her argument. This needs quoting at length:

> 'You say . . . that he was sorry for his *first* offer in the summer-house. Well, and how long did his sorrow last? Only till he found me by myself : and then he was worse than before ; and so became sorry *again.* And if he has designed to love me, and you say he can't *help* it, why, he can't *help* it neither, if he should have an opportunity, a *third* time to distress me . . . Besides, Mrs. Jervis, if he really intends to offer no *force*, what does that mean? While you say he can't *help* liking me--for *love* it cannot be--does it not imply that he hopes to ruin me by my own *consent?* I *think*. . . that I should not give way to his temptations on *any* account ; but it would be presumptuous in me to rely upon my own strength against a gentleman of his qualifications and estate, who is my *master*, and thinks himself entitled to call me Bold-face, and what

> not, only for standing on my defence, and that too, where the good of my soul and body, my duty to God and my parents, are all concerned. How then, Mrs. Jervis . . . . can I *ask* or *wish* to stay?' (30)

Given Pamela's vigorous argument, her decision to leave seems inevitable, determined, her resolve complete. Hence we tend to read her question to Mrs. Jervis as a simple rhetorical one, but this interpretation requires the easy inference that Pamela will be guided solely by reason. It is, however, quite legitimate to read her question as an honest one. Seen in this light, Pamela *is* looking for *reasons* that she can credibly give in order to justify her asking or wishing to stay because she does, in fact, wish to stay. Simply put, Pamela wants to have some explicit rational grounds that would vindicate her submerged desire to stay with Mr. B. However, Mrs. Jervis fails to provide such grounds. Pamela's argument continues, and she announces the unavoidable conclusion of her reasoning: " 'Well, there's no more to be said ; I must go, that's certain . . .' " (31). The matter appears firmly settled, but Pamela ends her letter to her parents on what, superficially, seems an astonishing afterthought: "Oh ! I forgot to say, that I would stay to finish the waistcoat, if I might with safety : Mrs. Jervis tells me I certainly may. I never had a prettier piece of work ; and I am up early and late to get it over ; for I long to be with you" (31). Of course, Pamela's announcement is not at all astonishing, given a proper understanding of her very real, albeit unacknowledged, desire for relation with Mr. B.

Notwithstanding her own argument, bristling with reasons to leave, Pamela finds a credible inducement to stay. The demands of her reason satisfied, she now may follow the dictates of her heart. Indeed, that Pamela has all along harbored fond feelings for Mr. B is reaffirmed later in the novel.

On the thirty-first day of what Pamela variously refers to as her "Bondage And Misery" (101), "Heavy Restraint" (140), "Distress" (147), and "Imprisonment" (157) at the Lincolnshire estate, Pamela makes a telling entry into her letter-journal when she learns of Mr. B's accident in the stream. She writes,

> What is the matter, that, with all his ill usage of me I cannot hate him? To be sure, I am not like other people ! He has certainly done enough to make me hate him ; but yet, when I heard his danger, which was very great, I could not in my heart forbear rejoicing for his safety ; though his death would have ended my afflictions . . . and oh what an angel would he be in my eyes yet, if he would cease his attempts and reform! (156)

Yes, to be sure Pamela is "not like other people" because of her deep feelings--deep both in strength and seclusion--for Mr. B. On one level, Pamela still mistrusts Mr. B at this point; her head knows his death would end her "afflictions," but her "heart" cannot but rejoice at his safety. Here Pamela's submerged affection, her secluded "heart," clearly comes to the fore. The foundation for relation with Mr. B is firmly in place; it is now for him to remove the impediments to its full actualization--to "cease his attempts and reform." But before considering Mr. B, I want to look at one more feature of *Pamela* that has gone unnoticed--the dialogic feature of "double-voicedness" that leads to this new awareness of her feelings for Mr. B.

Robert A. Day (1966) writes most assuredly that "*Pamela,* too, is a simple story, technically speaking. Its epistolary method shows no remarkable ingenuity; the exchanges are not developed to any complexity . . . " (207). But on the contrary, *Pamela* reveals some quite remarkable instances of ingenuity in its innovative, albeit infrequent, use of double-voiced passages. One such passage is the pond scene wherein Pamela considers suicide. As Mark Kinkead-Weekes has noted, this scene marks a critical juncture in the novel: "The scene by the pond is not only the centre of *Pamela,* the turning-point of the whole novel, it is also the first important and sustained self-analysis in English fiction."[79] Here, Pamela tries to escape her confinement. The key she has acquired is useless since Mrs. Jewkes has changed the lock to the gate; Pamela then tries to scale the wall but falls, battered and bruised. She finally sits by the pond, as she puts it, "to ponder my wretched condition ; and thus I reasoned with myself" (150). What is remarkable about Pamela's reasoning with herself, however, is not so much that there is "sustained self-analysis," but that her analysis manifests fairly intricate sorts of "internal dialogization."

Pamela's initial thoughts give voice to her apprehension of what others would say at finding her dead. Her thoughts are imbued with the anticipated response of Mr. B, and she articulates his voice: " 'O this is the unhappy Pamela ! that I have causelessly persecuted and destroyed. Now I see she preferred her honesty to her life,' will he say, 'and is no hypocrite nor deceiver ; but was the innocent creature she pretended to be' " (150). In thinking about what Mr. B would think, Pamela is relating to Mr. B's consciousness in a dialogic way. She is thinking through him, talking with him even though he is absent. As Bakhtin puts it, "The consciousness of other people cannot be perceived, analyzed, defined as objects or as things--one can only *relate to them dialogically.* To think about them means to *talk with them; otherwise they immediately turn to us their objectified side*: they fall silent, close up . . ." (*PDP,* 68). Mr. B is not silent to Pamela; he is not closed to her. Pamela's thoughts are laden with a consciousness of the words of another--of Mr. B; there is a "side-ward glance" toward another's prospective response. This is the foundation of double-voiced discourse, but her thoughts reveal even more complex kinds of dialogization.

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[79] *Samuel Richardson: Dramatic Novelist.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973, 47.

As Pamela continues her consideration of suicide, she even begins to rise in order to throw herself into the pond. It is at this critical point that her language takes on an entirely new character.[80] She suddenly begins to speak in the language of the

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[80] Kinkead-Weekes (1973) thinks the self-analysis in the pond scene does not succeed since "Richardson has not yet created an adequate dramatic language for the colloquy of a mind with itself, and so tends to fall back on idiom -- the 'theeing' and

King James Bible: " 'What art thou about to do, wretched Pamela ! How knowest thou, though the prospect be all dark to thy short-sighted eye, what God may do for thee, even when all human means fail ?' " (150-51). Now on the face of it, this may seem like the mere mouthing of the "authoritative word" of the Bible, but what we need to recognize is that Pamela is not simply parodying the idiom of scripture, she is *assimilating* and *reaccentuating* an authoritative word. Pamela's words are not simply a repetition of the other's authoritative words; her words are *both* her own and the other's.

Bakhtin notes that "there are always authoritative utterances that set the tone" (*SG,* 88) for one's own words, but these authoritative words may be integrated through a process of dialogization; hence, they are no longer the authoritative word of an external other, but they become the "internally persuasive" word within one's own self. Pamela's change in language, for example, signals a merger of the other's word with her own. As Bakhtin points out,

> . . . the unique speech experience of each individual is shaped and developed in continuous and constant

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'thouing', and the often unintentional comic 'poetic' imagery -- of domestic puritan traditions of devotional introspection" (47). Obviously Kinkead-Weekes has failed to recognize that the internally dialogized language of scripture *as the word of the other* is precisely the most adequate language for a devout Christian to voice during a time of deep spiritual crisis. To dismiss this language as mostly comic or simply idiomatic is, in my view, to make an ahistorical value judgment, rather than an aesthetic one.

> interaction with others' individual utterances. This experience can be characterized to some degree as the process of *assimilation*--more or less creative--of others' words (and not the words of a language). Our speech . . . is filled with others' words, varying degrees of otherness or varying degrees of "our-own-ness," varying degrees of awareness and detachment. (*SG,* 89)

Pamela's questions to herself are not merely her own autonomous words. The authoritative words of scripture have been reaccentuated, dialogized, and made innerly persuasive. Again, as Bakhtin explains,

> Internally persuasive discourse--as opposed to one that is externally authoritative--is, as it is affirmed through assimilation, tightly interwoven with "one's own word." In the everyday rounds of our consciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours, and half-someone else's. Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our own words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. (*DI,* 345)

Here, Pamela's words mark a testing of herself with the authoritative word, and it is also a simultaneous testing of that word since it has been reaccentuated to speak to her own situation. The authoritative word *qua* authoritative word cannot be argued with; it cannot be tested; it can only be fully accepted.[81] Similarly, "The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it may have to persuade us internally . . . " (*DI,* 342). Pamela's questions *are* questions. The word of the other has merged with her own word and gives rise to a dialogue within her own consciousness. Pamela's questions contain within them a "cringing" at the answer, a "side-ward glance" at the potential reply. They are not merely rhetorical questions; rather, her reasoning reveals an intense debate within herself--a debate informed by the internally dialogized word of the other:

> God *can* touch his heart in an instant ; and if this should *not* be done, I can *then* put an end to my life by some other means, if I am so resolved. How do I know but *these bruises* and *maims* that I received, while I pursued the escape I had meditated, may not have furnished myself the opportunity to precipitate myself, and of surrendering up myself, spotless and unguilty, to that Merciful Being who gave it. (151)

At this point, Pamela's reasoning still reveals the spiritual pride that she has consistently harbored. However, there is a further dialogization of the word of the other, and the force of the internally persuasive word becomes more apparent:

> who gave thee, presumptuous as thou art, a power over life? Who authorised thee to put an end to it, when the weakness of thy mind suggests not to thee a way to

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[81] Emerson and Morson (1990), make this point (219).

> preserve it with honour? How knowest thou what purpose God may have to serve, by the trials with which thou art now exercised? (151)

Pamela's remarks are increasingly dialogized in this passage, and they take on an active double-voicedness, not only through the reaccentuation of biblical language, but also in the suggestion of her presumption and weakness of mind. These are judgements that Pamela has failed to make upon herself with any seriousness thus far. But there is an important change in Pamela here.

We now perceive in Pamela a consciousness of herself through the refracted consciousness of the other's internally dialogized word. She now judges herself *through* the innerly present voice of the other, through the innerly dialogized judgement of the other. But the process of double-voicedness becomes even more complex yet as she continues: "Art thou to put a bound to the Divine Will, and say, ' Thus much will I bear, and no more ' ? And wilt thou *dare* to say, that if the trial be augmented, and continued, thou wilt sooner die than bear it ?" (151). Not only does Pamela articulate the internally persuasive voice of the other ("Art thou to put a bound to the Divine Will"), *she now speaks her own voice as given through the consciousness of the other*--of God. Here, Pamela gives voice to God voicing *her* words as he gives them back to her: " 'Thus much will I bear, and no more'. " And this voicing of God's voicing of her own words is framed within a larger question which is itself her voicing of the internally persuasive word of the other.

Bakhtin describes this kind of double-voiced dialogue as "intensely dialogic discourse." The words and the voice of the other are inextricably bound with the words and voice of the speaker. The very shape and intonation of the discourse are imbued with the presence of the invisible other. Bakhtin explains that in such speech,

> We sense that this is a conversation, although only one person is speaking, and it is a conversation of the most intense kind, for each present, uttered word responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another person. (*PDP,* 197)

Pamela's apparent monologue is, in fact, an intense dialogue with the internally persuasive word of an other, and at times with that (corporeally absent) other. Her consideration of suicide is permeated with responses and reactions to the words of an invisible speaker. But the final test of those words will depend, ultimately, on their level of dialogic interaction within Pamela --on their level of transformation within Pamela from invisible external authority into meaningful internal agency. This is precisely what occurs.

It is, I think, no accident that some of the most intensely dialogic discourse in the novel also marks Pamela's most significant spiritual victory and, consequently, her most notable change in overall attitude. Through dialogue with the other, Pamela comes to discern something of her own "distrust" and spiritual pride. She realizes that her own "contrivances"--in which she had previously prided herself--have yielded only vain self-reliance and almost a final "act of despondency." Despondency is despair, and it is despair that is absolute negation of relation since it cuts the person off both from God and from others. Pamela herself alludes to this irrevocable negation of relation with God: " 'This act of despondency,' thought I, 'is a sin, that, if I pursue, admits no repentance, and can therefore hope no forgiveness' " (151).[82] So, Pamela writes with a reaffirmed awareness of her own relation to the other--to God who "sees" her heart--and with a new found awareness of her own spiritual pride:

> And how do I know but that God, who sees all the lurking vileness of my heart, may have permitted these sufferings on that very score, and to make me rely on his grace and assistance, who, perhaps, have too much prided myself in a vain dependence on my own foolish contrivances ? (151)

Pamela's decision not to commit suicide is, of course, her main victory in the novel since, as we have seen, she now comes to recognize that she has overcome a foe much worse than Mr. B: "that though I should have praised God for my deliverance, had I been freed from my wicked keepers, and my designing master, yet

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[82] In orthodox Christian terms, despair is considered blasphemy against the Holy Spirit and the one unforgivable sin since it precludes salvation in that the despairing person believes his or her own sin or situation beyond the efficacious remedy of the grace of God. Suicide is considered unforgivable *because it is seen as evidence of despair.* See Matthew. 12: 31.

I have more abundant reason to praise him, that I have been delivered from a worse enemy, *myself*" (152). It is, again, no accident that this victory brings with it a new recognition of her submerged feelings for Mr. B. It is immediately after her recovery, in her next "letter-journal" entry, that she admits, "when I heard of his danger . . . I could not in my heart forbear rejoicing for his safety" (156). No longer will Pamela be as "mistrustful" (127), and no longer will Pamela be at such clear variance with her own heart as when she wrote, "Lie still, my throbbing heart, divided as thou art, between thy hopes and thy fears" (127). So, Pamela's victory, through the dialogized internally persuasive word of the other, finally brings her to a new awareness of herself and a new attitude toward Mr. B--an awareness and an attitude that establish the grounds which eventually permit an authentic relation between them. But Mr. B. also has personal impediments to relation that *he* needs to overcome. Appropriately enough, his "victory" over himself will come as a result of a kind of dialogue with Pamela--as a result of reading Pamela's words--of reading her "heart."

As I have said, Mr. B, like Pamela, suffers from a sort of isolation at the beginning of the novel. His isolation is not simply the kind that often manifests itself as loneliness at the death of one's parents (although the recent loss of his mother and the previous loss of his father cannot be wholly discounted). Rather, Mr. B's isolation has more to do with a serious *lack* within himself. His isolation is of a complex ontological sort, often bordering on the moral, and at times on the spiritual. But Mr. B's "lack" has to do mostly with his self-perpetuated separation from others. Certainly, Mr. B. is in obvious need of moral education, but this moral education is inextricably connected to his fundamental disregard for the other. This disregard suggests an ontological orientation that is itself in need of quite radical reformation. We might say that Mr. B's *character,* not just his morality or his personality is in need of education. This is an ongoing "task" for Mr. B, since character is never finished; character is continuously forming, filling whatever void or lack that exists within the person. As Martin Buber has observed, "Education worthy of the name is essentially education of character . . . Personality is completion, only character is task" (*BM&M,* 132). Of course, Mr. B's fundamental "lack," his need of ontological reformation and his hidden desire for relation are not obvious in the novel, but they can be adequately uncovered with some due consideration. Again, we may return to the beginnings of the novel for some of the early indications of the peculiar forms that Mr. B's own isolation takes.[83]

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[83] Obviously, the predominantly single-focus epistolary form through which we see via Pamela's own colored lenses is the major impediment to our understanding Mr. B. fully. As Mark Kinkead-Weekes (1973) has noted, "The fact that Pamela is the only source of narrative makes it too easy to confer the reliability of her reportage on to her interpretation also; and hence to assume that she herself, her parents, and her view of B, are meant to represent Richardson's own vision. A single direct insight into B's mind . . . would have made a world of difference" (24).

As I have previously suggested, intimations of Mr. B's desire for relation with Pamela are evident from the very outset of the novel. His marked *attention* to her and his appropriation of her letter bespeak a latent desire which itself gestures towards love.[84] Indeed, later in the novel after Mr. B. has read Pamela's letters and she has voluntarily returned to him, he tells her, ". . . I love you with a purer flame than ever I knew in my life; and which commenced for you in the garden; though you, unkindly, by your unreasonable doubts nipped the opening bud, while too tender to bear the cold blasts of slight and negligence" (236). At this point, we know that Mr. B. now recognizes that his (unrealized) love for Pamela began very early, for the scene to which he is referring is related in Pamela's ninth letter to her parents (11). However, in the beginning of the novel, Mr. B is able neither to genuinely recognize the true nature of his feelings for

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[84] Here we may recall Simone Weil's comments with respect to the connection between love and attention: " The poet produces the beautiful by fixing his attention on something real. It is the same with the act of love . . . The authentic and pure values--truth, beauty, and goodness--in the activity of a human being are the result of one and the same act, a certain application of the full attention to the object." *Simone Weil: An Anthology.* Ed. Sian Miles. New York: Weidinfeld & Nicolson. 1986, 214. Similarly, Jose Ortega Y Gasset writes that "Falling in love is a phenomenon of attention." *On love: aspects of a single theme.* Trans. Toby Talbot. New York: Meridian Books, 1968, 44. As we will see, initially Mr. B does show an attention to Pamela, but it is only through the course of the novel that it becomes a full attention to her as a real *subject,* and it is only then that Mr. B's complete and authentic love comes to the fore.

Pamela--the "purer flame"--nor to give them sufficient attention to generate anything much less superficial and less ephemeral than concupiscence. Simply put, Mr. B. is often at war with his own submerged desires. Like Callicles in the *Gorgias* (482b2-7), Mr. B is in need of self-knowledge for he seems perpetually at "variance" with himself. Take, for example, Mr. B's almost schizophrenic behavior in Letter XVIIII:

> He said, [to Mrs. Jervis] I was a strange girl ; he knew not what to make of me. "And is she gone?" said he. "I intended to have said something else to her ; but she behaved so oddly, that I had not the power to stop her." She asked, if she should call me again. He said, 'Yes;" and then "No : let her go ; it is best for her and me too . . . . (26)

And again, later in the novel, Mr. B. exhibits the same kind of inner turmoil with increased intensity. "He then took me in his arms," writes Pamela, "and presently pushed me from him. 'Mrs. Jervis,' said he, 'take the little witch from me ; I can neither bear nor forbear her ! '--Strange words these !--'But stay ; you shan't go !--Yet begone !--No, come back again' " (44). Although Mr. B's external behaviour may suggest lust, his inner battle reveals a more fundamental need within him--a need that is at variance with simple sexual gratification.

Similarly, it is evident that Mr. B's desire for authentic relation with another has lain dormant long before it has been exposed through his dealings with Pamela.[85] His comments about marriage are telling in this respect. Mr. B. frankly admits to Pamela, "I cannot endure the thought of marriage, even with a person of equal or superior degree to myself ; and have declined several proposals of that kind" (188), and he later declares emphatically, "Indeed, I cannot marry" (193). It is only through coming to a genuine trust in Pamela--"this belief of you" as he calls it--that Mr. B. becomes able to marry at all, since, as he says, "nobody was more averse to this state than myself" (401). Clearly, Mr. B's aversion to the state of marriage attests to a deeper dread of relation--a dread born of mistrust and nourished by repeated observation of failed relations. Like Pamela, Mr. B. is a kind of moral empiricist. He tells her, " 'The perverseness and contradiction I have too often seen, in my visits, among people of sense, as well as condition, had prejudiced me to the married state' " (405). Like Pamela, Mr. B's orientation is like official monologism in that he adheres to a kind of ready made truth--the sole authority of his own observations. This is especially apparent in his monologic preconceptions about Pamela.

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[85] Roussel (1974) makes a similar point (379).

Mr. B's initial beliefs about Pamela are mere *inferences* based only his personal observations of other marriages and other young maids. Hence, the limitations of a monologic orientation toward others are demonstrated by Mr. B's failure to treat the individual other as an equal, autonomous subject. Recall Mikhail Bakhtin's comments on this score:

> Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another *I* with equal rights (*thou*). With

> a monologic approach (in its extreme or pure form) *another person* remains wholly and merely an *object* of consciousness, and not another consciousness.
> (*PDP,* 292-93)

It is evident that Mr. B. needs to overcome his deep-seated mistrust of others, but to do so, he must also overcome the concomitant monologic tendency to view others as objects rather than subjects with "equal rights and equal responsibilities." Mr. B's myopic objectification of the other is apparent both in his comments about Pamela and in the demeaning names he gives her. Like Pamela's propensity to demonize others, Mr. B. is too prone to belittle others (especially Pamela) with derogatory appellations. In part, the source of this tendency in Mr. B. may lie in matters of class and gender, but much of it seems to derive from Mr. B's inability to trust in Pamela's own humanity. For example, his repeated charge that Pamela is "artful" signifies both the depth of his suspicion and the measure of his objectification.

As an adjective, "artful" is often used in conjunction with a noun that itself tends to dehumanize Pamela; thus, she is deemed "an artful young baggage" (16), "a subtle artful gypsey" (17), or an "Artful slut" (207) who practices "artful wiles" upon men (159). Similarly, Mr. B. asserts that Pamela "is mistress of arts" (160), and he claims that Pamela's apparent unconcern for men is a sham, "her art" as he calls it (17). He further claims that her "terror" at his advances shows only that "she has all the arts of her sex" (24), and that likewise, she uses artifice to attract him: "and so you must disguise yourself to attract me, and yet pretend, like a hypocrite as you are----" (44).

Art, artifice, and artfulness, these are the categories of suspicion that Mr. B. invokes to justify his unwitting objectification of the other. They deny Pamela the implicit truth of her claims, and consequently, the explicit reality of her own unique behaviour. Mr. B. is under the illusion that the other is not "genuine," and so he is prevented from seeing beyond the false projections of his own mistrustful mind. He presumes to act in a duplicitous manner since he thinks that Pamela is acting in a duplicitous manner. He *thinks* he is responding to Pamela in kind. This, of course, means that Mr. B. is unable to confront Pamela with any real reciprocity. He does scrutinize her words and actions, but initially, he does not turn to her with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation (of subject to subject).

This is why so many of their early encounters are more like verbal battles than genuine dialogues. To employ Martin Buber's terms, Mr. B's initial attitude towards Pamela is essentially one of "I-It." He is one of those who "says I-It [and] assumes a position before things but does not does not confront them in the current of reciprocity" (*I and Thou,* 80). Mr. B's objectification of Pamela prevents reciprocity since he is unable to see Pamela for the person that she really is. To Mr. B, Pamela is a "creature" (23), "a Sauce-box, a Bold-face, a Pert" (28), an "idle slut" (35), a "little slut" (36), a "little villain" (43), a "little witch" (44), an "ungrateful baggage" (55), an "insinuator" (60), a "hussey" (61), a "*fool's plaything,*" "*a speaking picture*" (141), an "equivocator" (19, 20), and a "sorceress" (162). All these names indicate that Mr. B fails to recognize Pamela as a real, autonomous subject. He fails, in Martin Buber's terms, to "mean" Pamela. That is, he fails to turn to her in the fullness of his own being, and he fails to turn to her as the very one that she truly is. And it is this ontological failure that prevents a "genuine dialogue" between them. As Buber explains,

> In genuine dialogue the turning to the partner takes place in all truth, that is, it is the turning of the being. Every speaker 'means' the partner or partners to whom he turns . . . To 'mean' someone in this connection is at the same time to exercise that degree of making present which is possible to that speaker at that moment. The experiencing senses and the imagining of the real . . . work together to make the other present as a whole and as a unique being, as the person that he is. (*KM,* 75)

Still, although Mr. B does not initially imagine the real Pamela as the whole and unique being that she is, his latent desire for authentic relation does manifest itself at crucial times in his dealings with her. This becomes evident in those scenes where he makes apparent "attempts" at her virtue.

It has been previously noted that Mr. B does not, in fact, really carry out any of his "attempts" on Pamela, and hence *her* submerged trust in him is vindicated. Seen from another perspective, these "failed attempts" likewise reveal *his* submerged desire for authentic relation with Pamela. Again, this perspective is somewhat clouded by the single-focus epistolary form which presents most events from Pamela's own (limited) point of view. We need first to remember that Mr. B. has consistently avowed that he would not do Pamela any "harm." Very early in the novel he assures her, " I'll do you no harm, Pamela; don't be afraid of me " (12). And again, after the scene in the summer-house, Mr. B. says that Pamela is acting "*foolishly* upon it, as if I had intended to do you great harm . . ." (18). Similarly, Mr. B. says, "I abhor the thought of forcing her to any thing . . ." (23), and later he declares, "I intended no harm to her, as I told you both . . . and I did no harm neither" (52). Pamela's view, of course, is that Mr. B has indeed done her harm by his advances, but the fact remains that he never does carry through with these "attempts"--he never does her the real harm of raping her.

Far from showing that Mr. B. is a bungling rapist, a "Booby" as Fielding thought, Mr. B's failure to carry out his apparent attempts at Pamela's virtue reveal, not a physical inability to rape, but a psychological desire to engage something more than just her body. His "dilly dallying" (179), as Mrs. Jewkes calls it, intimates a deeper concern for Pamela than he himself has recognized. Like his almost schizophrenic behaviour, his "attempts" show a divided heart, a heart that desires authentic relation with Pamela, but misguidedly seeks to fulfill that desire through physical means. In light of Mr. B's consistent claims to do Pamela no harm, his "failed attempts" begin to look more like victories over his own monological tendencies. Clearly, when Pamela is most at his mercy, when she has fainted or is constrained, Mr. B. does not treat her merely as an object to be used for his personal pleasure. Rather, it is precisely when Mr. B. could treat Pamela solely as an object to be used--when he could treat her merely as a means to satisfy his sexual desire--that he *begins* to encounter her as a subject, to respond to her as a "Thou."

As Buber has explained, in the I/Thou relation, "No purpose intervenes between I and You, no greed and no anticipation; and longing itself is changed as it plunges from the dream into appearance. Every means is an obstacle. Only where all means have disintegrated encounters occur" (*I and Thou,* 62-63). When Pamela is most vulnerable to Mr. B, his sexual longing is checked, and he begins to see Pamela not just as a means to his own ends, but as a real person. The illusion, the "dream" of Pamela subtly begins to give way to the reality, the "appearance" of her humanity. As Pamela notes, after she has fainted and "fears for the liberties taken with her in her deplorable state, "Mr. B. soothes her "with an aspect of pity and concern" (179), and he withdraws "with a countenance of remorse" (180). This is a victory for Mr. B. insofar as his pity, concern, and remorse intimate a "turning" toward Pamela, and it is this turning which is the foundation of genuine dialogue, since "The basic movement of the life of dialogue," writes Buber, "is the turning towards the other" (*BMM,* 40). Mr. B. has encountered Pamela as a human being; he has moved toward *her*--not just an illusion of her--a small but significant step in overcoming his own monological propensities.

But this is not an easy victory for Mr. B, for it helps to reveal that latent desire for authentic relation that he has for so long denied. This is part of the reason for his almost schizophrenic behaviour, and in part, the reason that Mr. B. repeatedly raises the issue of his conduct being revealed to others.[86] Mr. B. is not simply worried about others being aware of his apparent breach of decorum or of being "exposed" as a rake (19); rather, he is "vexed" at the new "shapes" (36), his behaviour has taken because of his submerged love. He is disconcerted by his own love being revealed, not just to others, but to himself. To reiterate, Mr. B. needs to overcome his objectification of Pamela, his fear of relation, his denial of love, and his deep-seated mistrust of others. Put another way, Mr. B. needs to overcome his "monological approach" in favor of a dialogical one. And, for the most part, this he achieves through dialogue with Pamela.

We saw above that a good deal of Mr. B's "lack" is connected to a deep-rooted mistrust in others. With respect to Pamela in particular, Mr. B. repeatedly asks for her trust, and he is obviously upset when that trust is not forthcoming: " 'Strange damned fate ! . . . that when I speak so solemnly, I can't be believed !' " (70). And it seems that faith *in* the trust of the other generates responsibility *to* the other; as Mr. B. explains to Pamela, "if you doubt me, I have no obligation to your confidence or opinion" (190). The other's trust is a kind of address, a petition for a reciprocal response. So, the trust of the other is an invitation to the addressee to enter into a dialogical relation. Similarly, Mr. B. himself comes to understand that his own mistrust is due, in part, to the mistrust of Pamela. Again, his comments suggest that trust itself seems to be a dialogical relation. He tells Pamela,

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[86] Again, Roussel (1947) is right on the mark when he notes that "When B is seized by love and forced to violate the distance between himself and Pamela, he is forced as well to reveal himself to her. One of the words which constantly appear in opposition to distance in the novel is the word 'expose' " (380).

> You need not be afraid of trusting yourself to *me*; I ought to be doubtful of myself when I am with *you* ;--but before I say any thing further on this subject, I will take my proud heart to task ; and, till then, let every thing be as if this conversation had never passed. Only let me tell you, that the more confidence you place in me, the more you'll oblige me : but your doubts will only beget *cause* of doubts. (194)

Mistrust prevents genuine dialogue, but significantly, it is often also *through* dialogue that this mistrust is overcome. In this regard, it is noteworthy, then, that the "movement" toward Pamela that we saw above was facilitated, in part, by Mr. B's overhearing a conversation between Pamela and Mrs. Jewkes, and it is furthered in the discussion that follows that overheard dialogue.

On the third day following Mr. B's final "attempt" on Pamela, he requests her to "attend" him in the garden. In this scene, Mr. B's behaviour is quite uncharacteristic in that he shows neither his authoritative assertiveness nor his rakish playfulness. On Pamela's arrival, Mr. B. takes her hand and declares, "I will now talk to you in a serious manner" (187). Here begins one of the decisive dialogues in the novel. It is telling that apart from her "wit" and "penetration" (187), Mr. B. praises Pamela for her "open, frank, and generous mind" (188)--constitutive elements of genuine dialogue (see above, 46). In large part, Pamela's own instances of open, frank, and generous conversation--her own exemplification of genuine dialogue--have diminished Mr. B's mistrust, and consequently, reduced his willingness to treat Pamela as an object. As he tells her, "Your pretty chit-chat to Mrs. Jewkes, the last Sunday night, so innocent, and so full of beautiful simplicity, half disarmed my resolution before I approached your bed" (188). Pamela's authentic words have helped give birth to a corresponding authenticity in Mr. B. His words to Pamela are similarly marked by openness, frankness, and generosity. He frankly points out which of her "accomplishments" have "engaged" his "affections so deeply," and declares that he cannot live without her. He openly acknowledges that he wanted Pamela on his "own terms," and that he has not been totally innocent but is "not a very abandoned profligate" (188). Furthermore, Mr. B. generously *invites* Pamela to be partner in dialogue with him, to help him to decide on what he should say and do. After confessing his passion for her, Mr. B. asks, "But now, what shall I say further, Pamela?" and he declares, "I will make you, though a party, my advisor in this matter, though not, perhaps, my definitive judge" (188). And after more confession, questions, and conversation, wherein Mr. B. has revealed "candidly" his mind, he entreats Pamela to respond genuinely and fully to what he has said: " 'tell me, with like openness and candour, what you think I ought to do, and what you would have me do' " (188). A dialogic orientation, it seems, courts a similar response.

Notice also that Mr. B's authentic "address" to Pamela likewise gives rise to a genuine response in her; she now admits that his "treatment"--his genuine address--has been a "blow" to her "most guarded thoughts" (189). Mr. B's words have arisen as a response to the words of Pamela, and his response now constitutes an address to her which elicits an authentic response: a consciousness of her latent desire for relation with Mr. B--a consciousness of her "most guarded thoughts." A dialogical relation has begun between Pamela and Mr. B., and now we see the *makings* of a "genuine dialogue" between them. They do, for a brief time, engage in genuine dialogue, but this engagement is short-lived. There is soon a falling away from the goal of genuine dialogue. As with the I/Thou relation wherein "Every You is doomed by its nature to become a thing or at least to enter into thinghood again and again" (*I and Thou,* 69, 147), so the genuine dialogue between Mr. B. and Pamela degenerates into dialogue which is not fully dialogical. This occurs, in part, because not all the impediments have been removed to allow for a fully authentic relation between them; their relation is not yet fully dialogical--it is not yet ongoing "genuine dialogue" in that there are still elements of mistrust on Pamela's side and of monologic desire on Mr. B's side. There is still not a full meeting of subject to subject. Pamela still equivocates at Mr. B's questions about her affections, and this lack of openness, as Mr. B. intimates, prevents the full fruition of relation by causing turmoil in his soul: "in not answering me directly, you put my soul upon the rack" (190). Mr. B. is adamant that no "secret of [Pamela's] soul" (191) is to be permitted as it would interfere in their relation. Although Mr. B. pleads with Pamela to "take me as I am at present . . . sincere and undesigning" (193), to accept him as "the very one" that he truly is, *he* still does not fully reciprocate by recognizing the authentic moral centre of real Pamela's self; he still declares, " 'Indeed, I cannot marry' " (193). For her part, Pamela continues to be doubtful of Mr. B. and at odds with her own heart:

> What shall I do , what steps take, if all this be designing ?--O the perplexities of these cruel doubtings !--To be sure, if he be false, I have gone too far ! I am, on the apprehension of this, ready to bite my forward tongue (or rather to beat my more forward heart that dictated to that poor machine), for what I have said. (194)

Notwithstanding Mr. B's sincere professions of affection and his warm entreaties for trust, Pamela chooses to believe the claim of the suspicious looking gypsy (Mr. Longman in disguise) that Mr. B. intends a "sham wicked marriage," even though she has, as she says, "as good as confessed I love him" (199). But to remove the remaining barriers to relation, Mr B and Pamela must engage in another kind of "dialogue." The efficacy of this "dialogue" will again come to rest in the domain of the epistle. Let's look at this section of the novel briefly.

The "dialogue" that is primarily responsible for removing the principal obstacles to genuine relation between Pamela and Mr. B. is, for the most part, unseen. This "dialogue" is Mr. B's reading of Pamela's journal, the attendant exchanges between them that this reading occasions, and finally Pamela's reading of Mr. B's request that she return. But the *results* of these readings are preceded by a failure in genuine dialogue. A day after Mr. B's declarations of love and requests for trust, he leaves for Stamford, and the next day Pamela is visited by the "gypsey" who delivers the letter about the "sham marriage." Mr. B. returns a day later and is given some of Pamela's papers that Mrs. Jewkes had earlier confiscated. Later that day, Mr. B comes to Pamela, and they begin to discuss the papers which Mr. B. has not yet read. Pamela asks Mr. B. not to read them since, as she says, "what one writes to one's father and mother, is not for every body to see" (202). With confidence of their new found relation, Mr. B. responds " Nor . . . am I every body," and in order to reassure Pamela, he asks rhetorically, "if I had not loved you, do you think I would have troubled myself about your letters? "

(202). But Pamela replies with the acrimony of reaffirmed mistrust: " 'Alas ! Sir,' " said I, 'great pride to me *that !* For they gave you such an opinion of my innocence, that you was resolved to ruin me. And what advantage have they brought *me,*who have been made a prisoner, and used as I have been between you and my housekeeper?' " (202). At this point, Mr. B. is taken aback, and asks, " 'Why, Pamela . . . why this behaviour for my goodness to you in the garden? This is not of a piece with your conduct and softness there ; that quite charmed me in your favour : and you must not give me cause to think you will be more insolent, as you find me kinder.' " Instead of genuinely and directly answering Mr. B's question, Pamela continues to be mistrustful, and she explicitly voices her suspicions and withdraws her previous overtures of love: " 'Ah ! Sir . . . you know best your own heart and designs ! But I fear I was too open-hearted then ; and that you still keep your resolution to undo me, and have only changed the form of your proceedings' " (202). Now Mr. B's trust in Pamela is likewise shaken; "a little sternly" he replies, " 'When I tell you once again . . . that you cannot oblige me more than by placing some confidence in me, I will let you know that these foolish and perverse doubts are the worst things you can be guilty of . . . you begin to make *me* suspect you.' "

In this exchange, Richardson gives the reader a little object lesson in how *not* to conduct a genuine dialogue. Mr. B's subsequent reading of Pamela's journal will facilitate an authentic relation between them, but unnecessary misunderstanding and pain intervene because of a lack of genuine dialogue here. Had Pamela trusted in the authenticity of the movement toward relation that they had made in the garden, had she trusted in the genuine dialogue that had occurred, the direction of this dialogue would have been different. Furthermore, even if her suspicions were warranted, mistrust need not follow. If she would have spoken with the same openness and candour as in the garden and given the reason for her suspicions, then presumably this failure to communicate would have been avoided. A dialogical approach of candour, openness, and directness--a *willingness* to engage in genuine dialogue--would have *created* a genuine dialogue and averted this unfortunate exchange. Instead, Pamela remains mistrustful, and because of these "foolish and perverse doubts," as Mr. B. sees them, he in turn is beginning to "suspect" her of being "prepossessed on some *other* person's favour" (202). Richardson has shown the reader how readily genuine dialogue can degenerate into mere verbal exchange, into a shadow of real dialogue. He has shown something of what Martin Buber has described as "an underworld of faceless spectres of dialogue" (*BMM,*28). But fortunately for Pamela and Mr. B, this is not the last word.

Mr. B. subsequently reads Pamela's letters with assurances from her of their open truthfulness: "I have no reason to be afraid of being found insincere, or having, in any respect, told you a falsehood : because, though I don't remember all I wrote, yet I know I wrote my heart, and that is not deceitful" (203). This assurance is more than a claim of her letters' veracity; it is also an assertion of the authenticity of Pamela's own heart, an inducement to read the letters *as a conversation* with her genuine self--her heart, for "this heart is Pamela" (223). As such, the letters constitute an appeal for genuine dialogue between the reader and the writer. They constitute a dialogical address that seeks a dialogical response. Since Pamela wrote her "heart," Mr. B. is expected to respond to them with reciprocal honesty and openness. Later, when Mr. B. sends for Pamela after reading her letters, his earlier "wrath'" (202) seems to have abated, and he is much more inclined to resume the goal of genuine dialogue. Although he playfully sets himself up as a judge of Pamela, nevertheless his comments to her suggest a *desire* for genuine dialogue: " 'I expect . . . that you will answer me directly, and plainly, to every question I shall ask you' " (203). Similarly, when he teasingly claims that Pamela has discouraged Mr. Williams' address only in "appearance," Pamela answers that "it does not appear so in the text" (203), and Mr. B. gives his assent to the truth of this reply. In so doing, Mr. B. affirms that the explicit truth of the "text" is the truth of Pamela's authentic feelings, for the text *is* her heart, and "this heart is Pamela." Again there is a *movement* towards genuine dialogue.

Eventually, Mr. B. convinces Pamela to surrender all her papers to him; he reads of her trials and her episode at the pond and is "touched" "sensibly" (213). In reading Pamela's letters--that is, in reading her heart--Mr. B. is once again able to see

Pamela for "the very one" that she is, and this renewed "dialogue" enables *him* to respond with the kind of authentic move toward relation that he has so long avoided. He responds with the intention of marrying. Mr. B. asks for Pamela's forgiveness and reaffirms his resolution to "defy the world and its censures, and make . . . Pamela amends" (214). But once again, suspicions of the "sham marriage" prevent Pamela from giving the genuine response of her heart, and she asks to return to her parents. Predictably, Mr. B now reacts with "a fearful passion" and requests that she leave his sight. Later in the day he orders her to return to her parents, and she begins the journey home. However, Pamela's submerged love for Mr. B. and her desire for relation with him are still apparent. Before leaving, she "like a fool . . . can't help crying" (215), and she feels "something so strange at [her] heart" (217). The seeds of authentic relation are fecund both in Mr. B. and Pamela; it remains only for genuine dialogue to bring them into fruition.

The final achievement of authentic relation between Mr. B. and Pamela is affected by Mr. B's further reading of Pamela's journal, and Pamela's subsequent reading of Mr. B's letters in response to her journal. In reading Pamela's journal, Mr. B. has engaged in a further "dialogue" with Pamela's "heart." And in response to this renewed "dialogue" with Pamela's "text"--with her "heart"--and "the affection they have riveted" (220) upon Mr. B., he writes Pamela with like authenticity. His reading of her journal enables Mr. B. to once again *move* toward genuine dialogue with her and declare his love. Similarly, Mr. B's letter enables Pamela to see him as he really is, "with so much openness, affection, and *honour* too (which was all [she] had doubted)" (220). Mr. B's address to Pamela is sufficiently dialogical that, finally, she cannot but respond and openly recognize her love for him: "*Love,* did I say--But come, it is not, I hope, gone so very far as to make me *very* uneasy : for I know not *how* it came, nor *when* it began ; but it has crept like a thief, upon me, before I knew what was the matter" (220). However, Pamela still does not fully recognize that this love has lain dormant in her heart all the while, and thus she mistakenly feels her heart has betrayed her real self: "O my treacherous heart to serve me thus !" (221). This is why she continues on her journey until she receives Mr. B's next letter.

Meanwhile, Mr. B. has read the remainder of Pamela's journal, and as a consequence, he writes her again with a *full* expression of his love for her and of his desire for authentic relation. Further, Mr. B. *invites* Pamela to *freely* return and, thus, to show a reciprocal response to his address. Not only does his letter fully reveal his genuine feelings for Pamela, he now treats her as "another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another *I* with equal rights (*thou*)" (*PDP,* 292). Although Pamela has recognized her love for Mr. B., she persists in thinking that her heart is betraying her by being "too credulous" (223).

The inner dialogue that follows is telling since it brings her to a final and full awareness that her heart and her real self are one and the same. After going over various reasons for not "giving way to the love of so dear a gentleman," Pamela finally comes to realize that her inner dialogue is folly given the genuine dialogue between Mr. B. and her "heart": "Thus foolishly dialogued I with my heart ; and yet, *all the time,* this heart is Pamela" (Italics mine, 223). Through the authentic address of the other (Mr. B.), Pamela has reached a state of congruence with herself. She now realizes that "all the time" her heart has been *her.* We see that genuine dialogue moves one *toward* authentic relation, and through relation with the other, the self reaches congruence--it reaches self-knowledge. As a result, Pamela decides that her response to Mr. B's address will be to "trust in his generosity" (224), and she returns to him.

From this point, their full and authentic relation is all but achieved; what remains is to *confirm* each other's love through continued genuine dialogue. It seems we can rest assured in this confirmation since Pamela and Mr. B. appear to recognize the absolute importance of ongoing genuine dialogue between them. As Mr. B says, "I am confident there can be no friendship lasting without freedom, and communicating to one another even the little caprices . . ." (335). This fully free, open, and direct communication between Mr. B and Pamela is the hope that the novel offers. It is the hope of genuine dialogue and the promise of that full equality of authentic relation that it both fosters and manifests:

[Mr. B:] Where, then, is the obligation, if not on my side, to

> you ?--But let us talk of nothing henceforth but equality . . . [Pamela:] you make me hope, that I shall be confirmed and approved by you ; and that we may have a prospect of perpetuating each other's happiness, till time shall be no more . . . And so we entered the house together. (314)

As the exchange above suggests, contrary to many eighteenth century notions of matrimony, Richardson's novel explores the radical view that full and authentic relation of "equality" is a necessary precursor to marriage. A genuine dialogue between "hearts," rather than a perpetual alliance of like classes, is what counts. *Pamela* is a work that shows the crucial need for dialogue, not only for the congruence of the self, but also for the foundation of authentic relation. Not only does polyphony appear in the double-voiced passages, the novel is permeated with moral philosophy that reflects Socratic philosophy and with dialogic elements that anticipate salient aspects of the thought of Bakhtin and Buber. Understood properly, *Pamela* is clearly anything but, as Terry Eagleton has claimed, "a cartoon version of *Clarissa,* simplified, stereotyped and comic in outcome."[87]

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[87] Terry Eagleton, *The Rape of Clarissa.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, 37.

Chapter Three

Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*: The Unrecognized Dialogic Imagination

> The dialogue of life requires a dialogic method and a dialogic conception of truth to represent it. But in Bakhtin's view, such a concept of truth is missing from modern Western thought, at least insofar as that thought is represented in the tradition of philosophy. So far, only literary works have approached this more adequate representation. The best novelists are far ahead of the philosophers. (Morson and Emerson, 1990)

A. *Pride and Prejudice*

It is by now well recognized that *Pride and Prejudice* is a kind of "novel of education" that involves cognition, judgement, and self-knowledge, with important ethical implications for both the individual and society. This, of course, raises hermeneutic and epistemological issues, and these issues are connected to and implicated in Jane Austen's use of narrative voice and especially in her use of dialogue. In an enduring essay, more than forty years ago, Reuben Brower noted that "What most satisfies us in reading the dialogue in *Pride and Prejudice* is Jane Austen's awareness that it is difficult to know any complex person, that the knowledge of a man like Darcy is an interpretation and a construction, not a simple absolute," and he further argues that Elizabeth's education "shows us what is meant by a more reasonable interpretation: it is a reasoned judgment of character reached through long experience and slow weighing of probabilities."[88] Similarly, in some measure, but certainly not in any exhaustive way, Jane Austen's philosophical leanings and their possible sources have also been suggested.[89] However, Jane Austen's "dialogic imagination," with its Bakhtinian and Socratic dimensions, has been virtually unrecognized.[90] My task here, then, will be to focus on some specific issues in *Pride and Prejudice,* and to show how Jane Austen's handling of these issues closely corresponds to some of the prominent features of Bakhtin's "Dialogical Imagination" and of "Socratic Philosophy." Now, although some of these issues may seem simple at first glance, they are often rather complex since they are, at times, connected or overlapping, whereas at other times they seem isolated and distinct.

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[88] Reuben Arthur Brower, *Fields of Light.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 172. Similarly, nearly thirty years ago Alistair Duckworth remarked on "The relativistic (or better, perspectivist) aspects involved in knowing another person" in *Pride and Prejudice. The Improvement of the Estate.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971, 121. See also, Susan Morgan, *In the Meantime: Character and Perception in Jane Austen's Fiction.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980. Tony Tanner, "Knowledge and Opinion: *Pride and Prejudice,"* in *Jane Austen.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.

[89] For Shaftsbury's influence on Jane Austen, for example, see Gilbert Ryle's "Jane Austen and the Moralists," in *English Literature and British Philosophy,* ed. S. P. Rosenbaum. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971. See also, Philip Drew, "Jane Austen and Bishop Butler." *Nineteenth-Century Fiction,* Vol 35, #2 (1980), and Martha Satz, "An Epistemological Understanding of *Pride and Prejudice,"* in *Jane Austen: New Perspectives,* ed. Janet Todd. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc, 1983.

[90] The phrase "Socratic dimensions" is important because I do not intend to navigate the perilous waters of "influence" or "debt" with respect to Jane Austen's precise philosophical leanings. I do, however, want to show how much of her ethical

For example, the issue of Elizabeth's "education" seems fairly straight-forward. Initially she harbors a (not altogether) unfounded prejudice against Mr. Darcy, and through subsequent revelations and changes in perception, she comes to recognize her errors in judgement; she comes to a new self-knowledge, and, thus, radically changes in her regard for him--so much so that she admits to her father that she not only likes him but loves him.[91] Certainly this is an accurate account of the bare bones of the "story," but when we dig a little deeper into the anatomy of Elizabeth's education and examine the motivation and reasons

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thought is aligned to "Socratic philosophy." It must suffice to say that Socrates was already much "in the air" by Jane Austen's time, and it seems safe to assume a general familiarity on her part with Socratic notions. For example, there was a very popular biography of Socrates by Cooper that appeared in 1749 and by 1771 reached its fourth edition. See *Socratic Questions,*175. Similarly, in his *Notes on the Art of Poetry* (1776), Richard Hurd wrote ". . . But the public taste, as appears, is running full fast that way [Platonic dialogue]." Cited in Michael Prince, *Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment.* Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1996, 163.

[91] Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice.* Ed. Frank W. Bradbrook and James Kinsley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970, 335. Subsequent citations in parenthesis.

underlying her radical shift, matters become less transparent and less straight-forward.

Consider that for decades, critics have tended to stress that Elizabeth's education (and Darcy's alteration) is made possible largely because of certain character traits that Elizabeth possesses. Her vivacity, wit, intelligence, physical vitality, and curiosity have been repeatedly emphasized.[92] However, Elizabeth does not merely need to overcome a *particular* prejudice, a need her "traits" almost guarantee, in Bakhtinian terms, Elizabeth also needs to overcome a deep-seated monological world view.[93] If Elizabeth's final union with Mr. Darcy is uncertain in the first two-thirds of the novel, her eventual epistemological success has been seen as almost inevitable given her character. But if viewed in light of Bakhtin's analysis of monologism and Socrates' apprehension of dialogue as an invitation for self-examination, Elizabeth's eventual triumphs seem far less secure.

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[92] It would be pointless to list the numerous references to such a commonplace in Austen criticism. I will refer to some of the germane conceptions of Elizabeth's traits in the course of my discussion. There are also a few counter examples to the critical approbation of Elizabeth's traits. These will also be cited as required.

[93] As I have suggested, critics tend to agree on Elizabeth's traits, but the critical *evaluation* of the meaning of these character traits tends to fall into two broad camps. In very general terms, one group tends to admire these traits insofar as they permit Elizabeth's education, they facilitate the modulation of Darcy's character, and they complement Elizabeth as an individual and, consequently, her subsequent union with Mr. Darcy. The second camp, largely informed by feminist criticism, also tends to admire these traits, but they are seen as more subversive--a challenge to male patriarchy, power, and dominance. Of course, there are a number other ways of conceptualizing the critical battle lines drawn over the novel's treatment of character traits and related issues. D. W. Harding may be seen as representing a view that stresses the autonomy of the individual, such that "The social world . . . hasn't the power that comes from having created or moulded her . . . the heroine is independent of those about her and isolated from

Early in *Pride and Prejudice,* Elizabeth tends to think she knows the truth of matters. But this goes far deeper than her merely thinking she knows all or even some of the facts; her problem is more complex. In my view, Elizabeth lacks two crucial things in her life: the capacity for experiencing wonder and the ability to enter into a dialogical relation. It is the conjunction of these two deficiencies that is primarily responsible for her pervasive monologism. As we will see, these two notions are connected to each other, but they also bear on some other issues that have figured in recent (and some not so recent) discussions of the novel. In very general terms, these issues include the nature of Elizabeth's subjectivity and the nature of her union with Mr. Darcy.

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them." "Regulated Hatred: An Aspect of the Work of Jane Austen." *Scrutiny,* VIII (1940), 346-62. Whereas Marilyn Butler exemplifies a position that sees the novel as about "the struggle towards a fixed and permanent truth external to the individual; and chastening, necessarily, to individual presumption and self-consequence." *Jane Austen and the War of Ideas.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, 260. More recently, this critical split has been drawn in terms of a de-centered subject versus the Cartesian subject, or simply in terms of patriarchy versus "women's culture"--more about these later.

1) Wonder

> Socrates: . . . This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosoher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin . . .
> (Plato, *Theaetetus,* 155b)

On the face of it, it may seem odd to talk about the notion of wonder as a crucial element in properly understanding Elizabeth's monological world view. There certainly are no *explicit* references in *Pride and Prejudice* to her lack of wonder per se, but the novel does offer itself to a reading in which wonder or its lack plays an important role.[94] In any case, we need first to define wonder before exploring how the concept figures in the novel.

The term wonder includes two connected senses. One sense has to do with the "feeling of surprise, admiration, and awe aroused by something strange, unexpected." The other sense has to do with having "curiosity, sometimes mingled with doubt about [something]; [a] want to know."[95] This will do nicely as a basic working definition, but for the purposes of my discussion, there is more that needs to be said about wonder. Fortunately, some thinkers have elaborated on the meaning and implications of this definition. For example, F. R. Leavis has noted that in

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[94] On the other hand, it may also seem odd that critics have *not* noticed the role of wonder in *Pride and Prejudice* as the term itself appears at least forty-four times in the novel, and variations of the term such as "awe," "astonished," "amazed," and "surprised" occur at least another fifty times.

[95] *Webster's New World Dictionary*. Ed. David B. Guralnik. Cleveland: Williams Collins Publishers, Inc., 1979.

Dickens' *Hard Times* Mr. Gradgrind admonishes his daughter, " 'Louisa, never wonder!' "[96] Mr. Leavis goes on to explain that Mr. Gradgrind wants his daughter to have "scrupulous deference towards the laws that limit possibility, and towards the formulated definitions that chart the actual and may be taken as the real reality" (Leavis, 14-15); "Wonder," he adds "is the welcoming apprehension of the new, the . . . recognition of the divined possibility." Mr. Leavis's comments are suggestive as to how wonder or the lack thereof affects the individual. Gradgrind's position on wonder is the position of monologism--a deferring to the "laws that limit possibility--or in Bakhtin's terms, a deferring to "ready-made truth" (*PDP,* 110). Wonder, as Mr. Leavis describes it, entails the kind of receptivity to the world which is fundamentally dialogic in nature; it is more than a temporal/spatial *event*; it is an *attitude of being.* On this score, we will see that for at least the first two thirds of the novel, Elizabeth, in fact, does defer "towards the laws that limit possibility," and likewise, that she is wanting with respect to "the welcoming apprehension of the new." Elizabeth's level of wonder, then, may function as an index to her own dialogical engagement with the world. But there is yet another aspect of wonder that proves relevant to my discussion of the novel.

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[96] F. R. Leavis, *Nor Shall My Sword.* London: Chatto and Windus Ltd, 1972, 14. For further discussion pertaining to the history and use of the term wonder in literature see, J. V. Cunningham's "Woe or Wonder: The Emotional Effect of Shakespearean Tragedy" in *The Collected Essays of J. V. Cunningham.* Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc, 1976, especially 9-29 and 53-96.

In a recent meditation on Rene Descartes' *The Passions of the Soul,* Luce Irigaray offers a further insight into wonder. She writes that "wonder is a mourning for the self as an autarchic entity . . . Wonder must be the advent or the event of the other."[97] Ms. Irigaray's comments are significant because they point to an explicit connection between wonder and the other--between wonder and *relation.* Again, this connection is apropos of Elizabeth, and we will see, for example, that her education does not merely entail self-knowledge in the sense of realizing one's mistakes or prejudices; Elizabeth's education has a considerable, if ignored, dialogic component. Seen from this perspective, some of the very traits critics rightly tend to praise her for are, in how she sometimes manifests them, detrimental to her. Elizabeth's independence, for example, although generally a positive virtue, sometimes impedes rather than facilitates her personal growth and her interpersonal relations. She herself will come to "mourn" not just her mistakes, but her overweening self-sufficiency--her continual "autarchic" approach to the other. Similarly, it will become clear that Elizabeth's deficiency with respect to wonder translates into a failure, almost disastrous, to open herself to "the advent or event of the other"--in particular, the advent of Mr. Darcy in her life.[98] What specific textual evidence do we have, then, that Elizabeth lacks wonder? And what role does this deficiency play in the novel? Before I directly consider how *Pride and Prejudice* reveals Elizabeth's monological world view in connection to wonder, I want first to illustrate how Jane Austen has revealed that this monological tendency permeates Elizabeth's world from the outset of the novel.

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[97] Luce Irigaray, *An Ethics of Sexual Difference.* Trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, 75.

[98] Again, my contention is that, initially, Elizabeth lacks these senses of wonder, and it is here that my view differs from the general critical consensus about Elizabeth Bennet's

2) Monological Milieu

It is, I think, important to recognize that Jane Austen did not see Elizabeth in any telling isolation from her family or her world. Elizabeth's monological world view and its particular manifestation as a deficiency of wonder is diagnosed as an individual case of a more pervasive, if equally pernicious, societal pathology. If we consider the first few chapters of *Pride and Prejudice* in light of Bakhtin's exploration of monologism--taking our cue from Mr. Leavis's comments about

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traits. For example, in an otherwise fine essay, Gary Kelly argues that the two main traits that permit Elizabeth's "education" are "courage" and "curiosity." However, this seems to be an a priori assumption on Mr. Kelly's part. He never actually *argues* for Elizabeth's having curiosity throughout the novel, and the only reference that he cites in support of his contention is the passage that describes her opening Mr. Darcy's letter "with no expectation of pleasure, but with the strongest curiosity" (*Pride and Prejudice,* 174). Of course, this is what we would expect at this juncture in the novel, and it is the *only* reference to Elizabeth's curiosity that I could find in the novel. See, Gary Kelly, "The Art Of Reading In *Pride and Prejudice." English Studies in Canada,* Vol X, #2 (1984), 156-71.

wonder--a perspective on the novel will emerge that sees the irony and comedy as much more than the novel's *modus operandi* or mode of discourse.[99] Or put another way, we will see that the irony and comedy, although certainly amusing in their own right, also serve the serious function of moral and social critique.[100] Jane Austen wastes no time in cutting to the heart of the matter; the monological milieu and the critique that it intimates is sounded in the very first line of the novel. Far from being the fragmented, disorganized world that many critics have claimed, the world that Elizabeth occupies is one that is relatively static and unified insofar as it is a world that generally shares in a monological consciousness.[101]

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[99] It is not my intention to analyze comedy or irony as concepts in any way. I would side with Wayne C. Booth's reservation that "irony has come to stand for so many things that we are in danger of losing it as useful term altogether" (2). For a thorough study of irony, see his *A Rhetoric of Irony.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1974.

[100] Others have noted that irony in the novel is more than window dressing, but none to my knowledge have seen the function of irony (and comedy) in terms of revealing a pervasive monological milieu. However, some recent critics especially have emphasized some of the serious uses of irony in the novel. For example, in "Ideological Contradictions and the Consolations of Form (2)," Mary Poovey writes that "Jane Austen's irony, then, enables her to reproduce--without exposing in any systematic way--some of the contradictions inherent in bourgeois ideology." In Ed. Robert Clark. *New Case Books: "Sense and Sensibility" and "Pride and Prejudice".* New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1994, 113-14. Similarly, in "Irony and Authority," Rachel Brownstein writes that ". . . Austen questions authorative discourse through dialogue . . . There are many modes of dialogue in *Pride and Prejudice,* the first of which is the mode of ironic narrative." Ibid, 190. Julia Prewitt Brown writes that Jane Austen's "irony is the stylistic expression of the dialectical relation between self and society . . . irony mediates between the ideal and the real on the level of form." *Jane Austen's Novels: Social Change and Literary Form.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979, 25.

"It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife." Probably the most famous and most widely discussed line in Jane Austen's works, the opening of *Pride and Prejudice* is also unique to her fiction in that it begins with an authorative assertion rather than a description. As Bakhtin points out, as an assertion "there must be a creator of the given utterance whose position it expresses" (*PDP,* 184). Here, then, is a position, a world view, that is offered for our consideration. But as the point of departure for the novel, it functions not only as an ironic comment on what the reader will come to recognize as the parochial perspective of Mrs. Bennet in particular and her neighbourhood in general, it also cleverly insinuates a philosophical orientation that will inform--sometimes explicitly, more often implicitly--the subsequent action of the novel.[102] On one level, of course, the "truth universally acknowledged" proves, in fact, to be neither true nor universal. Rather than underwrite an external objective truth that is "out there" in the world, the opening statement serves to delineate the internal localized attitude of the majority of those who people the novel. Such an attitude, authorative on the surface, but ironically rendered, suggests a state of mind steeped in monologism.

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[101] Ira Koningsberg, for example, sees the world of *Pride and Prejudice* as one of "social and universal disorder." *Narrative Technique in the English Novel: Defoe to Austen.* Hamden: Archon Books, 1985, 254, and Alistair Duckworth remarks on the "initial condition of potential social fragmentation" in the novel. *The Improvement of the Estate.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971, 116.

[102] Kenneth Moler argues that the opening line duplicates both the language "associated with Hume, Smith, and other

The opening line is, of course, a generalization, and as such it immediately invites scrutiny from a Bakhtinian point of view.[103] As many critics have already noted, its irony is evident, and so we are meant to understand that this is a particular, limited perspective rather than a universal truth.[104]

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prestigious philosophers of the day," and the language of the advocates of moral self-examination. *Pride and Prejudice: A Study in Artistic Economy.* Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989, 34.

[103] Howard S. Babb's take on generalizations in Jane Austen is indicative of those who tend to fail to recognize potential monologism inherent in such statements. In an otherwise excellent study of the use of dialogue in Jane Austen's novels, Mr. Babb writes that a generalization's "reliability is confirmed by the impersonal phrasing . . . Thus, a generalization, like its close relative the maxim, apparently brings to bear universal wisdom, so fundamental that we all can assume ourselves ready to call on it at any moment." *Jane Austen's Novels: The Fabric of Dialogue.* Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962, 13. Similarly, Nancy Armstrong sees the opening line as indicating that "fiction by definition no longer opposed truth . . . ." *Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, 135.

[104] Dorothy Van Ghent, on the other hand, sees the opening as signifying "its opposite--a single woman must be in want of a man with a good fortune." See, "On *Pride and Prejudice,*" in *Pride and Prejudice,* ed. Donald J. Gray. Norton Critical

But for a fuller understanding, we need to note that this "local truth" is disguised as a universal truth, not merely to ironically highlight the folly of those who accede to its *veracity*, but much more, to undermine the *validity* of a presumption to authorative discourse by those who monologically claim to *know* certain truths. Put another way, it is not the status of truth as such that is undermined by the opening line, but rather, it is the validity of a world view, of a pattern of thinking, that is put into question. Consequently, two kinds of monologism are simultaneously exposed--that which is parochial opinion but masquerades as universal truth, and that which claims epistemic authority and thereby demonstrates its own philosophical limitations. The opening line, then, constitutes a moment of dialogical juxtapositioning of two fundamental world views; it intimates not only a critique of monologism, but also by extension an affirmation of dialogism. Hence, the opening line introduces an opposition of points of view that will inform the subsequent

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Edition. New York: Norton, 1966, 364.

In a recent essay, William Deresiewicz writes that the opening line is "An aphorism, or rather a mock aphorism, for it is immediately intimated that this 'truth universally acknowledged' is in fact nothing more than one of the fixed opinions of the 'neighborhood' [sic] . . . ." "Community And Cognition In *Pride and Prejudice. ELH,* Vol 64, #2 (1997), 503. Although I agree with Mr. Deresiewicz on one level, the crux of my point is that the opening is *much more* (rather than "nothing more") than one of the fixed opinions of the neighbourhood. Jane Austen is demonstrating much more than an example of erroneous opinion; she is drawing our attention to a monological habit of mind that is a "well-fixed" feature of the "surrounding families" (2).

action of the novel. Mikhail Bakhtin saw this opposition of views, beliefs, and evaluations as a characteristic of dialogism at work in the novel. In *The Dialogic Imagination* he writes,

> Every moment of the story has a conscious relationship with this normal language and its belief system, is in fact set against them, and set against them *dialogically*: one point of view opposed to another, one evaluation opposed to another, one accent opposed to another . . . This interaction, this dialogic tension between two languages and two belief systems, permits authorial intentions to be realized in such a way that we can acutely sense their presence at every point in the work. (314)

In our recognition of this initial interaction and tension between opposing world views or habits of mind early in novel, Jane Austen's dialogic "intentions" in the rest of the novel become more clear.[105] And in this regard, her philosophical task, if you will, is in keeping with Socrates' avowed intentions in doing philosophy. She, like Socrates, wants to show how the wise human being "will know himself, and be able to examine what he knows or does not know, and to see what others know and think that they know, and what they do not know and fancy that they know when they do not" (*Charmides.* 167a1-4). Of course, the burden of this examination will fall primarily on Elizabeth, but it also will fall on the reader as he or she participates in the ongoing philosophical dialogue that is the novel.

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[105] I use the inverted commas to indicate my awareness of problems involved in discussing authorial intentions. The history of the discussion, from Wimsatt and Beardsley to Derrida, is well known, and I do not intend to take up the issue here. Suffice it to say that I do think Jane Austen intended to show the dangers of what Bakhtin has termed monologism, and that she affirmed the benefits of what he terms dialogism. In any case, her works show a concern with these world views, and that is the crucial point.

To continue, we need also to recognize that this philosophical-sounding assertion *is* tantamount to a universal truth in the world encompassed by the environs of Meryton. Jane Austen, it seems, recognized the force of such entrenched opinions, regardless of their monological bearing. It is the force of these monological species of belief that inform and influence Elizabeth's own world view, and similarly, it is the force of these beliefs that will dictate the nature of her own struggles against personal and social monologism. We need only look at the second paragraph in the novel to appreciate something of the character and force of monologism:

> However little known the feelings or views of such a man may be on his first entering a neighbourhood, this truth is so well fixed in the minds of surrounding families, that he is considered as the rightful property of some one or other of their daughters. (2)

Now for the most part, critics have seen this passage in terms either of its reaffirming or of its ironically undercutting the connected themes of marriage and money introduced in the first line. But again, if we consider the passage as a window into the monological mind, some interesting images come to light.

We might first notice that the "truth universally acknowledged" discounts or at least does not consider the "feelings or views" of the man to whom it is meant to apply. Similarly, the use of the words "rightful property" to describe how the families regard the man is also telling. With these observations in mind, we may recall again Bakhtin's comments on the nature of monologism:

> Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another *I* with equal rights (*thou*). With a monologic approach . . . *another person* remains wholly and merely an *object* of consciousness, and not another consciousness. No response is expected from it . . . Monologue is finalized and deaf to the other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge it in any *decisive* force. (*PDP,* 292-93)

Certainly, the features of monologism that Bakhtin describes here are each reflected in the second passage of *Pride and Prejudice.* In disregarding the "feelings and views" of the other, the "families" deny the other's consciousness "equal rights and equal responsibilities"; the other's position is not entertained within the monological mind, and thus, no "response is expected" from the other. Furthermore, the other is also regarded as an "*object* of consciousness"--the "rightful property" of the community--an *it* more than a *thou.* And finally, the monological "truth is so well *fixed* in the minds of the surrounding families" (Italics mine), that their position is "finalized;" as a fixed truth, it is equivalent to a "ready-made truth" and consequently "deaf to the other's response." And this fixity, furthermore, is akin to a lack of wonder--a lack of human spontaneity in the face of the unfamiliar, an inability to open oneself to "the advent" of the other. This, then, is the monological state within which Elizabeth finds herself and of which she is, willing or not, a participant. This is not to claim, however, that Elizabeth (or Jane for that matter) concur with this *particular* manifestation of monological thought--whether they concur or not is uncertain; this is to claim, rather, that they are part of a family and of a community in which monological thinking is a pervasive and potent phenomenon. The dialogue that takes up the remainder of the chapter is a further testimony to this phenomenon.

As humorous as the dialogue between Mr. and Mrs. Bennet is, it nevertheless underscores, by verbally enacting, the monologic milieu intimated in the first two paragraphs. As in Socratic philosophy, Jane Austen often uses the dramatic immediacy of the dialogue form in order to represent philosophical views as they arise within "lived situations." This, again, like Socratic philosophy, involves the reader in the process of evaluation and judgement.[106] But the peculiar feature of the dialogue between the elder Bennets is that by and large, it is, in fact, more like two simultaneous monologues on a single subject. I say "by and large" because I think there is also a *kind* of dialogue or a form of exchange between them insofar as both Mr. and Mrs. Bennet share a monologic world view with each other. They share, as Martin Buber put it "an underworld of faceless spectres of dialogue" (*Between Man and Man,* 28), or as we will see later, what Bakhtin terms a "crude" form of dialogism. Their dialogue, such as it is, entails a kind of *intersection* of fundamentally similar world views with respect to a referential object--the "single man in possession of a good fortune"--without any real dialogic *interaction.* As Bakhtin explains,

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[106] That the reader is critically involved in interpretation, evaluation, and judgement is not, of course, a novel observation with respect to Jane Austen's fiction.

> Dialogic relationships are reducible neither to logical relationships nor to relationships oriented semantically toward their referential object, relationships *in and of themselves* devoid of any dialogic element. They must clothe themselves in discourse, become utterances, become the positions of various subjects expressed in discourse, in order that dialogic relationships might arise among them. (*PDP,* 183)

Certainly, on the face of it, Mrs. Bennet's viewpoint about single men with fortunes is most clearly aligned with the overt position of the first two paragraphs; Mr. Bennet, on the other hand, *seems* to think such notions are foolish and, thus, his teasing, sarcasm, and apparent unconcern. But is this really the case? Let's look at the beginning of their exchange:

> 'My dear Mr. Bennet,' said his lady to him one day, 'have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?'

> Mr. Bennet replied that he had not.
>
> 'But it is,' returned she; 'for Mrs. Long has just been here, and she told me all about it.'
>
> Mr. Bennet made no answer.
>
> 'Do not you want to know who has taken it?' cried his wife impatiently.
>
> '*You* want to tell me, and I have no objection to hearing it.' (1)

What initially looks like a dialogic exchange is, in actuality, a poor shadow, an external semblance of dialogism, lacking the most essential constituents of a fully dialogic exchange. It is what Bakhtin has called a "crude" *form* of dialogism. Replete dialogism, on the other hand, entails

> Confidence in another's word, reverential reception . . . apprenticeship, the search for . . . deep meaning, *agreement,* its infinite gradations and shadings . . . the layering of meaning upon meaning, voice upon voice, strengthening through merging (but not identification), the combination of many voices (a corridor of voices) that augments understanding, departure beyond the limits of the understood, and so forth.
>
> (*Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,* 121)

The exchange between Mr. and Mrs. Bennet lacks the features of dialogism that Bakhtin describes above. Mr. Bennet's seeming unconcern is simply a mask covering his own desire, as well as a ploy to bait his wife. Mr. Bennet's voice is not heard in his first two "replies"; it is merely narrated: "Mr. Bennet replied that he had not . . . Mr. Bennet made no answer." When we do hear him, his "reply" is a further abdication of his involvement in the dialogue--the italicized "*You* want to tell me" denotes an emphatic shift of the burden of talk onto his wife. Moreover, Mr. Bennet's reply indicates that he understands that his wife, too, is not really interested in a genuine dialogue but wants only to "tell" him what she deems important.

The "dialogue" between them in the rest of the chapter reveals a general continuation of Mr. Bennet's posing and teasing and of Mrs. Bennet's attempts to make Mr. Bennet conform to her wishes. In Bakhtin's terms, then, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bennet "clothe themselves in discourse"; their exchanges do not really "become utterances, become the positions of various subjects expressed in discourse" (*PDP,* 183). What the exchange between the elder Bennets reveals is not, therefore, their "positions," but their *temperaments.* Their temperaments, their characters, and their manner of talk, obviously, are quite different, but they share a common footing insofar as they both exhibit a monological bearing--towards others, and towards each other. Neither Mr. or Mrs. Bennet reveal a capacity for wonder since neither shows, to borrow F. R. Leavis's phrase, "a welcoming apprehension of the new, the . . . recognition of the divined possibility"--with respect to others, or with respect to each other. Mr. Bennet, it seems, will always "take delight in vexing" Mrs. Bennet, and Mrs. Bennet's "nerves" will continue to be Mr.

Bennet's "old friends" (3).

Clearly, then, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bennet really intend on *meeting* one another in genuine dialogue. Now Mrs. Bennet's monologism needs little explication, but what of Mr. Bennet's? As we subsequently learn in the beginning of chapter two, Mr. Bennet "had always intended on visiting him [Mr. Bingley], though to the last always assuring his wife that he should not go" (4). Mr. Bennet, we come to realize, has, in fact, shared to a large degree in much of his wife's monologic approach to the other as potential "property." We may recall, for example, that after learning Mr. Bingley's name, it is Mr. Bennet who immediately asks, " 'Is he married of single?' " (2). His pose of unconcern simply masks a world view that is quite in keeping with his wife's. Mr. Bennet manifests his monologism by capriciously engaging in the outer *forms* of dialogue without any real desire to make the other a partner in genuine dialogue. On this score, we are reminded that Mr. Bennet "requir[es] no partner in his pleasure" (60). There is a lack of dialogue between the elder Bennets for the very reason that they only relate to each other on a surface level. That is, their overt dialogue masks a covert monologism since there is no real dialogic interaction between them. They are both, in their own peculiar ways, closed to the word of the other--without "confidence" in the word of the other, without "reverential reception" of the word of the other, and without a shared "search" for "deep meaning"; they are both steeped in monologism.

Obviously, both Mr. and Mrs. Bennet, again each in his or her own way, utterly fail their children. They, like many parents in Jane Austen's fiction, are inadequate and inept, but even more, they are actually harmful to their children's welfare. This failure is predominantly because of their lack of moral *wisdom*--both in their everyday life, and when life's exigencies demand its clear and immediate application.[107] We do not need to scrutinize the text of *Pride and Prejudice* very closely nor employ unusual interpretive strategies to recognize the ill effects of the elder Bennets' monological folly. Mrs. Bennet is consistent throughout the novel in her excessive language, her monologic tunnel vision, and in her inability to relate to others in any deep or meaningful way. Indeed, "The business of her life was to get her daughters married; its solace was visiting and news," and this narrow world view, combined with her "mean understanding, little information, and uncertain temper" (3), makes her a model of the monological mind.[108] Her assertion that Mrs. Long "is a selfish, hypocritical woman" and that she has "no opinion of her" (4), with its usual narrow-mindedness and excess, tells us more about Mrs. Bennet that it does about Mrs. Long. Repeatedly, Mrs. Bennet's speech is marked by its utter lack of regard for the other, and by its constant antagonism. Her speech is never described as a dialogue; rather, it is frequently seen as an "attack" to be "repulsed" (See, for example, 6, 92, 101, 117).[109] In typical fashion, Mrs. Bennet reacts to the news of Lydia's elopement by "blaming every body but the person to whose ill judging indulgence the errors of her daughter must be principally owing" (253)--"the person," of course, is Mrs. Bennet herself.

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[107] Howard S. Babb has noticed the essential similarity between the elder Bennets. He writes, "In the last analysis, Mr. Bennet's mode has the same effect as his wife's, prohibiting him from distinguishing between the trivial and the significant." *Jane Austen's Novels: The Fabric of Dialogue.* Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962, 129.

[108] That the narrator describes her as such does affect the reader's judgement of her, but this should not be taken as evidence of the narrator's final "authorative word." In the final analysis, it is Mrs. Bennet's subsequent dialogue and behaviour that establishes her monologism. Similarly, the narrator's comments on Mr. Bennet are much more favorable, but Mr. Bennet's subsequent behaviour *conflicts* with the narrator's position in that his dialogue and behaviour, like his wife's, reveals his monological tendencies.

But notwithstanding the narrator's comparative benevolence towards Mr. Bennet, he, too, repeatedly exhibits an entrenched monological bearing. His monologism is much less overt, and certainly less annoying, but in its injurious effects on his family, it is no less culpable than is Mrs. Bennet's. As was intimated earlier, Mr. Bennet's monologism manifests itself as a failure to adequately engage the other. Apart from his sarcastic wit--sometimes cynical and unfeeling in its expression--Mr. Bennet's most salient feature is his *withdrawal,* not only from dialogue with others, but from dialogical engagement with life. At times almost solipsistic in his detachment, Mr. Bennet repeatedly retreats to the privacy of his library when challenged by the vicissitudes of life--be they annoying or pressing.[110] Lax and morally irresponsible, Mr. Bennet's behaviour is a product of the kind of monologism that expresses itself as self-absorption and self-sufficiency. Unless absolutely necessary, Mr. Bennet, by and large, refuses to actively participate in the dialogue that is life. He does not adequately enter into what Bakhtin has described as the "dialogic nature of consciousness, the dialogic nature of human life itself" (*PDP,* 293).

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[109] Gabriela Castellanos has commented on the "martial language" used in *Pride and Prejudice.* She writes that "the principal characters . . . and the narrator herself . . . all consistently use the language of war to refer to linguistic exchanges." She also notes the use of the word "attack," but she sees it "used to refer to a character's effort to sway another character's opinion . . . . " *Laughter, War, and Feminism: Elements of Carnival in Three of Jane Austen's Novels.* New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1994, 143. Ms. Castellanos, however, fails to point out that the word "attack" is used *only* in connection to Mrs. Bennet and Lydia, Mr. Collins once , and on two occasions Miss Bingley. The only exception is to be found in chapter three, when Mrs. Bennet and her five daughters "attacked" Mr. Bennet for information on Bingley. Furthermore, "martial language" is *not* used "consistently" by Elizabeth, Jane, or Mr. Darcy; like the word "attack," it is predominantly used in situations or by characters that reveal a monologic bearing.

Keeping Mr. Bennet in mind, consider Bakhtin's further adumbration of the features of this dialogic life:

> To live means to participate in a dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In

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[110] Among others, Tara Ghoshal Wallace has noticed "that Mr. Bennet's quiet disengagement (which takes the form of both silence and satire) has damaged his family" (although she does not explain how this is the case). See her *Jane Austen and Narrative Authority.* New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1995, 47.

> this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium. (*PDP,* 293)

In the final analysis, Mr. Bennet, like his wife, is so wrapped up in himself that he is rarely able to participate in any real dialogue with his family members, even when they need it most. So obvious is his lack of responsible engagement with his family, that it is left to his own daughter, Elizabeth, to try to rouse him out of his solipsistic slumber: "If you my dear father, will not take the trouble of checking her [Lydia's] exuberant spirits, and of teaching her that her present pursuits are not to be the business of her life, she will soon be beyond the reach of amendment" (205). Rather than engage the other in genuine dialogue, Mr. Bennet repeatedly chooses to exhibit his facile wit, mistaking it for wisdom.[111] He is like the unnamed man who Socrates examines only to find "that although in many people's opinion, and especially in his own, he appeared to be wise, in fact he was not" (*Apology.* 21c7-8).[112]

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[111] My view of Mr. Bennet differs radically from that of Gabriela Castellanos who (astonishing to me) asserts that Mr. Bennet is one of "the most intelligent characters" in the novel. He *may* exhibit a kind of detached intelligence, but he certainly lacks wisdom. See Castellanos (1994), 129.

[112] Howard Babb's comments on Mr. Bennet seem right on the mark and are worth noting at length. He writes, "The essence of his wit lies in that literalistic manner by means of which he converts whatever is said to him . . . into absurdity--thus indulging his superior wisdom. The trick is amusing enough

Oblivious to the feelings of others, Mr. Bennet routinely exhibits his "wit" when he ought to exhibit some wisdom. Typical of this monological habit is his teasing of Elizabeth on receiving a letter from Mr. Collins congratulating him on the marriage of Elizabeth to Mr. Darcy, but "Never had his wit been directed in a manner so little agreeable to her" (322). Now, as I previously suggested, Mr. and Mrs. Bennet are not alone in their failure to enter the "dialogic fabric of human life." Other members of their family share in their monological world view. Talk may abound in the Bennet household, but dialogism is wanting.

Lydia probably first comes to mind as a clear example of the perils of monologism. Like her mother who admits " . . . I liked a red coat myself very well--and indeed so I do still at my heart" (25), so Lydia, on the day of her wedding, is more concerned with the color of Wickham's coat than her aunt's attempts to speak to her:

> And there was my aunt, all the time I was dressing, preaching and talking away just as if she was reading a sermon. However, I did not hear above one word in ten, for I was thinking, you may suppose, of my dear old Wickham. I longed to know whether he would be married in his blue

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when he plays it on the silly Mrs. Bennet . . . But he seems heartless, even imperceptive, when he talks to Elizabeth of Jane's separation from Bingley in the same fashion: ' . . . your sister is crossed in love I find. I congratulate her. Next to being married, a girl likes to be crossed in love a little now and then . . . ' " (Babb, 1962, 129).

coat. (281-82)

Lydia, in fact, does not ever really "hear above one word in ten" from anyone. Closed to the word of the other, she never listens, never engages in dialogue. Like her mother, Lydia is more apt to talk *at* others rather than *with* them. Her words, are "finalized and deaf to the other's response, [she] does not expect it and does not acknowledge it" (*PDP,* 293). As the narrator tells us, Lydia "seldom listened to anybody for more than half a minute" (197). Typical of Lydia's monologic mode is her response to Mrs. Forester's invitation for her to visit Brighton: "Wholly inattentive to her sister's feelings, Lydia flew about the house in restless ecstacy, calling for every one's congratulations, and laughing and talking with more violence than ever" (203-04).

In addition to Lydia's entire inattention to others' feelings and her coercive "calling for every one's congratulations," we should also notice the connection made between her laughter and the "violence" of her talk.[113] Laughter, like talk, is not neutral in *Pride and Prejudice,* and like talk, it often signals a person's monologic bearing. Repeatedly, Lydia is either described as laughing or she is describing her own laughter. And Lydia's laughter is not merely in response to some triviality as when they dress Chamerlayne in women's clothes--"Lord! how I laughed" (196)--or when Lydia and Kitty are frolicking in the coach--"I was ready to die of laughter . . . we talked and laughed so loud, that any body might have heard us ten miles off" (197). Crucially, Lydia's laughter is most prominent when it is least appropriate. In the letter in which she announces her elopement, for example, she writes " 'You will laugh when you know where I am gone, and I cannot help laughing myself . . . I can hardly write for laughing' " (257). Lydia's laughter enables her to avoid engaging others in genuine dialogue, and it prevents her from thinking beyond the "official truth" she has inherited from her parents. Although it seems counter-intuitive, seen from a teleological point of view, Lydia, in fact, *perpetuates* rather than undermines the monologism of her parents since the *end result* of her elopement is marriage.

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[113] In a recent review of Caryl Emerson's *The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin,* Tzvetan Todorov writes that "Dialogue is serious, the carnival on the side of laughter, but, contrary to what Bakhtin says, violence quite easily accommodates itself to laughter." *TLS,* March 13, (1998) p. 8. I concur with Mr. Todorov that violence accommodates itself to laughter, but I have not found anywhere in Bakhtin's works where he says the "contrary." Bakhtin simply emphasizes the positive aspects of laughter. See footnote #23 above.

On the surface, Lydia may seem to be a carnival rebel, overthrowing "official truth," but in the final analysis, what she does is *blindly* contravene a particular social norm in order to "fast track" herself into the "official truth" of matrimony.[114] In Bakhtin's terms, Lydia does not conform to "unofficial truth" because unofficial truth entails "a peculiar conception *free from*

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[114] Lydia's blindness as well as her intention of marriage rather than illicit sex is affirmed by Elizabeth's response to her letter: " 'Oh! thoughtless, thoughtless Lydia!' . . . 'What a letter is this, to be written at such a moment. But at least it shews, that *she* was serious on the object of her journey. Whatever he might afterwards persuade her to, it was not on her side a *scheme* of infamy' " (257).

selfish interests, norms, and appreciations of 'this world' (that is the established world, which it is always profitable to serve)" (Italics mine. *Rabelais and His World,* 262). We need only recall that the "business" of Mrs. Bennet's life is to "get her daughters married" (3), and that Elizabeth admonishes her father not to let Lydia's selfish pursuit of men be "the business of her life" (205), to recognize that Lydia has succeeded in the *official* "business" of her parents' "established world". Lydia is no carnival character whose laughter overthrows "official truth" and "liberates objects from the snares of false seriousness, from illusions and sublimations inspired by fear" (*Rabelais and His World,* 376); rather, Lydia is a character whose behaviour and its attendant laughter affirm the need of *true seriousness* and the reality of genuine relation that the novel finally underwrites. In her selfish unconsciousness, Lydia, like her mother, marks one end of the monologic spectrum; in her self-complacent consciousness, Mary, like her father, marks the other.

Although the narrator tells us that Mary Bennet possesses "neither genius nor taste; and though vanity had given her application, it had given her likewise a pedantic air and conceited manner" (20-21), it is Mary's talk rather than the narrator's observations that most decisively establishes her character. Mary, of course, constantly takes it upon herself to enunciate little gems of wisdom when she deems them necessary for the moral edification of others. Her speech is usually pedantic, pseudo-philosophical, and in its dogged devotion to received "wisdom", out of touch with the moral complexities her precepts, presumably, are intended to ameliorate. Mary's monologism takes the form of a studied engagement with "ready-made truths" *at the expense of spontaneous human relation.* Mr. Bennet's description of Mary as "a young lady of deep reflection" who has "read great books" and made "extracts" (5) well summarizes the extent of Mary's engagement with life. And in an important way, Mary's monologism is more culpable than Lydia's since Mary naively *thinks* that she has knowledge.[115] Unlike Lydia, who is simply self-absorbed and vacuous, Mary is *actively,* albeit naively, in opposition to the "dialogic means of seeking the truth" which, as Bakhtin points out, "is counterposed to *official* monologism, which pretends to *possess a ready-made truth,*and it is also counterposed to the naive self-confidence of those people who think that they know something, that is, who think that they possess certain truths" (*PDP,* 110).

The end result of Mary's monologism is a complete lack of discernment and sensitivity with respect to the feelings of others. We need only to consider Mary's sorry response to Lydia's elopement to appreciate how her studied monologism removes her from any "community of feeling" with others: " 'Unhappy as the event must be for Lydia, we may draw from it this useful lesson; that the loss of virtue in a female is irretrievable--that one false step involves her in endless ruin--that her reputation is no less brittle than it is beautiful . . . ' " (255). Mary's "lesson," we should note, is little better than Mr. Collins' completely insensitive remark in his letter to Mr. Bennet: "The death of your daughter would have been a blessing in comparison of this" (262). Mary, it seems, is much aligned with the "true philosopher" (209), like her father, and with the pedantic moralizer, like Mr. Collins.

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[115] We may recall here Socrates' explanation that the wisest of men have "realized, like Socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless" *Apology.* 23b1-4.

We need also to recognize that this pervasive monologism is not only to be found within the Bennet household. In particular, the early parts of the novel reveal a pervasive monological mode *between* families as well. Under the veneer of friendly relations, the members of Meryton's community are in fierce competition--especially to have their daughters "suitably" married.[116] Of course, other individual characters--Mr. Collins, Mr. Wickham, Lady Catherine, Sir William Lucas, Miss Bingley--also display various facets of monologism. In this regard, they function, like some of the Bennets, as fools in the novel--fools who, each in his or her own way, teach the reader by their monological example how *not* to think and act. This, then, is part of Jane Austen's strategy in delineating a monological milieu. The reader must see the nature and effects of the sickness before he or she can fully appreciate the cure. As Bakhtin sees it, "the author needs the fool . . . By representing stupidity, the novel teaches prose intelligence, prose wisdom" (*The Dialogic Imagination,* 404). Thus the important question arises: what does the novel teach us through the heroine, Elizabeth? What "prose intelligence, prose wisdom" are we intended to learn?

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[116] Castellanos (1994) makes a similar point about the "generalized war" between the families in the novel.\121.

3) Elizabeth Bennet: From Monologism to Wonder and Relation

Now, Elizabeth Bennet is no fool, but it is important to reiterate that she too initially shares in the monological milieu that the novel portrays. Certainly, Elizabeth has considerably more intelligence and more sensitivity to others' feelings than most of the characters in *Pride and Prejudice,* but these virtues alone are not sufficient to free her from the monological milieu in which she was born and in which she must live. And as I suggested earlier, Elizabeth's particular manifestation of the larger monological milieu takes the form of a lack of the capacity to experience wonder and to enter into a dialogical relation. So we return to the crucial questions: How does Elizabeth share in the monological milieu? How does Elizabeth lack the capacity to experience wonder and to enter into dialogic relations? And how do these negative factors affect her?

First of all, we should note that unlike Jane Austen's other most memorable character, Emma Woodhouse, Elizabeth Bennet "is very far from being the center of attention in the early chapters, scarcely mentioned at all until the third, not clearly mentioned at all until the sixth."[117] Consequently, the importance of her milieu is intimated early in the novel. More importantly, however, we must also note that she is *implicated* in the monologic milieu in the early chapters. We first learn of Elizabeth, for example, "trimming a hat," which her father connects to the arrival of Mr. Bingley. She is then asked when her "next ball is to be" (4). We soon learn Mr. Bennet has visited Mr. Bingley and that "The astonishment of the ladies was just what he wished" (5). And in the next chapter we learn "that Mrs. Bennet . . . *with the assistance of her five daughters*" "attacked" Mr. Bennet "in various ways; with barefaced questions, ingenious suppositions, and distant surmises" (Italics mine, 6) for information about Mr. Bingley. Although in retrospect we tend to forget these little details, it is clear that Elizabeth is initially very much a part of the monological "business" of her family and the surrounding neighbourhood.

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[117] William Deresiewicz. "Community And Cognition In *Pride and Prejudice.*" *ELH,* Vol 64, #2 (1997), 503. Mr. Deresiewicz

Elizabeth is further implicated in the monologic milieu in chapter three. Of course, after overhearing the infamous conversation between Mr. Darcy and Mr. Bingley, Elizabeth is not happy with Mr. Darcy's slight of her. But notice that when Mr. Darcy walks off, "Elizabeth remained with no cordial feelings

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also discusses the importance of the community in shaping both the novel and Elizabeth. Similarly, I share in his view (which I discovered after formulating my own) that contrary to the numerous critics who have emphasized Elizabeth's "individuality and imaginative freedom . . . her story must be seen, not as an exercise of freedom, but as an effort to achieve freedom, not as a light-footed dance away from a community that cannot contain her, but as a struggle to wake herself out of a community in which she is all too comfortably embedded" (504).

towards him" (9). The word "remained" is interesting here because it not only describes her physical position but also her mental attitude. Before Elizabeth had overheard Mr. Darcy's remarks, we read that "His character was decided . . . and everybody hoped he would never come there again" (8). Who then is "everybody"? The answer, of course, is that it is those who are not of Mr. Bingley's party. It is the families of Meryton--those whose "fixed" minds have now "decided" on Mr. Darcy's character since he has not engaged in the "business" of their world. And as we have seen, Elizabeth is implicated in this monological world, and so, it seems, her mind was also previously "decided" about Mr. Darcy, and in that sense his comments simply reaffirmed her attitude about him--therefore she "remained"-- that is, persisted--"with no cordial feelings toward him." Far from being the radically independent person that most critics have claimed, Elizabeth seems very much involved in the monologism of her world.

Indeed, Elizabeth's *response* to overhearing Mr. Darcy's comments seem to bear out her sharing in the already "decided" view of Mr. Darcy: "She told the story however with great spirit among her friends; for she had a lively, playful disposition, which delighted in any thing ridiculous" (9). The point is that Elizabeth is not deeply affronted *personally* at this juncture. If she did feel differently from "every body" towards Mr. Darcy, then surely she would find his comments personally insulting, rather than simply "ridiculous." By adopting and perpetuating the community's view of Mr. Darcy, Elizabeth, like her community, shows an incapacity to experience wonder, to have a "welcoming apprehension of the new."

Mrs. Bennet's remark to Charlotte that she "not put it into Lizzy's head to be vexed by his [Mr. Darcy's] ill treatment" (15) further suggests that Elizabeth's animosity toward him is derived, not from her own personal engagement with his word--whether pleasing or repugnant--but from the mediated resentment of her community. As William Deresiewicz points out, Elizabeth is not "mortified" on first hearing Mr. Darcy's comments; rather, her "resentment arises in the course of that next morning's conversation, when she finds that her friends take the incident as a more serious affront than she was first inclined to do."[118] In light of F. R. Leavis's comments, rather than revealing wonder, Elizabeth shows "deference towards the laws that limit possibility, and towards the formulated definitions that chart the actual and may be taken as the real reality" (Leavis,15). By deferring to the monological milieu of her community--"the laws that limit possibility"-- and to the "fixed" opinion of Mr. Darcy--"the formulated definitions that chart the actual, and may be taken as the real reality," Elizabeth reveals her incapacity to experience wonder.

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[118] See, Deresiewicz, (1997), 508. In *Deceit, Desire, And The Novel: Self And Other In Literary Structure,* Rene Girard writes that "the Other and only the Other sets desire in motion . . . At its birth, in other words at the very source of the subjectivity, one always finds the victorious Other. " Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, 33. My claim is that just as desire is mediated, so Elizabeth's initial animosity toward Mr. Darcy is mediated through the victorious "Other" of her community.

But not all of Elizabeth's failure to open herself to wonder can be attributed to her adoption of the monologism of her milieu. Elizabeth's incapacity to experience wonder and to enter into a dialogical relation with others is also a feature of her own wilful deafness to the word of the other--of her own rejection of the "divined possibility" that accompanies the address of the other. As Mr. Darcy correctly notes at one point, Elizabeth's defect "is wilfully to misunderstand" others (51). But the form that Elizabeth's wilful misunderstanding takes is an obstinate assurance concerning the inviolability of her own *understanding*, and this makes her closed to possibilities which lie outside the narrow confines of that "understanding." For example, one of Elizabeth's early exchanges with Mr. Bingley is typical of this monological defect:

> 'Whatever I do is done in a hurry," replied he [Mr. Bingley]; 'and therefore if I should resolve to quit Netherfield, I should probably be off in five minutes. At present, however, I consider myself as quite fixed here.'
>
> 'That is exactly what I should have supposed of you,' said Elizabeth.
>
> 'You begin to comprehend me, do you?' cried he, turning towards her.
>
> 'Oh ! yes--I understand you perfectly.' (36)

Although the conversation is playful here, nevertheless, it reveals the kind of monologism that Elizabeth needs to overcome. Mr. Bingley, it seems, wants to convey something of his own spontaneity and unpredictability while maintaining that he is, however, "at present . . . quite fixed." But Elizabeth basically asserts that nothing about Mr. Bingley could *surprise* her. Mr. Bingley's comments are meant to make her *wonder* about him, and yet she claims "That is exactly what I should have supposed of you." This is not the only time that Elizabeth will claim to know "exactly" what to think. And her additional claim that she "understands" Mr. Bingley "perfectly" further attests to Elizabeth's refusal to open herself to the unforeseen possibilities that authentic dialogical exchange with the other could generate. Elizabeth's closed confidence in her own perfect "understanding" is precisely the attitude of monologism. As Bakhtin points out, "Monologue pretends to be the *ultimate word.* It closes down the represented world and represented persons" (*PDP*,293).

Similarly, Elizabeth's failure to show a capacity to experience wonder is also to be found in her exchanges with Jane and Charlotte, her two closest confidants.[119] In the first exchange, Elizabeth and Charlotte discuss what makes for a happy marriage. Elizabeth argues that a woman must understand a man's character enough to be "certain of the degree of her own regard . . . [and] of its reasonableness" (18). Charlotte, on the other hand, argues that "Happiness in marriage is entirely a matter of chance. If the dispositions of the parties are ever so well known to each other, or ever so similar beforehand, it does not advance their felicity in the least" (19). What is of interest here is not which position is true or false, but rather, Elizabeth's response to Charlotte's argument: " 'You make me laugh, Charlotte; but it is not sound. You know it is not sound, and that you would never act this way yourself' " (19).

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[119] Deresiewicz, (1997) makes a similar point, but he sees Elizabeth as "the leading exemplar of the desire to evade contradiction" (510).

Once again, Elizabeth thinks she comprehends the other "perfectly." Elizabeth does not allow for an alternate perception of reality--a perception that is not in keeping with her own. It is not just that she *disagrees* with Charlotte, for even disagreement would suggest dialogical exchange, she *denies* Charlotte her own perception--her own autonomous understanding. With monological arrogance, Elizabeth ends the conversation by negating the other's word--"You make me laugh"--but even more importantly, Elizabeth claims to *know* what the other *thinks* and how the other will *act,* irrespective of what the other *says.* Clearly, Elizabeth once again fails to be open to a possibility not comprehended within her own static "understanding." Had Elizabeth been less closed to the "represented world" of Charlotte, she might have understood that in Charlotte's view, matrimony "was the only honourable provision for well-educated young women of small fortune, and however uncertain of giving happiness, must be their pleasantest preservation from want" (111). But Elizabeth's incapacity to experience the "wonder" of an alternate perception of reality makes *her* response predictable: " 'Engaged to Mr. Collins! my dear Charlotte,--*impossible*!' " (113, Italics mine).

This monological dynamic in Elizabeth is also evident in her discussion with Jane about Mr. Darcy's alleged misconduct to Wickham. When Elizabeth relates to Jane her conversation with Mr. Wickham, "Jane listened with astonishment and concern" (76). Jane's response, notice, is one of "astonishment"--of wonder, and she tried "to throw into the account of accident or mistake, whatever could not be otherwise explained" (76). Here Jane functions as an exemplar of wonder. In telling contrast to Elizabeth, Jane remains open to the unforeseen--to "accident" or "mistake" or "otherwise"--that are not encapsulated within Elizabeth's "decided" view-point. And Jane further argues the point, refusing to submit to a static epistemic position that would "finalize" either Mr. Darcy or Wickham: "it is impossible for us to conjecture the causes or circumstances which may have alienated them, without actual blame on either side."

Again, the important aspect of this exchange is not to be found in whose position is correct and whose is false; it is Jane and Elizabeth's respective *orientation* that is crucial. Jane opens herself to alternate explanations of the affair that Elizabeth is unwilling to consider. And once again, as intimated by Jane's comment, Elizabeth's monological arrogance is revealed in her laughing at the other's position: "Laugh as much as you choose, but you will not laugh me out of my opinion" (76). The discussion continues and Jane admits that " 'It is difficult indeed--it is distressing.--One does not know what to think' " to which Elizabeth replies with the final, revealing, *"ultimate word"*: " 'I beg your pardon;--one knows exactly what to think' " (77). In contrast to Jane, here again, Elizabeth shows an incapacity to experience wonder, to be astonished, to open herself to possibilities other than those that she has already decided are true. Once again "the divined possibility" offered by the other is met with laughter; Elizabeth "knows exactly what to think."

We also should notice that Elizabeth's dismissal of the word of the other and her perpetuation of the monological milieu are not the only ways in which she shows a failure to experience wonder. If we consider Elizabeth's favorable appraisal of George Wickham we see another dynamic come into play. Her initial conversation with Wickham reveals a curious blend of the above two dynamics as well as a kind of epistemic selectivity that privileges the *mode* of address over the *content.* And in terms of Socratic philosophy, Wickham functions as an exemplar of the sophist, the enemy of dialogical exchange, since *his* discourse is actually skillful rhetoric, meant only to convince the other of his position rather than to sort out reality from illusion. Elizabeth is seduced by his sophistic discourse because she fails to wonder; she fails to look beyond the surface, beyond his manner into the deeper reality of his matter: "the agreeable manner in which he immediately fell into conversation . . . made her feel that the commonest, dullest, most threadbare topic may be rendered interesting by the skill of the speaker" (67).

Wickham's discourse should have brought Elizabeth to have questions, not about Mr. Darcy, but about Wickham himself.[120] Wickham emphasizes that he is in no position to give his "opinion" of Mr. Darcy (68) or to "expose" him (71), but he proceeds to do both, much to Mr. Darcy's discredit. But Elizabeth fails to wonder: about the veracity of Wickham's claims, about the propriety of his communicating his views to a virtual stranger, or about the consistency of his professing one thing and then doing the opposite. And again, this failure to wonder is derived largely from Elizabeth's privileging of the mode of address over the content: " 'To treat in such a manner, the godson, the friend, the favorite of his father!'--She could have added, 'A young man too, like *you,* whose very countenance may vouch for your being amiable' " (72-3). Elizabeth presumes that skill in conversation--an agreeable manner--a pleasing countenance ensures amiability of character and, thus, veracity of speech. And in this respect, Elizabeth, once again conforms to the community's monological judgement both of Wickham and of Mr. Darcy--a judgement similarly founded on the communal approval of Wickham's manner and disapproval of Mr. Darcy's:

> They saw him [Wickham] often, and to his other recommendations now added that of general unreserve. The

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[120] Wickham's emphatic assertion that " 'Oh! no--it is not for *me* to be driven away by Mr. Darcy. If *he* wishes to avoid seeing *me,* he must go' " (69), is, of course, undermined by Wickham's subsequent failure to show up at the Netherfield ball. Failing again to "wonder" at this inconsistency, Elizabeth continues in her "decided" view of Mr. Darcy and Wickham.

> whole of what Elizabeth had already heard . . . was now publicly canvassed; and every body was pleased to think how much they had always disliked Mr. Darcy before they had known anything of the matter. (124)[121]

Here, then, we see Elizabeth's monologism manifested once more as a failure to experience wonder--a failure founded, in large part, on an erroneous assumption that manner (or mode of address) signifies the inner reality (or matter). As we might expect, this same failure figured in Elizabeth's early conversations with Mr. Darcy. And as we have seen, Elizabeth has already "decided" Mr. Darcy's manner, and thus, the matter of his subsequent discussions with Elizabeth is likewise "decided." Put in Bakhtinian terms, Elizabeth's early discussions with Mr. Darcy reveal a refusal by her to enter into genuine dialogue with him--a refusal to actually *hear* what he has to say--a refusal to be addressed by him. Elizabeth assumes duplicity or ill intent on Mr. Darcy's part, and so she refuses to acknowledge the very real likelihood of the authenticity of his speech; closed to wonder, her mind will not admit the dialogical potentialities offered by the other.

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[121] Deresiewicz, (1997) makes a similar point, but he sees this as showing *only* that Elizabeth is "a typical member of her community" (509). He refers to Elizabeth's assumption as a "syllogistic mousetrap" that may be formulated as follows:

"All men of good countenance are amiable.
Wickham is a man of good countenance.
Wickham is amiable."

We should also note the flaw in Elizabeth's assumption. Mr. Wickham shows no regard for the feelings of others in gossiping about Mr. Darcy, and so he is not truly amiable. As Mr. Knightly points out with respect to Frank Churchill, "He may be very 'aimable,' have very good manners, and be very agreeable, but he can have no English delicacy towards the feelings of other people: nothing really amiable about him.' " Jane Austen, *Emma.* Ed. James Kinsley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, 134-35.

We first see Elizabeth's rejection of "the advent" of Mr. Darcy in her conversations with him at Netherfield during Jane's illness. Here, Elizabeth continually blocks Mr. Darcy's advances toward any mutual understanding between them. For example, when a discussion arises over what constitutes an "accomplished" woman, Mr. Darcy adds to the criteria listed by Miss Bingley; he says, " 'All this she must possess . . . and to all this she must add something more substantial, in the improvement of her mind by extensive reading' " (34). Clearly, Mr. Darcy's comment is meant as an honest compliment to Elizabeth since she had been reading instead of playing cards with the others. However, instead of accepting Mr. Darcy's comment in the spirit in which it is intended, Elizabeth chooses to turn it into an argument: " 'I am no longer surprised at your knowing *only* six accomplished women. I rather wonder now at your knowing *any*' " (34). This response may seem trivial, but it is typical of Elizabeth's ongoing orientation toward Mr. Darcy--Mr. Darcy tries to "meet" her in conversation, and she turns dialogue into debate.

We see this dynamic repeated when Elizabeth observes how frequently "Mr. Darcy's eyes were fixed on her" (44). Elizabeth can only interpret Mr. Darcy's look negatively: "She could only imagine however at last, that she drew his notice because there was something about her more wrong and reprehensible, according to his ideas of right, than in any other person present" (44). Mr. Darcy soon asks Elizabeth to dance; Elizabeth makes no reply, and after he repeats the question, she answers:

> 'Oh!' . . . 'I heard you before; but I could not immediately determine what to say in reply. You wanted me, I know, to say "Yes," that you might have the pleasure of despising my taste; but I always delight in overthrowing those kind of schemes, and cheating a person of their premeditated contempt. I have therefore made up my mind to tell you, that I do not what to dance a reel at all--and now despise me it you dare' (45)

Notice how, in typical monologic fashion, Elizabeth claims to "know" what Mr. Darcy wanted her to say (rather than "wondering" at his attempt at "meeting" her). Similarly, Elizabeth's choice of words is telling. She is convinced that Mr. Darcy intends to "despise" her; she thinks his approach is a "scheme" that needs "overthrowing" and that it signals "premeditated contempt." Finally, Elizabeth ends her comments with a challenge--not to "meet" with her in conversation, but to dare to despise her. Clearly, Elizabeth blocks Mr. Darcy's attempt at "meeting" her, at beginning an understanding between them. As the narrator notes, Elizabeth "rather expected to affront" Mr. Darcy, and her comments affirm this monologic response towards his approach.

Once again, the potential for dialogue is presented by Mr. Darcy, and once again, it is thwarted by Elizabeth's refusal to experience any novel possibilities about the other.

This kind of orientation towards Mr. Darcy is also evident in her conversation with him at the Netherfield ball. Predictably, Elizabeth begins the evening "resolved against any sort of conversation" with Mr. Darcy (80), but after being surprised into dancing with him, she decides to *coerce* him into speech in order to punish him:

> They stood for some time without speaking a word; and she began to imagine that their silence was to last through two dances, and at first was resolved not to break it; till suddenly fancying it would be the greater punishment to her partner to oblige him to talk, she made some slight observation on the dance. He replied, and was again silent. (81)

Here, of course, we again see an almost "textbook" example of a monologic orientation toward the other. Elizabeth intends no "genuine dialogue" with Mr. Darcy, but rather, as a kind of preemptive strike, "oblige[s]" him to speak. Here provocation rather than dialogue is Elizabeth's motive for conversation. However, Mr. Darcy's reply is neutral, and so she further taunts him: " 'It is *your* turn to say something now, Mr. Darcy.--*I* talked about the dance, and *you* ought to make some kind of remark . . .' " (81). The coercion here is increased by Elizabeth's intimation that Mr. Darcy's further silence would be a breach of decorum. Hence, she turns what could to be an *invitation* to conversation into a *obligation*--an "ought"--to be *performed* at her command.[122]

But Mr. Darcy, clearly intent on establishing an amicable relation between them, politely submits to her avowed wishes, but again Elizabeth responds with authoritarian formality, dictating both the subject and scope of their conversation: " 'Very well.--That reply will do for the present.--Perhaps by and by I may observe that private balls are much pleasanter than public ones.--But *now* we may be silent' " (81). Now, Mr. Darcy's response to this is telling since it suggests that he realizes that Elizabeth is not speaking openly or spontaneously, but is feigning--performing--conventional talk: " 'Do you talk by rule then, while you are dancing?' " (81). By referring to "talk by rule," Mr. Darcy puts his finger precisely on the nature of Elizabeth's monologic speech in their exchange. Elizabeth's talk has not been an effort at mutuality, but another attempt to "affront" or provoke. But even more, she speaks from a "decided" orientation, a "ready-made truth," a "rule" which is designed to negate rather facilitate genuine dialogue. Put another way, Elizabeth's adherence to the "rule" of conversation is one more way of avoiding wonder, of avoiding the positive possibility of something new and unexpected arising out of her exchange with Mr. Darcy.

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[122] We should note that subsequently this conversation, and a number of other exchanges between Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy , both implicitly and explicitly, concern the notion of "performance." The notion of "performance" becomes important when applied to conversation since it is one way of conceptualizing the difference between "genuine dialogue" and "feigned speech." And in *Pride and Prejudice,* the distinction between what is "genuine dialogue" and and what is "performance" is crucial, both for the characters and the reader, since it goes to the issue of "authentic personality" that the former will illuminate and that the later will hide. As Bakhtin notes in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* "The genuine life of personality is made available only through a *dialogic* penetration of that personality, during which it freely and reciprocally reveals itself" (59). For a discussion of the importance of "performance" in *Pride and Prejudice,* see Babb (1962), 132-41, and for a more general discussion see John A. Dussinger's *In the Pride of the Moment: Encounters In Jane Austen's World.* Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1990, 19-30.

Elizabeth's response to Mr. Darcy's intimation that they discard "rule" and thus engage in genuine dialogue is similarly monologic. She reverts to generalization, thus rejecting the opportunity for more personal exchange: " 'Sometimes. One must speak a little, you know. It would look odd to be entirely silent for half an hour together, and yet for the advantage of *some*, conversation ought to be so arranged as that they may have the trouble of saying as little as possible' " (81-2). Again, Elizabeth shows an unwillingness to engage Mr. Darcy in genuine dialogue, and again she appeals to "rule" as her justification.

Basically, Elizabeth argues that conversation "must" be "arranged" at times in order to keep up appearances. Elizabeth's claim, then, amounts to the assertion that, at times (and this, she thinks, is one of them), conversation is simply a necessary *ritual* that people undertake. This may be true for some, but in this case, her claim is a clear rejection of the radical contingency the other--a rejection of Mr. Darcy's clear address to her. By proposing ritual as the mode of exchange between them, Elizabeth is rejecting the *personal* uniqueness of Mr. Darcy's present address. In a sense, then, she is ritualizing Mr. Darcy, making his conversation, and thus he himself, a mere type, an impersonal abstraction that may be represented within the confines of the ritual. Put another way, her call for ritual is a kind of objectification of Mr. Darcy's discourse, and thus, of Mr. Darcy himself. Bakhtin called such behaviour "life's ritualism," and interestingly enough, he saw its source as "pride," the very thing Elizabeth attributes to Mr. Darcy.[123] Bakhtin explains that when we make concrete moments into "a ritual act, we turn into impostors or pretenders," the enemies of dialogical exchange (Ibid, 52). He further notes that when one

> introduces a moment of rituality into a concretely real act or deed . . . loss of once-occurrent unity takes place as a result of the attempt to see in every other, in every object of a given act or deed, *not* a concrete uniqueness which participates in Being *personally,* but a representative of a certain large whole. (Ibid, 52-3)

Certainly, in Elizabeth's call for a kind of ritualized talk between her and Mr. Darcy, she is detracting from the "concretely real act or deed" that Mr. Darcy intends, seeing in *him* not "a concrete uniqueness" but a "representative" of the proud man. As we might expect, Elizabeth's conversations with Mr. Darcy at Rosings also reveal a similar monologic bearing towards him.

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[123] M. M. Bakhtin, *Toward A Philosophy Of The Act.* Ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov. Austen: University of Texas Press, 1993. 52.

Elizabeth begins their first conversation at Rosings in typical monologic fashion; suspicious of his motives for approaching her, she intimates a challenge to Mr. Darcy, putting him on the defensive: " 'You mean to frighten me, Mr. Darcy, by coming in all this state to hear me? But I will not be alarmed . . . There is a stubbornness about me about me that never can bear to be frightened at the will of others. My courage always rises with every attempt to intimidate me' " (155). Although the exchange is somewhat playful, Elizabeth's language is again suggestive of her monological orientation to the other; she thinks that Mr. Darcy is exercising his "will," intending to "frighten" and "intimidate" her. Here, as elsewhere, Elizabeth thinks Mr. Darcy is willfully exerting his *power*, merely "enjoy[ing] the power of doing what he likes," as she later puts it to Colonel Fitzwilliam (163).

But as in the past, Mr. Darcy answers with perfect politeness, yet he also raises an important issue--one that goes to the heart of most of the engagements between Elizabeth and him--the discrepancy between the real and the professed, between reality and illusion:[124]

'I shall not say that you are mistaken,' he replied, 'because

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[124] As we have seen, this is also the central issue of Socratic philosophy, and this issue underlies and informs much of *Pride and Prejudice* and *Emma*. Babb (1962) also makes the point that Mr. Darcy "distinguishes . . . between the real and the professed" in the passage cited above (137).

> you could not really believe me to entertain any design of alarming you; and I have had the pleasure of your acquaintance long enough to know, that you find great enjoyment in occasionally professing opinions which in fact are not your own.' (155)

Not only does Mr. Darcy's refusal to argue that Elizabeth is "mistaken" suggest his desire to engage in genuine dialogue with her, his stated reason reveals that he is confident of a more generous spirit underlying Elizabeth's overt comments. Although mistaken about the precise nature of Elizabeth's "performance," Mr. Darcy, it seems, is *willing* to look for what she "really believe[s]"; he shows what Bakhtin calls "a *sense of faith,*that is, an integral attitude . . . " towards her (*PDP,* 294). Mr. Darcy puts faith in what he trusts is Elizabeth's concealed good will towards him, and he simultaneously emphasizes this trust by asking her to recognize a relevant truth about herself: that she "find[s] great enjoyment in occasionally professing opinions which in fact are not [her] own." Although the "reality" of Elizabeth's feelings towards him are, in fact, even *more* negative than her remarks indicate, nevertheless, the entire passage is telling insofar as it suggests both *his* desire for reality--for genuine dialogue, and *her* persistence in illusion--in performing a role.

Indeed, we will see how much of the rest of their conversation revolves around the notion of performance, and performance, as I intimated earlier, becomes a metaphorical instrument for analyzing the difference between reality and illusion. However, Elizabeth's next comments continue in a monological vein on a more literal level. Again, her first response is laughter, and again this signals her failure to engage in genuine dialogue.[125] Furthermore, she addresses her comments to Colonel Fitzwilliam rather than to Mr. Darcy; in so doing, she manages to avoid responding personally to Mr. Darcy--thus depreciating his address, and she chooses to ignore the substance of the issues that he raises--thus discounting his assertion:

> 'Your cousin will give you a very pretty notion of me, and teach you not to believe a word I say. I am particularly unlucky in meeting with a person so well able to expose my

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[125] Notwithstanding the general critical approval of Elizabeth's laughter, I think that careful scrutiny of her *use* of laughter puts it in a mostly negative light. As I have said, laughter is not neutral in *Pride and Prejudice,* and contrary to Claudia Johnson's claim that "principled restraint differentiates Elizabeth's laughter from Lydia's animal glee" (Claudia Johnson, *Jane Austen: Women, Politics, and the Novel.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, 87), Elizabeth's laughter is rarely just a spontaneous response; rather, it is usually employed as deflective mechanism, enabling her to avoid serious engagement with the word of the other, and hence, to avoid self-examination. This connects her to Lydia and to her father, who is often "contented with laughing"(189) when he should speak rationally or take action, and whose shared orientation with Elizabeth is suggested when he asks her, " 'For what do we live, but to make sport for our neighbours, and laugh at them in our turn?' " (323). We may also recall that Mr. Darcy himself intimates that Elizabeth's laughter tends toward ridicule (50). For some examples of Elizabeth's employment of laughter see, 19, 46, 76, 155, 161, 200, 300, 323.

> real character . . . where I had hoped to pass myself off with some degree of credit. Indeed, Mr. Darcy, it is very ungenerous in you to mention all that you knew to my disadvantage in Hertfordshire--and, give me leave to say, very impolitic too--for it is provoking me to retaliate, and such things may come out, as will shock your relations to hear.' (155)

Consistent with her previous rejoinders to Mr. Darcy, Elizabeth masks her inner antipathy with the outer appearance of good humour. But if we can look beyond her affected, jesting tone--which Mr. Darcy's affection for her prevents him from doing--into the essential substance of her comments, I think something of her willful refusal to see the reality of Mr. Darcy's person and address comes to the fore.

The first sentence of her reply implies that Mr. Darcy's comments bespeak a rather unsavory hidden agenda. Basically, Elizabeth suggests that Mr. Darcy intends on defaming her character and discrediting her words. The phrase "pass myself off" in the second sentence is double-edged; it simultaneously reaffirms her suggestion that Mr. Darcy is attributing subterfuge to her, while at the same time, it suggests her own perception of Mr. Darcy's behaviour at Netherfield. And, as Howard Babb has noted, she increases her verbal offensive by "coupl[ing] 'ungenerous' with the threat of laying bare his disagreeable past to attack him more directly" (Babb, 1962, 138). But Elizabeth is even more culpable in that she comes dangerously close to outright mendacity when she says "it is very ungenerous in you to mention *all that you knew to my disadvantage* in Hertfordshire" (Italics mine). Of course, Mr. Darcy has done no such thing. Her "impolitic" is further revealing as it again suggests that it is her monologic view that their exchange is on the level of politics, of expediency, of performance. Clearly, then, it is no surprise that she sees his address as "provoking [her] to retaliate" rather than inviting her to respond in the spirit of dialogical exchange.

Understandably, Colonel Fitzwilliam is interested to hear what Elizabeth has to "accuse" Mr. Darcy of, and so he urges her to make good her threat to expose Mr. Darcy's behaviour "among strangers." Without hesitation, Elizabeth complies and relates the circumstances of his "very dreadful" conduct:

> ' . . . The first time of my ever seeing him in Hertfordshire, you must know was at a ball--and at this ball, what do you think he did? He danced only four dances! . . . He danced only four dances, though gentlemen were scarce; and, to my certain knowledge, more than one young lady was sitting down in want of a partner. Mr. Darcy, you cannot deny the fact.' (156)

Again, on the face of it, this allegation seems playfully innocuous, but once more, Elizabeth's words betray something of the nature and source of her underlying antipathy towards Mr. Darcy. And Elizabeth is more than just a little disingenuous in her suggestion that it is Mr. Darcy's having "danced only four dances" that is his fault (even though she emphasizes the claim through repetition); we know that the source of her prejudice against him is that he did not ask *her* to dance, and she is also disingenuous in suggesting that her censure of his behaviour is because it was a general transgression against "more than one young lady" who was "in want of a partner." Elizabeth basically claims Mr. Darcy's behaviour was a breach of social decorum--a failure to engage in the ritual behaviour of balls--when her real problem with him, as we have seen, is that she subsequently comes to view his alleged breach as a personal affront. Here, as elsewhere, Elizabeth is neither very honest nor very open.

And here, as elsewhere, Elizabeth monologically claims epistemic authority for her interpretation of Mr. Darcy's character, claiming "certain knowledge" and appealing to "the fact." Of course her entire comment, aimed at Mr. Darcy, is also a thinly veiled insinuation that he was arrogant and proud in refusing to dance with her. But as in the past, Mr. Darcy makes an effort to come to an understanding with her; he explains, "I had not at that time the honour of knowing any lady in the assembly beyond my own party" (156). We should note here that Mr. Darcy's qualification that he "had not *at that time* the honour of knowing any lady . . ." (Italics mine) is a genuine communication, not only of his feelings *for* Elizabeth, but *to* Elizabeth; he is saying that it has since become a real privilege to come to know her, and by extension, that he would like to know her better. Furthermore, although there may be elements of self-defense and gallantry in Mr. Darcy's reply, nevertheless, his reasoning is in keeping with what we know of his character--

that he is more shy than haughty, his hyperbolic comments to Mr. Bingley at the ball notwithstanding.[126] As Howard S. Babb put it, "In effect he is saying, 'You have interpreted my performance wrongly--as a mere exhibition--because you ignore my total character' " (Babb, 1962, 139).

Under the pretense of agreement, Elizabeth then curtly replies to Mr. Darcy's remark, ironically subverting his reasoning with a droll generalization. Furthermore, by addressing herself once more to Colonel Fitzwilliam and by changing the subject, Elizabeth monologically asserts her control of the discussion, in effect, terminating her dialogue with Mr. Darcy as though her ironic reply was the final, authorative word: " 'True; and nobody can ever be introduced in a ball room. Well, Colonel Fitzwilliam, what do I play next? My fingers wait your orders.' " (156). Here, Elizabeth's comments and behaviour conform to Bakhtin's description of a monologic orientation to the other; her approach is "finalized and deaf to the other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge it any *decisive* force" (*PDP,* 293).

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[126] My view on Mr. Darcy's shyness differs radically from Claudia Johnson's; she writes that " . . . Elizabeth also takes him to task for a carelessness of pleasing, and when he lamely pleads shyness with strangers, she taxes him with the . . . ugly failure of civility . . . " (Johnson, 1988, 82). Ms. Johnson's argument about Mr. Darcy centers upon what she perceives as a "failure of deference." Darcy may not defer to others, but this does not mean that he is not shy nor that he is not open to authentic dialogical exchange where it is offered. See D. W. Harding's "On the Custom of War and the Notion of Peace" for an excellent discussion of the difference between deference and more dialogical relationships (what Harding calls "integrative relationships"). *Scrutiny,* Vol IX, #3 (1940), 214-16.

But Mr. Darcy disregards the monologic snub and perseveres in his attempt to come to an understanding with Elizabeth. With dialogical balance, he again explains his conduct, simultaneously conceding the fallibility of his judgement while reiterating that his shyness amongst strangers was the real reason for what Elizabeth has asserted was a faulty performance of his social duty: " 'Perhaps,' said Darcy, 'I should have judged better, had I sought an introduction, but I am ill qualified to recommend myself to strangers.' " But Elizabeth continues in her refusal to accept his explanation, and once more she explicitly addresses Colonel Fitzwilliam while implicitly attacking Mr. Darcy:

> 'Shall we ask your cousin the reason of this?' said Elizabeth, still addressing Colonel Fitzwilliam. 'Shall we ask him why a man of sense and education, and who has lived in the world, is ill qualified to recommend himself to strangers?'

Phrasing her rhetorical question in terms of general conduct, Elizabeth attempts to give her attack the air of philosophic authority, while at the same time, she denies Mr. Darcy the legitimate appeal to personal considerations as a "decisive force" in his own conduct.

But again, Mr. Darcy intimates that he is shy, and again he endeavors to explain his character to Elizabeth, conceding to his own difficulty in adequately performing socially amongst those with whom he is unacquainted: " 'I certainly have not the talent which some people possess,' said Darcy, 'of conversing easily with those I have never seen before. I cannot catch their tone of conversation, or appear interested in their concerns, as I often see done' " (156). Mr. Darcy's use of the term "talent" is telling since it reveals that he well understands that Elizabeth is complaining of his failure in performance. But on Mr. Darcy's part, performance is the very thing he wants to transcend with respect to Elizabeth. Hence, he reiterates the implicit distinction between talking to strangers and talking to someone who is more familiar. The former, it seems, would more likely generate performance, while the later would more likely facilitate genuine dialogue. Hence, he reiterates the distinction because he wants Elizabeth to make the same distinction and, thus, to go beyond matters of performance and participate in authentic dialogue *with him,* which is to say, he wants them to abandon mere appearances in order to disclose pressing realities. Apparently, Mr. Darcy is fooled by Elizabeth's tone since it masks her real feelings, but his remarks imply that *he* is genuinely "interested" in her "concerns" and not just "appear[ing]" to be interested as he has "often see[n] done" with those who are performing. By extension, he is appealing to her to reciprocate his interest and concern by recognizing his real self instead of focusing merely on the superficial aspect of performance.

Now although Elizabeth continues to reject the overt thrust of Mr. Darcy's explanation, she does seem to understand something of what he has implied, and thus, she takes up the issue of performance, referring to literal piano-playing in order to further attack Mr. Darcy:

> 'My fingers,' said Elizabeth, 'do not move over this instrument in the masterly manner which I see so many women's do. They have not the same force or rapidity, and do not produce the same expression. But then I have always supposed it to be my own fault--because I would not take the trouble of practising. It is not that I do not believe *my* fingers as capable as any other woman's of superior execution.'

Certainly, Elizabeth shows little interest in coming to an understanding with Mr. Darcy here; rather, her foremost intent seems to be the sophistic one of perpetuating and winning an argument (to put him in his place). Still, Elizabeth's argument is a compelling one, but only insofar as it ignores the deeper convictions that Mr. Darcy has been at pains to convey to her. By persisting in arguing on the level of external performance, Elizabeth has failed to acknowledge the more profound level of internal motivation that finally gives performance its significance. Probably unwittingly, her own example of piano-playing illustrates the very point Mr. Darcy has tried to convey since she focuses on mechanical dexterity and execution rather than on the more profound elements of musical virtuosity that inform great performances. The fact is Mr. Darcy has consistently maintained that he was *not* performing, since his outer "display" was congruent with his inner convictions; his plea to Elizabeth is that she see beyond the foreground of appearances into the real background of values that underlie them. We need only be reminded of Elizabeth's mistaken notions concerning Wickham's "manner" to sufficiently appreciate the justice of Mr. Darcy's appeal.

Mr. Darcy finally expresses his desire to come to terms with Elizabeth by waiving the pursuit of his own intentions and conceding to her argument: " 'You are perfectly right. You have employed your time much better. No one admitted to the privilege of hearing you, can think anything wanting. We neither of us perform to strangers' " (156). Perhaps Mr. Darcy thinks he and Elizabeth have reached an understanding, since she has reproached her own performance--thus appearing to align herself with Mr. Darcy--and since she has employed an example that apparently illustrates his position--thus appearing appreciate his perspective. In any case, Mr. Darcy himself transcends the entire argument by putting himself entirely into Elizabeth's hands. He grants her her argument, but even more importantly, he again shows both his affection for her and his desire for relation with her by complimenting *her* performance while emphatically voicing their shared experience in performing "to strangers."[127]

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[127] Howard S. Babb (1962) writes that Mr. Darcy "expresses his deepest attachment her in these sentences. The first refuses to dispute her judgement of him, which is to say that Darcy cheerfully sacrifices the real motives he has been explaining. His second sentence must be sheer feeling, for it contradicts the logic both of Elizabeth's metaphor and of what Darcy himself has said earlier: after all, he praises his sister at the beginning of the scene because she 'practises very constantly,' and Elizabeth has just reproached herself for not practicing more often" (140-41).

This is Mr. Darcy's last attempt at coming to a genuine understanding with Elizabeth before his disastrous proposal, but it is not until Elizabeth reads and re-reads his letter of explanation to her that *she* will finally come to the understanding that he has so long sought to establish.[128]

Elizabeth's reading of Mr. Darcy's letter is certainly momentous, then, in that it marks a pivotal turning point in the development of her consciousness, and it paves the way for the possibility of authentic relation between her and Mr. Darcy. And as we might expect, in reading Mr. Darcy's letter, Elizabeth also begins to open herself to wonder, and in so doing, at last, to the "advent" of Mr. Darcy. It is also no coincidence that this "opening" is, in large part, precipitated by the reading of a letter, for as we saw earlier, the epistle constitutes a special kind of dialogue wherein the importance of external factors (like countenance and manner) is minimized, thereby, in one way, enabling the reader of the letter to contemplate the words of the other with greater depth and attention. So, given the circumstances of her dealings with Mr. Darcy, the epistolary "dialogue" is especially apt here since Elizabeth has tended to focus mainly on external matters--favoring Wickham primarily because of his "manner," etc, while disliking Mr. Darcy largely on the basis of his perceived haughtiness. Similarly, Mr. Darcy's own shyness and his affection for Elizabeth have often hindered him from expressing himself to her with the very openness that he has endeavored to achieve between them. As he himself writes in his letter the day after the proposal, "You may possibly wonder why all this was not told you last night. But I was not then master enough of myself to know what could or ought to be revealed" (180).

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[128] We should note that Mr. Darcy's proposal is, as Mr. Babb notes, "almost the only unequivocal instance in the novel of the pride usually attributed to Mr. Darcy" (1962, 142). I take Mr. Darcy's monological behaviour in the proposal as evidence of Jane Austen's fidelity to reality; it shows her understanding of the universal human difficulty in maintaining a dialogical orientation toward others. Dialogism is a goal to be achieved rather than a finalized ontological state. Or, put another way, Jane Austen recognizes that the kind of relation that Martin Buber has described as an I-Thou relation is constantly subject to the force of "thinghood," that is, of monologism. Buber writes, "Every You in the world is compelled by its nature to become a thing for us or at least to enter again and again into thinghood" (*I and Thou,*147).

In considering Mr. Darcy's letter, we should first recognize that when Mr. Darcy gives the letter to Elizabeth, it is at a time when she is probably more firmly prejudiced against him than she has ever been. Even the description of his "*look* of haughty composure" on delivering the letter reveals Elizabeth's adverse perception of him (Italics mine, 174). But more, the insulting quality of his proposal, the accusations of pride and injustice leveled by Wickham, and his hand in Bingley's removal from Jane all weigh heavily against Mr. Darcy in Elizabeth's mind. Darcy's letter, however, will address each of these concerns, and although she does not yet know it, Elizabeth's *response* will crucially affect her entire future.

Predictably, Elizabeth opens Mr. Darcy's letter "With no expectation of pleasure," but significantly, she does so "with the strongest curiosity" (174). As we saw earlier, one of the two primary senses of wonder involves "curiosity, sometimes mingled with doubt about [something]; [a] want to know." Of course, Elizabeth's openness to unforeseen possibilities has already been facilitated by the psychic shock of Mr. Darcy's proposal; as the narrator tells us, after Mr. Darcy "hastily left the room . . . Her *astonishment*, as she reflected on what had passed, was increased by every review of it" (Italics mine, 172). Notwithstanding her antipathy towards Mr. Darcy, the very fact that he has addressed her once more--even after being so strongly berated and so firmly rejected--further awakens a measure of wonder in Elizabeth.[129] This explicit "movement" by Mr. Darcy towards Elizabeth has, I think, been underestimated in the critical literature, for apart from the force of his reasoning, the letter reveals to Elizabeth his authentic desire to be understood by her, and this in itself does much to open her mind towards him.[130] Certainly, as many people would have done in a similar situation, Elizabeth could have rejected his address by destroying the letter, but she chooses to submit to the promptings of "curiosity," and so she opens the letter, thus, *opening herself* to "her still increasing *wonder* " (Italics mine, 174) at the contents of the envelope.

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[129] Samuel Kliger has argued that Mr. Darcy does not publicly answer Wickham's charges because he observes the principle of *Noblesse Oblige* which entails that one neither complains nor explains. ("Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice* in the Eighteenth-Century Mode," in Donald J. Gray, ed, *Pride and Prejudice.* New York: W. W. Norton, 1966, 360). However, Mr. Klinger fails to recognize the crucial point that Mr. Darcy's letter of explanation constitutes putting another human being ahead of an abstract principle--a "ready-made truth." And as we saw earlier, such a regard for the other is an important aspect of the dialogical "philosophy" of both Socrates and Bakhtin. As Bakhtin puts it, "The highest value is a human being, and the subordinated value is 'the good,' and not the other way around." Cited in Morson and Emerson, 1980, 182.

But before we are given Elizabeth's response to reading the letter, we are privy to its contents. As Gary Kelly notes, "this allows us to form our own 'first impressions' (the novel's original title) of Darcy's arguments and explanations . . . we are then curious to compare our reading to hers" (1984, 162). Understood in dialogical terms, our reading of the letter constitutes a kind of unmediated address to us. With neither narrative comment nor Elizabeth's response to influence us, we are, in a sense, directly introduced to the "strange" and "unexpected"--to the "wonderful." Not only does this address allow us to subsequently "compare our reading to hers," first and foremost, the letter compels us to consider our own preconceived notions about Mr. Darcy. The address requires responsive understanding, evaluation of our own position vis a vis Mr. Darcy--in other words, it prompts self-examination in the reader: the goal of Socratic philosophy. As Bakhtin recognized, the reader may function as an absent "third person" whose involvement in "*contextual meaning* (that is, integrated meaning that relates to value--to truth, beauty, and so forth . . . requires a *responsive* understanding, one that includes evaluation). The responsive understanding of a speech whole is always dialogic in nature" (*Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,*125). Once our responsive understanding has come into play, we are then given Elizabeth's process of evaluation and response; thus, a third position becomes explicit--one which we again evaluate both in terms of its response and in terms of our own revised understanding. The question for us then becomes, "Does Elizabeth persist in her monologic orientation to Mr. Darcy, or does she continue to open herself to heretofore unthinkable possibilities?"

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[130] Bruce Stovel's remarks are an exception to the general critical underestimation of the effect of Darcy's letter. Mr. Stovel notes that Darcy's letter shows "how much he wants to continue to communicate with [Elizabeth]." See, "Surprise in *Pride and Prejudice,"* in *Approaches to Teaching Austen's "Pride and Prejudice"* (124).

Initially, Elizabeth's response to Mr. Darcy's letter does not appear promising, for we read that "With a strong prejudice against every thing he might say, she began his account of what had happened at Netherfield" (181). Her monologic orientation seems firmly entrenched, but our apprehension at her prejudice is assuaged momentarily, for "She read, with an eagerness which hardly left her power of comprehension, and from *impatience of knowing* what the next sentence *might* bring, was incapable of the attending to the sense of the one before her eyes" (Italics mine). The desire to know what "might" be--one of the features of wonder--is at least present to some degree in Elizabeth's mind, but at the same time, because she is "incapable of [properly] attending" to what is being said, she concludes that Mr.

Darcy's "style was not penitent, but haughty. It was all pride and insolence." Of course, as we have seen, the lack of "attending" to the word of another is one of the fundamental features of monologism.

But our hopes for Elizabeth are soon revived once more, for when she peruses the account of Mr. Wickham, "she read with somewhat clearer attention" (181), and consequently, "Astonishment, apprehension, and even horror, oppressed her." It is noteworthy that Elizabeth's "clearer attention" to the words of Mr. Darcy first brings *astonishment* before apprehension and horror, and although these feelings oppress Elizabeth, nevertheless, their very intensity suggests something of the power of wonder to affect the monologic mind. Comfortable or not, Elizabeth's psyche has been irrevocably moved.

But not surprisingly, Elizabeth wishes to "discredit [Mr. Darcy's account] entirely, repeatedly exclaiming, 'This must be false ! This cannot be ! This must be the grossest falsehood !' " (181-82). Finally, Elizabeth puts the letter away and again reverts to monologic closure, refusing to be further addressed by the letter, "protesting that she would not regard it, that she would never look at it again" (182). What I find intriguing here is the telling vacillation--the psychic tug of war between monologism and dialogism--in Elizabeth's reactions to the letter. Here, Jane Austen presents us with an enlightening sort of object lesson about the interplay between dialogism and monologism. We see again that neither orientation is a static, all-encompassing *state*; we see that in reality, human beings are constantly subject to both orientations, subject, that is, to the struggle between the "finalizing" pull of monologism and the "unfinalized" potentialities of dialogism.[131] Elizabeth's responses to the letter cogently dramatize this ongoing mental and moral struggle.

Notwithstanding her decision to disregard Mr. Darcy's address, the struggle continues; Elizabeth soon returns to the letter "and commanded herself so far as to examine the meaning of every sentence," and so she "read and re-read with the *closest attention*" (Italics mine, 182). In mustering the presence of mind to give Mr. Darcy's words "the closest attention," Elizabeth, once more, opens herself to the world of unrecognized possibilities. By reading and re-reading the letter, she finally gives Mr. Darcy's address more than just a momentary thought; she "weighed every circumstance . . . deliberated on the probability of each statement," and consequently, she discovers that the affair "was capable of a turn which must make him [Mr. Darcy] entirely blameless throughout the whole" (182). Once she has admitted to herself the possibility that the entire affair "was capable of a turn" which she had previously refused to recognize, Elizabeth becomes open to a new and larger reality. And this reality includes the "advent" of a Mr. Darcy that she has never really recognized before, a Mr. Darcy "entirely blameless throughout the whole."

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[131] As Morson and Emerson (1990) note, *unfinalizability* "designates a complex of values central to his [Bakhtin's] thinking: innovation, "surprisingness," the genuinely new, openness, potentiality, freedom, creativity--terms that he also uses frequently" (36-7). Bakhtin sees this "unfinalizability" as a feature of Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel. He expresses this polyphony as follows: "*nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is still in the future and will always be in the future*" (*PDP*, 166).

And although Elizabeth "tried to recollect some instance of goodness, some distinguishing trait of integrity or benevolence, that might rescue him [Wickham] from the attacks of Mr. Darcy" (183), it is the sources of *her* monologic failure that become most clearly apparent. The text itself now points to her mistaken emphasis on superficial appearances as well as her deference to the entrenched monologism of the community:

> His [Wickham's] countenance, voice, and manner, had established him at once in the possession of every virtue . . . She could see him instantly before her, in every charm of air and address; but she could remember no more substantial good than the general approbation of the neighbourhood, and the regard which his social powers had gained him in the mess. (183)

Furthermore, it is also telling that in recalling her impressions of Mr. Wickham, Elizabeth intimates her own failure to question, to enquire, to wonder: "As to his real character, had information been in her power, she had never felt a wish of enquiring" (183).[132] It is telling that at this juncture, Elizabeth has alluded to *each* of the sources of monologism that we have considered. She is finally becoming cognizant, it seems, of the influence of her community, of her erroneous attention to external appearances, of her narrow bias against Mr. Darcy, and of her own failure to experience wonder.

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[132] To be precise, this passage is an example of "double-voiced discourse"--a fusion of the voices of the narrator and Elizabeth. As Bakhtin has shown, such discourse weakens authorial control

These realizations, coupled with her new found attention to Mr. Darcy's words,[133] finally bring Elizabeth to a more compelling experience of wonder; in thinking of Wickham's discourse, "She was *now* struck with the impropriety of such communications to a stranger, and *wondered* it had escaped her

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by undermining the monologic context and, hence, is one of the fundamental features of the polyphonic novel. In *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,*Bakhtin writes, "The weakening or destruction of a monologic context occurs only when there is a coming together of two utterances equally and directly orientated toward a referential object. Two discourses equally and directly orientated toward a referential object within the limits of a single context cannot exist side by side without intersecting dialogically . . ." (188-89). Similarly, Bakhtin maintains that "The possibility of employing on the plane of a single work discourses of various types, with all their expressive capacities intact, without reducing them to a common denominator--this is one of the most fundamental characteristics of [polyphonic] prose" (200).

[133] I think it is important that we notice that Mr. Darcy's painful but candid revelations about Wickham's "designs on Miss Darcy" must strongly influence Elizabeth, not merely for what these revelations say about Wickham, but for what they say about Mr. Darcy. His revelations show that he is holding nothing in reserve with Elizabeth; in Martin Buber's terms, Mr. Darcy "confirms" Elizabeth by entrusting her with information that could harm his own family; we can safely assume this is not lost on her.

before" (Second italics mine, 183-84). This experience further brings Elizabeth to a new and radical apprehension of reality: "How differently did every thing now appear in which he [Wickham] was concerned" (184). And in turn, this new apprehension of reality subsequently causes Elizabeth to experience *shame,* and thus, to see *herself* in a new and revealing light: "She grew absolutely ashamed of herself.--Of neither Darcy nor Wickham could she think, without feeling that she had been blind, partial, prejudiced, absurd" (185).[134] At this point, Elizabeth's consciousness of others--Darcy and Wickham--creates in her a consciousness of her own moral shortcomings. Through the other, then, Elizabeth has finally come to an authentic engagement with herself. Here again, Jane Austen shows an understanding of one of the crucial aspects of what I have termed "dialogical philosophy." Elizabeth's thinking of the *other* helps *her* to turn inward, to engage in self-examination;[135] Martin Buber explains this dynamic in *the Knowledge of Man*; he writes, "For the inmost growth of the self is not accomplished, as some like to suppose today, in man's relation to himself, but in the relation between the one and the other . . ." (61).

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[134] We should recall here that in the Socratic dialogues, shame often attends those who come to see reality properly. Shame, then, is positive in Socratic philosophy, for its presence suggests that the person who feels shame has experienced the moral efficacy of the philosophical dialogue, experienced the "spiritual exercise" of the examined life.

[135] James Thompson takes the converse view; he argues, "knowledge of others is not so achieved as it is given as a reward for newly discovered knowledge of self, and the process of knowing others is interiorized." *Between Self and the World: The Novels of Jane Austen.* London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988. 115.

Having examined herself by virtue of thinking of her relation with others, Elizabeth begins the process of what Bakhtin describes as "an *active dialogic approach to one's own self,* destroying one's naive wholeness of one's notions about oneself . . . break[ing] down the outer shell of the self's image . . ." (*PDP,* 120). The force of this *"internal dialogicality"* is stressed as Elizabeth audibly voices her inner dialogue. Again, her response is measured in terms of her relation with others and, thus, with an eye turned inward she sees her own naivety and folly, and with an eye turned outward, she sees the false image of "abilities" that she has portrayed in her behaviour:

> 'How despicably have I acted !' she cried.--'I, who have prided myself on my abilities ! who have often disdained the generous candour of my sister, and gratified my vanity, in useless of blameable distrust.--How humiliating is this discovery !--Yet, how just a humiliation !--Had I been in love, I could not have been more wretchedly blind. But vanity, not love, has been my folly.--Pleased with the preference of one, and offended by the neglect of the other, on the very beginning of our acquaintance, I have courted prepossession and ignorance, and driven reason away, where either were concerned. Till this moment, I never knew myself.' (185)

Elizabeth's considered and detailed inner dialogue suggests the degree of dialogical activity within her, for she now holds nothing in reserve *with herself* . Elizabeth is open and honest with herself; she holds nothing back from herself. Her self depreciation and the "humiliation" that it engenders is, in fact, a kind of deep experience of wonder, for as Luce Irigaray has pointed out, "wonder is a mourning for the self as an autarchic entity" (*An Ethics of Sexual Difference,* 75). Elizabeth "mourns" her own illusion of self-sufficiency, her "disdain" of others, her "vanity." The illusory "autarchic entity" that she once thought she was has been dealt a lethal blow. Elizabeth realizes her own folly, and this, as Socrates repeatedly emphasized, is the beginning of wisdom.

"Till this moment I never knew myself." It is, I think, no accident that Elizabeth's dialogic engagement with others and with herself finally brings her to the ultimate goal of Socratic philosophy: "Know thyself." Clearly, then, this philosophical insight is the most important "moment" in the novel. Elizabeth has moved from monologism to an experience of wonder, through shame to self-knowledge; it now remains to be seen if "relation" with Mr. Darcy will follow. I will offer some brief remarks on this score.

I think it is important to recognize that Elizabeth's subsequent relation with Mr. Darcy is not *simply* a matter of course. That is, their marriage is not an *inevitable* function of comedy, conventional romance plot, some utopian impulse, or the triumph of patriarchy.[136] Certainly, the dialogical grounds for relation have been established between Elizabeth and Darcy, putting them on a much more secure footing for potential developments, but this is no guarantee that full and authentic relation will ensue. As we saw earlier, monologism is a pervasive and recalcitrant phenomenon, and its influence is never negated once and for all. Similarly, dialogism is an ongoing orientation that must be constantly renewed from one moment to the next. *Pride and Prejudice* reveals that *relation,* too, is a dynamic process rather than a finished state. So to see Elizabeth and Darcy's marriage as representing extraneous concerns--signifying some completed ontological state or expressing some finalized "ultimate word" --would, in my view, be to overlook the

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[136] Gary Kelly's remarks on this subject are worth noting. He writes, "the attentive reader will suppose, from Elizabeth's acceptance of Darcy's point of view, that she has nothing left to do but love him . . . If Darcy as she now knows him to be *is* his letter (the letter replaces the person), he has already won her mind and therefore her heart, though of course it is ironical that his writing, not his face-to-face proposal, should gain Elizabeth for him . . . The rest, the novel makes plain, is up to time and chance, for this is after all a comic world" (1984, 166). In my view, Mr. Kelly is quite right in supposing Mr. Darcy's epistle has won Elizabeth's mind, but I cannot agree that "therefore" he has won her heart. As we read in the next chapter, "His attachment excited gratitude, his general character respect; but she could not approve him; nor could she for a moment repent her refusal, or feel the slightest inclination ever to see him again" (189). *Pride and Prejudice* has repeatedly shown the difficulty in overcoming monologism and entering into a dialogical relation with others; hence, given our understanding of the novel, if there is a sense of inevitability with respect to Elizabeth and Darcy's marriage, it is much more likely to be a result of their having reached a dialogical relation than their simply inhabiting a "comic world."

novel's dialogic bearing and its concern with the very nature and grounds of *relation* itself.[137]

Of course, as we know, Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth do finally enter into the relation of marriage, but for the most part, this is because they have first entered into a dialogical relation with one another. Their previous monological tendencies give way to authentic exchanges in which they openly reveal themselves to each other. And in such exchanges, like the following, we see that reserve, mistrust, misunderstanding, "performance," and even the failure to wonder have fallen to the wayside--open, affable dialogue now reveals dynamic relation:

> 'Why, especially, when you called, did you look as if you did not care about me?'

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[137] For example, Julia Prewitt Brown writes that "Their marriage represents his [Darcy's] capitulation to the force of irrationality as it does her [Elizabeth's] surrender to the need for rationality" ("Necessary Conjunctions" in *New Case Books: "Sense and Sensibility" and "Pride and Prejudice,"* 155.) Deborah Kaplan argues that *Pride and Prejudice* "affirm[s] patriarchal values with the resolution of marriage" (*Jane Austen Among Women.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992, 183). Tony Tanner sees the marriage as a metaphor for the uniting of "playfulness and regulation--energy and boundaries" (Tanner, 141). Mary Poovey complains that the end of *Pride and Prejudice* (and other Austen novels) functions to "disguise the inescapable system of economic and political domination" (*The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelly, and Jane Austen.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984, 237). Gabriela Castellanos sees "two worlds depicted in the novel's resolution: the official one of conventions and hierarchies . . . and the extraofficial one of . . . carnivalesque utopia" (Castellanos, 166).

> 'Because you were grave and silent, and gave me no encouragement.'
>
> 'But I was embarrassed.'
>
> 'But so was I.'
>
> 'You might have talked to me more when you came to dinner.'
>
> 'A man who had felt less, might.'
>
> 'How unlucky that you should have a reasonable answer to give, and that I should be so reasonable as to admit it ! But I wonder how long you *would* have gone on , if you had been left to yourself. I wonder when you *would* have spoken, if I had not asked you !' (338-39)

But, this exchange does more than reveal genuine dialogue and dynamic relation between Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy; it makes these matters its *subject.* As such, Jane Austen gives us a kind of meta-philosophy, a quick inquiry into the notions her novel has been dramatizing. Consider Elizabeth's "wondering" above. The focus of her "wonder" offers us a brief glimpse into Jane Austen's concerns, into the dialogic imagination that informs *Pride and Prejudice.* Elizabeth's wondering is concerned with the nature and grounds of *relation;* it is concerned with otherness and how it is overcome; it is concerned with how the dialogic word of one may penetrate the world of the other; it is concerned with wonder itself--with possibilities--with what *"would"* happen if monologism were left to its own devices--with what *"would"* happen if the one had not addressed the other. Seen in this light, *Pride and Prejudice* is much more expansive and compelling than a novel about money, or marriage, or manners, or romance, or epistemology, or gender, or patriarchy and so forth. More radical than a modernist novel that makes fictional conventions its subject, *Pride and Prejudice* makes the *actual* "dialogue of life" both its subject and its object. Monologism and dialogism, the examined life and self-knowledge, the other and relation: all figure prominently in *Pride and Prejudice;* all are revealed, scrutinized, and given their voice in Jane Austen's unrecognized dialogic imagination.

Chapter Four

Emma: The Education of Character, the Examination of Openness, and Sensitivity as Self-Knowledge.

Education worthy of the name is essentially education of character.

Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man.*

Currently, it is almost a critical commonplace to discuss *Emma* in terms of education or pedagogy. Indeed, much valuable and enlightening work has been done to explicate the novel's preoccupation with various elements of the education of Emma Woodhouse. In general, early essays concerned with education in *Emma* tend to focus on Mr. Knightley's role as Emma's teacher--stressing his almost infallible judgement and Emma's most profound reformation. Other essays have challenged this early tendency and view the process of Emma's education in less formulaic terms--arguing, for example, that Mr. Knightley is not without fault, whether as a pedagogue or as a person, and that Emma's reform is neither as perfect nor even as necessary as some critics have claimed.[138] How, then, beyond the obvious differences in plot and characters, does *Emma* differ substantially from *Pride and Prejudice* as a *Bildungsroman*? Both Emma and Elizabeth come to self-knowledge; wherein, then, does the essential difference lie? The answer, I think, may be found by scrutinizing some features of *Emma* that have received either insufficient attention or no attention at all. In particular, these features include the education of Emma's *character* and the *unusual* kind of pedagogical relation between Mr. Knightley and Emma; the novel's treatment of the relation between openness and reserve; and, closely connected to this treatment,

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[138] By and large, feminist critics have tended to stress Mr. Knightley's flaws while reformulating the terms of Emma's reform, either to deflate its import or to recast it as a kind of feminist victory. For example, Claudia Johnson (1988) remarks that "even the very worst of Knightley's criticisms turn out to be fretfully minute" (128), and that "Knightley is not nearly so wise and all-seeing as he appears to think" (140). Ms. Johnson also writes that Emma is "a woman who possesses and enjoys

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power without being demure about it . . . power not only over her own destiny, but . . . power over the destinies of others--and in so doing she poaches on what is felt to be male turf" (125). Ms. Johnson concludes that "In moving to Hartfield, Knightley is sharing *her* home, and in placing herself in her domain, Knightley gives his blessing to her rule" (143). Gabriela Castellanos (1994) notes, "Mr. Knightley's simplistic confidence that virtue will assert itself and eventually triumph . . ." (185), and that "Mr. Knightly also makes profound mistakes" (199). For some recent essays that offer various insights into pedagogy in *Emma*, see also, Anne Ruderman, "Moral Education in Jane Austen's *Emma,*" in *Poets, Princes, And Private Citizens: Literary Alternatives to Postmodern Politics,* ed. Joseph M. Knippenberg and Peter Augustine Lawler. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1996; Christine Roulston, "Discourse, Gender, and Gossip: Some Reflections on Bakhtin and *Emma,*" in *Ambiguous Discourse: Feminist Narratology and British Women Writers,* ed. Kathy Mezei. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996; Barbara Horwitz, "Women's Education During the Regency: Jane Austen's Quiet Rebellion." *Persuasions,* #16 (1994), 135-148; J. M. Q. Davies, *"Emma* as Charade and the Education of the Reader." *Philological Quarterly,* Vol 65, #2 (1986), 231-242; and Margaret Lenta, "Jane Fairfax and Jane Eyre: Educating Women." *Ariel,* Vol 12, #4 (1981), 27-41.

the peculiar form of self-knowledge that the novel underwrites, namely, sensitivity.

A. The Education of Character and the Pedagogic Relation

Garry Kelly (among others) has claimed that "Emma Woodhouse has the social and material standing that Elizabeth Bennet lacks, while lacking the intellectual if not moral merit of the latter."[139] It seems to me that the second clause of Mr. Kelly's assertion, while perhaps arguable, is misleading since it intimates that Elizabeth and Emma's intellectual and moral shortcomings as well as their intellectual and moral achievements are of the same order, and therefore subject to the same criteria of evaluation. But this is not the case. Of course, the relation between Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth and the relation between Mr. Knightley and Emma are clearly quite different, but more importantly, the kind of self-knowledge that Elizabeth and Emma respectively reach is of a markedly different order. Except, perhaps, for her realization of her love for Mr. Knightley, Emma does not come to the kind of self-knowledge that Elizabeth so cogently expresses after re-reading Mr. Darcy's letter: "Till this moment, I never knew myself" (185). Emma's education is not involved primarily with coming to recognize her own monologism or moral flaws, but rather, it is largely a process of learning how to *properly apply* the moral knowledge that she *already* possesses. The distinction may be a subtle one, but I think it is essential to understanding the nature of Emma's education and of her unique relation to Mr. Knightley.

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[139] "Jane Austen, Romantic Feminism, and Civil Society," in *Jane Austen and Discourses of Feminism,* ed. Devoney Looser. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1995, 29.

Generally stated, unlike Elizabeth who comes to self-knowledge through *confrontingthe other* (Mr. Darcy), Emma is schooled by another (Mr. Knightley) in how to apply her self-knowledge *with respect to the other.* This, of course, is not to say that Emma has no moral flaws or that she does not learn crucial things about herself; on both counts, she does. But the *predominant* feature of Emma's relation with Mr. Knightley is not that he "teaches" her morality, but that, for the most part, he helps her to properly realize and to properly exercise the moral knowledge that she possesses. In this way, Mr. Knightley is analogous to Socrates who, as we saw earlier, is no teacher in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather is a kind of "midwife" who assists in the travail of moral labour and in the "birth" of moral wisdom.[140] But before I explore the pedagogical relation between Mr. Knightley and Emma in detail, some further clarifications are needed.

I want first to quote a passage from D. H. Lawrence which is, perhaps, one of the most famous and one of the most scathing criticisms of Jane Austen ever penned. Lawrence writes:

> In the old England, the curious blood-connection held the classes together. The squires might be arrogant, violent,

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[140] See page twelve above.

> bullying, and unjust, yet in some ways they were *at one* with the people, part of the same blood-stream. We feel it in Defoe or Fielding. And then, in the mean Jane Austen, it is gone. Already this old maid typifies 'personality' instead of character, the sharp knowing in apartness instead of knowing in togetherness, and she is, to my feeling, thoroughly unpleasant, English in the bad, mean, snobbish sense of the word . . . .[141]

Now I do not intend to explicitly debate Lawrence's assertion here, for it is not his attack on Jane Austen per se that interests me.[142] Although I do believe Lawrence is gravely mistaken in his evaluation of Jane Austen, nevertheless his comments are insightfully suggestive since they can be seen to go to the heart of the issue of pedagogy in *Emma*. It seems to me that Lawrence's appreciation of the differences between "personality" and "character" and between "knowing in apartness" and "knowing in togetherness" offers one fruitful way of conceptualizing the essential features of the sort of self-knowledge that I have suggested pertains to Emma's education. Without extrapolating too much, we can infer from Lawrence's comments that one could well think of the educative process itself as primarily aimed either at the "character" of the "student" or at his or her "personality." Clearly, Lawrence thought of personality in pejorative terms, preferring character as the locus of novelistic attention. But, of course, the precise distinction between personality and character is not readily apparent. What, then, is the difference between personality and character? And how does this apply to *Emma*? For some assistance in answering these questions, we can turn to the thought of Martin Buber.

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[141] D. H. Lawrence, "A Propos of *Lady Chatterley's Lover,*" in *Sex, Literature and Censorship,* ed. Harry T. Moore. New York: Viking Press, 1959, 109.

[142] Alistair Duckworth has already convincingly argued that "Lawrence has confused authorial identity with dramatic presentation. Had he argued that Jane Austen dramatically represents 'personality' and 'the sharp knowing in apartness'--had he accused the character of Mrs. Elton of being 'English in the bad, mean, snobbish sense of the word'--then, surely, we could have agreed with him." See, Duckworth, 1971, 152.

In "The Education of Character" Martin Buber points the reader's attention toward the place of personality and character in the educative process. His comments are worth quoting at length:

> a man can be conceived either as personality, that is, as a unique spiritual-physical form with all the forces dormant in it, or as character, that is, as the link between what this individual is and the sequence of his actions and attitudes. Between these two modes of conceiving the pupil in his wholeness there is a fundamental difference. Personality is something which in its growth remains essentially outside the influence of the educator; but to assist in the moulding of character is his greatest task. Personality is a completion, only character is a task. One may cultivate and enhance personality, but in education one can and one must aim at character.[143]

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[143] Martin Buber, "The Education of Character," in *Between*

While Buber's analysis may seem counter-intuitive to our conventional understanding of character as being more or less fixed, his comments prove instructive if we consider *Emma* in light of his distinctions. In particular, we need to notice that personality is a "completion," a "unique spiritual-physical form with all the forces dormant within in it," and that it is "outside the influence of the educator." On this account, then, personality is, by and large, unique, complete, and stable. As Buber points out, personality is subject to cultivation and growth, but it remains, in its essential features, what it is. We might safely think of it as roughly equivalent to personal identity. If Buber's analysis is correct, we would expect that Emma's personality, her personal identity, is "outside the influence of the educator," outside the purview of Mr. Knightley's pedagogic role. We will see that this is indeed the case.

Similarly, it is important to keep in mind that by Buber's reckoning, character is "the link between what this individual is and the sequence of his actions and attitudes"--"a task." That is, character is the ongoing process of realizing and applying one's personal identity; it is a kind of active mediating knowledge and manifestation of what one is. And again, if Buber's analysis is correct, we would expect that Mr. Knightley's pedagogic task would be directed at Emma's character, that he would seek to bring about a congruous relation between who Emma is and how her attitudes and--most importantly--how her actions are

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Man and Man.
London: Collins, 1968, 132.

realized in relation to others. And, in fact, we will see that this is precisely what Mr. Knightley's "lessons" are aimed at with respect to Emma. For example, although Mr. Knightley points out to Mrs. Weston that "Emma has been meaning to read more ever since she was twelve years old," it is not these kind of pedagogical matters that will receive his attention.[144] Mr. Knightley states that he has "done with expecting any course of steady reading" or "any thing requiring industry and patience" (32), from Emma, but he is certainly not done with the paramount "task" of assisting in the education of her character.

Bearing in mind the caveat that Buber's conception of the education of character is to be understood only as approximated in *Emma*, the first question I want to address is not concerned with why Emma is in need of a "teacher," but with why she is in need of a "teacher" *like Mr. Knightley.* The well-known opening paragraph to the novel offers the first clues in answering this question:

> Emma Woodhouse, handsome, clever, and rich, with a comfortable home and happy disposition, seemed to unite some of the best blessings of existence; and had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world with very little to distress or vex her. (3)

That all is not simply sweetness and light is apparent in this and the following few paragraphs.[145] As I have noted, the word

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[144] Jane Austen. *Emma.* Ed. James Kinsley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, 32. Subsequent citations in parenthesis.

"seemed" first indicates that Emma's real condition is not as blessed as it appears to be. This one word--"seemed"--subtly introduces the disparity between reality and illusion, between what is and what appears to be, and as we saw earlier, this is a central theme both in Socratic philosophy and in *Pride and Prejudice.* But it is the word "vex" that I think merits some particular notice with respect to the precise pedagogical relation between Mr. Knightley and Emma.

Certainly Emma, who is described as "an imaginist" (302), with a "fancy . . . very active" (357), is under various illusions about herself and others. In this respect, she might well profit by the moderating input of a teacher or mentor. *But it is important to recognize that, in fact, most of her illusions are demolished, not by any pedagogical intervention from others, including Mr. Knightley, but simply by the course of events as they unfold around her.* That is, for the most part, Emma's fanciful illusions are disconfirmed *by reality,* not by the moral or philosophical tutoring of a pedagogue.[146] As the first

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[145] Of course, various critics have commented on how the first few paragraphs reveal insights into Emma's character and flaws. Although Gabriela Castellanos (1994), sees the first paragraph as revealing a "nearly utopian . . . ideal situation" (178) most critics recognize the force of the qualifying verb "seemed" in undermining the *apparent* "blessings" conferred on Emma. As Roger Gard puts it, "all this happy plainness is qualified by the first verb--at first unobtrusively charged--which is to be crucial to the action: 'seemed'. Emma's advantages only potentially confer the best blessings of existence. . . ." *Jane Austen's Novel's: The Art of Clarity.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, 156.

paragraph in the novel indicates, Emma has had "nearly twenty-one years in the world with very little to distress or vex her"; we might say that reality will eventually distress her, just as Mr. Knightley will edifyingly vex her. So, Mr. Knightley's *primary* role as a teacher will not be to reveal to Emma what is true and what is false or what is moral and what is immoral; rather, like Socrates, who annoyed others by "sifting" their lives in order to advance the "examined life," one of Mr. Knightley's essential roles will be to vex Emma into self-examination. As the narrator puts it, Emma "had a sort of habitual respect for his [Mr. Knightley's] judgement, which made her dislike having it so loudly against her" (59). Emma's "habitual respect" for Mr. Knightley's judgement enables him to secure a hearing, but it is Emma's "dislike" of what she hears that often disturbs her into deeper reflection.

But this does not always appear to be the case. Think of Mr. Elton's disastrous proposal to Emma. Previously, Mr. Knightley had perceived that Emma intended to encourage a match between

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[146] To my knowledge, no critic writing on *Emma* and education has made this crucial point. I find this surprising as it seems to me that it is both clear and obvious that Emma's major revelations are the result of the unfolding of external events rather than the direct input of a teacher. In this sense, Emma is "schooled" by reality not by a teacher. Tony Tanner is one critic who does come to something of a recognition of Emma's being "schooled" by reality. He writes, "There is very little either in her upbringing or in her environment (apart from the solid sageness of Mr Knightley) to prepare Emma for an unavoidable and significant encounter with the reality principle--or, things as they *are*" (187).

Mr. Elton and Harriet. He had warned Emma that Mr. Elton would "act rationally" and not pursue "an imprudent match" (59). But Emma's subsequent revelation that "The first error and the worst lay at her door," and that "It was foolish, it was wrong, to take so active a part in bringing any two people together" (124), does not derive so much from Mr. Knightley's previous admonishments concerning Mr. Elton than from the "astonishment" (118) of Mr. Elton's unanticipated proposal and from his explanation that his attentions to Harriet were only a function of her being Emma's friend. So, in a very germane sense, Emma is primarily schooled by the "brute fact" of Mr. Elton's proposal, not by any direct pedagogical insights that she may have received in her previous exchange with Mr. Knightley. One might reasonably ask, then, "Was Mr. Knightley's advice without effect on Emma? Was there no pedagogical efficacy in his 'lesson' about Robert Martin and Mr. Elton"?

Suffice it to say that after a lengthy exchange between Mr. Knightley and Emma on the respective merits and short-comings of Mr. Martin and Harriet (and after some oblique conjecture on Mr. Elton's future behaviour), Mr. Knightley and Emma reach a virtual impasse. Mr. Knightley--exercising the "reality principle"--seriously attempts to represent the *facts* about Mr. Martin, Harriet, and Mr. Elton insofar as they are known to him. In so doing, he "teaches" by example that imagination or conjecture about others ought to be grounded, as much as possible, in the particular facts of reality.[147] Emma, on the other hand, for whom "It was most convenient . . . not to make a direct reply" (56), responds to Mr. Knightley by shifting to a general argument about men and women.[148] It is important to notice that although the moral tone of much of Mr. Knightley's argument is evident, he does not directly lecture Emma on the morality of her involvement in the affair. What appears to concern him most is Emma's apparent abuse of her own reason and the ill effects it will have on both Harriet and Robert Martin. That is, although Mr. Knightley does argue with Emma over the particular facts of the matter, what he wants *from Emma,* and what he hopes for her, is that she properly *apply* the reason she already possesses--that she *act* in accordance with what she actually *knows* so as not to adversely affect others. Mr. Knightley puts it clearly to Emma: "Upon my word, Emma, to hear you abusing the reason you have . . . better be without sense than *misapply* it as you do" (57, emphasis mine). It seems to be a valid assumption, then, that Mr. Knightley knows full well that

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[147] Mr. Knightley's attempt to focus on the facts as they are

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known is in keeping with Martin Buber's insight that "education, conscious and willed, means *a selection by man of the effective world." Between Man and Man,* 116. Selection of the effective world is closely connected to, as Buber writes elsewhere, what "may be described as 'imagining' the real." *The Knowledge of Man: Selected Essays.* Trans. Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1988, 60.

[148] Howard Babb (1962) makes a number of observations on Emma's propensity to generalize, including the point that she "instinctively shields herself from responsibility by the generalization" that "Nobody could have helped it [her insult to Miss Bates]" (181-187).

Emma possesses all the "sense" she needs to make informed, moral decisions; her real problem, is that she misapplies her "reason" and her moral "sense." His concern, therefore, is not to influence Emma's personality--her "unique spiritual-physical form"--but to educate her character--"the link between what this individual is and the sequence of [her] actions and attitudes."

The discussion between the two interlocutors continues, and although we read that Emma cries "playfully" (57), that she "laughed and disclaimed" (59), "laughing again" (60), nevertheless, Mr. Knightley's counsel is not without some effect.[149] After Mr. Knightly leaves, "Emma remained in a state of vexation . . ." for "She did not always feel so absolutely satisfied with herself, so entirely convinced that her opinions were right and her adversary's wrong, as Mr. Knightley" (60). Mr. Knightley has not *taught* Emma right from wrong or to know herself in the sense that Elizabeth Bennet comes to know herself; what his "lecture" has done is to create a "state of vexation" in her, and in large part, it is this vexation that precipitates a kind of self-examination on Emma's part.[150]

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[149] Like Elizabeth Bennet, Emma often uses laughter to avoid the penetrating word of the other and, thus, to avoid self-examination. See note #124 above.

[150] We read that Mr. Knightley is also "very much vexed," and that "He felt the disappointment of the young man [Robert Martin], and was mortified to have been the means of promoting it, by the sanction he had given . . ." (60). I see this as one of the first signs that the pedagogical relation between Emma and Mr. Knightley is reciprocal to some degree; Emma also teaches Mr. Knightley some things. As Juliet McMaster has rightly pointed out, for Jane Austen, "the pedagogic relationship is not

Emma's self-examination takes the form of rationalizations about her own interference with respect to Harriet and Mr. Elton. And although the next chapter tells us that Emma "was sorry, but could not repent" and that "Mr. Knightley might quarrel with her, but Emma could not quarrel with herself" (62), nevertheless Emma *does,* in effect, "quarrel with herself" *through* the absent "teacher"--*through* repeated considerations of Mr. Knightly's position and words:

> she felt a satisfaction which settled her with her own mind, and convinced her, that let Mr. Knightley think or say what he would, she had done nothing which woman's friendship and woman's feelings would not justify . . . He had frightened her a little about Mr. Elton; but when she considered that Mr. Knightley could not have observed him as she had done . . . nor (she must be allowed to tell herself, in spite of Mr. Knightley's pretensions) . . . Mr. Knightley did not make due allowance . . . Mr. Knightley saw no such passion . . . . (60-61)

Emma's persistent rationalizing of her behaviour in light of Mr. Knightley's perspective reveals his pedagogical influence in creating a "state of vexation" within her. The effect is a kind of quarrel with herself, with the internalized words and thoughts of Mr. Knightley. And although Emma ultimately justifies her own behaviour to herself--"she must be allowed to tell herself . . . "--

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parasitic but symbiotic . . . ." See "Love and Pedagogy," in Juliet McMaster's *Jane Austen the Novelist: Essays Past and Present.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, 152.

and persists in her erroneous "plans," she has, in a small but significant way, begun to examine the merits of her own behaviour in relation to others.

Still, this as well as Mr. Knightley's other "lessons" are not lost on Emma. For example, when Emma considers why she does not like Jane Fairfax, she thinks about what "Mr. Knightley had once told her": that she saw in Jane the "the really accomplished young woman, which she wanted to be herself" (148). The efficacious effects on Emma of Mr. Knightley's troubling insights are clear, for "though the accusation had been eagerly refuted at the time, there were moments of self-examination in which her conscience could not quit her" (148). Again, Mr. Knightley does not teach Emma morality, but vexes her into self-examination.

Similarly, after Mr. Elton's proposal, Emma is mindful of validity of Mr. Knightly's warnings concerning Mr. Elton:

> She remembered what Mr. Knightley had once said to her about Mr. Elton, the caution he had given, the conviction he had professed that Mr. Elton would never marry indiscreetly; and blushed to think how much a truer knowledge of his character had been there shewn than any she had reached herself. (122)

Indeed, the essential focus of Mr. Knightley's previous pedagogical advice--that Emma properly apply what she really knows so as not to harm others--now comes to the fore in Emma's consciousness. The disgrace and humiliation that Emma feels over her blunder in the Elton--Harriet affair is focused not so much on her own moral culpability or even on her blatant mistake, as it is on the the harm that the *application* of her error through the *action* of interference has caused her friend:

> Such a blow for Harriet!--That was the worst of all. Every part of it brought pain and humiliation, of some sort or other; but, compared with the evil to Harriet , all was light; and she would gladly have submitted to feel yet more mistaken--more in error--more disgraced by mis-judgement, than she actually was, could the effects of her blunders have been confined to herself.
>
> 'If I had not persuaded Harriet into liking the man, I could have born any thing . . .' She had taken up the idea, she supposed, and made every thing bend to it. (121)

Similarly, after Emma again examines herself in connection to her behaviour toward Mr. Elton, her subsequent resolve over the entire affair is not to know herself better nor not to make mistakes about others, but not to *act* beyond the scope of what she actually knows to be proper:

> It was foolish, it was wrong, to take so active a part in bringing two people together. It was adventuring too far, assuming too much, making light of what ought to be serious, a trick of what ought to be simple. She was quite concerned and ashamed, and resolved to *do* such things no more. (124, italics mine)

Emma's "resolve," then, is not to change her personality but to improve her character. And if one scrutinizes a little more of the first chapter of the novel, it will become apparent why this must be the locus of her education and why it must be Mr. Knightley who facilitates the process.

In the second paragraph of *Emma* ,we learn that Emma's father is "indulgent," and in the next we learn that her governess of sixteen years, Miss Taylor, had been "less a governess than a friend," and that "the mildness of her temper had hardly allowed her to impose any restraint [on Emma]" (3). Furthermore, "Emma doing just what she liked; highly esteemed Miss Taylor's judgement, but [was] directed chiefly by her own." A summary of the essential features of this description of Emma's circumstances might yield the following paraphrase: Emma hardly has any restraints; she is primarily directed by her own judgement, and so she does as she wishes. Each of these three clauses can be understood as revealing a lack of *government* in Emma's life. Nowhere in the above description does one find any explicit moral censure of Emma. Rather, the reader finds Emma ungoverned by her father since he is "indulgent"; ungoverned by her "governess" since she is "less a governess than a friend"; and, most importantly, ungoverned by herself since she does "just what she like[s]." Hence, Emma requires the missing "link" between ontology and epistemology--between "being" and "knowing"; government will *help* establish this link. Self-government will be the crucial starting point in Emma's moral education (but as we will see later, it will not be the final goal since, in human affairs, government *alone* does not guarantee the appropriate *application* of moral being).

Government has to do with the exercise of authority over persons; it is concerned with direction, management, order, and control. This is precisely what Emma needs to begin her moral education. For the most part, Emma does not need to know what is fundamentally right and wrong--she knows this already; she does not need to be further educated in morality--she is a moral person already. Jane Fairfax's words to Mrs. Weston could as easily and as justly come from Emma herself: " 'Do not imagine . . . that I was taught wrong" (380). As Mr. Knightley tells Emma, "Nature gave you understanding:--Miss Taylor gave you principles" (419). Emma's "personality" is fine. What she mostly needs is to learn how to exercise authority over herself; she needs to learn how to responsibly direct, manage, order, and control herself; she needs self-government. It is government, then, that will enable her "character" to become truly educated, to become mature, to become the responsible "link" between who she really is and what she actually knows, thinks, and does. And as her character is educated, she will exercise more government, and conversely, as she exercises more government, her character will be more educated. That is, one can conceive of the relation between character and government as a dialogical, reciprocal one.[151] But again, we need to be mindful that the *exercise* of government itself requires an evaluative mechanism, a guiding spirit if you will, that will help ensure that the exercise of government is legitimate.

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[151] In order to understand this relation more clearly, an analogy may prove useful. If one considers how "self-esteem" is generated, it becomes clear that it arises when a person's conduct is congruent with his or her standards, values, and beliefs etc. And when a person has self-esteem, he or she tends to act according to his or her standards, values, and beliefs. Hence, certain behaviours promote self-esteem, and self-

Furthermore, as Martin Buber understood it, the effective educator must not make "the fatal mistake of *giving instruction* in ethics" (*Between Man and Man,*133); rather, one of the most primary tasks of the teacher is to help the pupil establish self-government (he calls it "self-responsibility") in order to bring about what he describes as the "unity of character." The "unity of character" is a kind of dialogical congruity of character, a dynamic unification of being, life, and action. Buber explains that the educator

> can teach them [students] . . . to recognize that discipline and order too are starting-points on the way to self-responsibility. He can show that even the great character is not born perfect, that the unity of his being has first to mature before expressing itself in the sequence of his actions and attitudes . . . But unity itself, unity of the person, unity of the lived life, has to be emphasized again and again . . . unity of being, life, action together. This does not mean static unity of the uniform, but the great dynamic unity of the multiform in which multiformity is formed into the unity of character [152]

Emma needs self-government to ameliorate one of the "real evils indeed of [her] situation . . . the power of having rather too much

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esteem, in turn generates those same behaviours.

[152] *Between Man and Man,* 145-46.

her own way," just as she needs Mr. Knightley to vex her into self-examination since she also has "a disposition to think a little to well of herself" (4). So again, it is Mr. Knightley who will help Emma to *recognize* her need for self-government, and further, it is Mr. Knightley who will help Emma to properly *realize* self-government so that she might achieve the "unity of character" that she lacks.

The second feature which makes for a special pedagogical relation between Emma and Mr. Knightley is that their relation is a dialogical one. We saw above that Mr. Knightley is no teacher in the ordinary sense; he does not really teach in the sense of imparting knowledge from a privileged epistemic position; rather, like Socrates, he functions *primarily* as a "midwife" who assists in the development of Emma's character. And as we saw, to do this he sometimes vexes her into self-examination, but he also engages in dialogues with her. Mr. Knightley speaks to Emma in a way that no one else ever does; he is, in fact, "one of the few people who could see faults in Emma Woodhouse, *and the only one who ever told her of them"* (8, emphasis mine). Often, Mr. Knightley does not agree with her, of course, but he never directly tells Emma what to do; rather, when either Emma's character or moral matters are at stake, he engages her in frank, open discussions. This again connects him to the Socratic "method" of dialogical exchange and, therefore, it makes his relationship with Emma a very special one.[153]

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[153] See pages #6, and 10-15 above.

Emma is in need of the special pedagogical relation with another since she has not had a person in her life who could *both* challenge and vex her as well as *meet* her in what Martin Buber calls "genuine dialogue." Buber explains that

> In genuine dialogue the turning to the partner takes place in all truth, that is, it is a turning of the being . . . that means that he confirms this other being . . . Of course, such a confirmation does not mean approval; but no matter in what I am against the other, by accepting him as my partner in genuine dialogue I have affirmed him as a person . . . And that means he must be willing on each occasion to say what is really in his mind about the subject of the conversation.[154]

Not only is Emma "in great danger of suffering from intellectual solitude" (5); her father is also unable to engage in genuine dialogue with her since "He could not meet her in conversation, rational or playful" (5). And although Miss Taylor is "one to whom she [Emma] could speak every thought as it arose," there has been really no genuine dialogue between them since Miss Taylor "had such an affection for her as could never find fault" (4), and hence, she cannot speak "in all truth" when the occasion warrants it. Miss Taylor is unable to engage Emma in genuine dialogue for two reasons: her affection for Emma blinds her to Emma's faults, and she has been under Emma's "rule"--in a sense, more of a student of Emma's than her teacher. As Mr. Knightley amicably explains to her (now Mrs. Weston),

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[154] Martin Buber. *The Knowledge of Man: Selected Essays.* 75.

> ever since she was twelve, Emma has been mistress of the house and of you all . . . You are better placed *here*; very fit for a wife, but not at all for a governess . . . You might not give Emma such a complete education as your powers as your powers seem to promise; but you were receiving a very good education from *her*. . . . (32-33)

Not only is Mr. Knightly the one person who is *able* to (and does) challenge and vex Emma into self-examination; he is also the one person who is willing (and can) truly *meet* her in conversation. As Emma tells her father very early in the novel, " '. . . Mr. Knightley loves to find fault with me you know--in a joke--it is all a joke. We always say what we like to one another' " (8). Emma's remarks here are telling. Although these comments are given in a facetious spirit, and although she is mistaken that Mr. Knightley "loves to find fault" with her and that "it is all a joke," nevertheless, Emma's remarks reveal her need for the kind of education Mr. Knightley will help her achieve (for one thing, an awareness that all is not a joke), and they also reveal her acceptance of him as a partner in genuine dialogue.

Furthermore, Mr. Knightley's unique pedagogical credentials as Emma's teacher are further substantiated by his overwhelming concern for her moral welfare. As Martin Buber explains in *Between Man and Man,*

> the genuine educator does not merely consider individual functions of his pupil, as one intending to teach him only to know or to be capable of certain definite things; but his

> concern is always with the person as a whole . . . by his *will* to take part in the stamping of character and by his *consciousness* that he represents in the eyes of the growing person a certain *selection* of what is, the selection of what is "right," of what *should* be. (132,134)

Certainly, Mr. Knightly shows an overwhelming concern for Emma's person as well as a consistent willingness to take part in the development of her character and in her *selection* of what is right. But it is not just that Emma has "had a habitual respect for his judgement," or that he is a "very humane" man (201); as well, Mr. Knightley has had a special pedagogical relation--a dialogical relation--with her that is particular to him and him alone: "he had loved her, and watched over her from a girl, with an endeavor to improve her, and an anxiety for her doing right, which no other creature had at all shared" (376). It is this special dialogical relation with Mr. Knightley that repeatedly enables his words to dwell on her mind and, thus, to penetrate her conscience. As the narrator explains at one point, "Since her [Emma's] last conversation with Mrs. Weston and Mr. Knightley, she was more conscience-stricken about Jane Fairfax than she had often been.--Mr. Knightley's words dwelt with her" (262). And not only is the dialogical nature of Mr. Knightley's pedagogical relation with Emma unique, the novel's situating its field of operation in the interplay between openness and reserve is equally unique.

B. The Examination of Openness

As we have seen, in terms of education, Jane Austen explores the movement from monologism to self-knowledge in *Pride and Prejudice*; in *Emma*, however, she explores the movement from the knowledge of right to its proper application with respect to the other--to "doing right." *Emma* is like an extended moral test case which investigates whether a person who possesses sufficient self-knowledge to *be* moral will necessarily *act* morally. Like Socrates and Bakhtin, Jane Austen is more interested in action than ideas per se. And as many critics have noted, in Jane Austen's works, dialogue most often carries the weight of moral action.[155] *Emma* is no exception;

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[155] For example, Howard S. Babb writes that "Jane Austen's dialogue actually reveals her characters in depth and shows them engaged in the most fundamental activities of personality: in bringing to bear the entire self, for instance, to sway someone else; or in evolving judgements about the behaviour of others and the self; or in winning through to insight into human beings and affairs, as well as lapsing into blindness . . . " (*Jane Austen's Novels: The Fabric of Dialogue,* 5-6). Similarly, Marylea Meyersohn notes that "the full weight of meaning in Austen is carried by speech." See, "Jane Austen's Garrulous Speakers: Social Criticism in *Sense and Sensibility, Emma,* and *Persuasion,"* in *Reading And Writing Women's Lives: A Study of the Novel of Manners,* ed. Bege K. Bowers and Barbara Brothers. Michigan: U. M. I. Research Press, 1990, 135. These insights by critics find confirmation in Jacques Lacan's thinking. Shoshona Felman writes that for Lacan, "Dialogue is thus the radical condition of learning and of knowing, the analytically constitutive condition through which ignorance becomes structurally informative; knowledge is essentially, irreducibly dialogic." *Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, 83.

moral action is played out in the general arena of dialogue, but in particular, moral action is manifest in the novel's treatment of the specific interplay between openness and reserve. That is, *content* is not the only ethical yardstick by which to measure speech; *when* one speaks and *how* one speaks--the context, the motive, the dialogical space--is equally significant in determining what is "right." As Mikhail Bakhtin has noted in *Toward a Philosophy of the Act,* "The truth of the event is not the truth that is self-identical and self-equivalent in its content, but is the rightful and unique position of every participant--the truth of each participant's actual concrete *ought*" (46). For Emma, education in how to do right will primarily entail the apprehension and application of when she ought to speak in all openness and when she ought to exercise reserve--of recognizing, as Bakhtin formulates it, the truth of her "actual concrete *ought.*"

In reference to *Emma*, Marilyn Butler (1975) writes that "All forms of inwardness and secrecy tend to be anti-social. There is a moral obligation to live outside the self, in honest communication with others" (258). While this is certainly true of Jane Austen's general position with respect to "inwardness" and "communication," *Emma* is unusual insofar as it investigates the limits of this general "rule." It is understandable that readers should tend to take as a kind of motto for the novel Mr. Knightley's remarks to Emma concerning Frank Churchill's duplicitous behaviour: "My Emma, does not every thing serve to prove more and more the beauty of truth and sincerity in all our dealings with each other?" (404). Indeed, for Jane Austen "truth and sincerity in all our dealings with each other" *is* a general goal, but we need to recognize also that Jane Austen was sufficiently intelligent and sensitive enough to realize that even this extremely important goal may have its limits--its parameters of suitable operation and proper expression--and that these limits or parameters may often be dictated by the unique contingencies of context. That is, Jane Austen seems to recognize that what constitutes genuine dialogue, or the dialogic word, may not be reduced to indiscriminate openness or compulsive truth telling. What is true may be absolute, but when and how truth is expressed may be a more complicated matter.[156]

Certainly, *Emma* contains a significant amount of discussion concerning the relative merits of openness and the relative demerits of reserve. But, of course, these discussions do not stand in isolation from the events in the novel. Nor do the sentiments expressed in these discussions necessarily express the final authoritive word, either about openness or about reserve. So, in order to give these discussions a wider frame of reference, it will be helpful first to look briefly at some actual exchanges between characters--to see if concrete situations in the novel conform to the values expressed in the explicit discussions of openness and reserve.

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[156] My claim here should not be misconstrued as suggesting that Jane Austen was an ethical relativist; she was not. I think Jane Austen would concur with Bakhtin's assertion that "both relativism and dogmatism equally exclude all argumentation, all authentic dialogue, by making it either unnecessary (relativism) or impossible (dogmatism)." *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* 68. What I want to show is that in *Emma*, Jane Austen (like Bakhtin) was interested in investigating the operation of morality with reference to specific circumstances. Note also, that by "context" I mean the totality of significant elements that make a particular situation unique. This may include factors such as the characters' motives, the discrepancies between statements and how they are understood or between truth and illusion, and so forth.

One character who stands out as an exemplar of openness is Mrs. Elton. The reader must admit that Mrs. Elton customarily "speaks her mind." But the novel's explicit affirmations of openness notwithstanding, her unreserved speech is overwhelmingly self-centered, often damaging, and, one might say, illegitimate. Mrs. Elton routinely speaks with very little regard for the feelings of others. For example, she shows a complete lack of tact and feeling with Jane Fairfax about obtaining Jane a "situation." Although Jane repeatedly protests against Mrs. Elton's interventions on her behalf, Mrs. Elton persists in expressing her resolve to find her a situation (271-72). Mrs. Elton's speeches are typically "paradings" of herself (255), in which she "insist[s]" on exerting her "authority" (265) or on being "authorized" to speak or act with respect to others' concerns (320, 325). As Emma so aptly puts it at one point, "there seems to be no limits to the licentiousness of that woman's tongue" (255).

And not only is Mrs. Elton too unreserved about matters that do not concern her; also her talk, although quite "open" in one sense, is often more like a self-centered monologue than a real dialogue. Consider that in one instance, she uses the first person pronoun twenty-five times in the space of nineteen lines (272), and again, in the space of twelve lines, Mrs. Elton uses the first person pronoun ten times; here we read that "Emma made as slight a reply as she could; but it was fully sufficient for Mrs. Elton, who only wanted to be talking herself" (245). And if the reader should miss how Mrs. Elton's talk violates the essential reciprocity of speech, Mr. Knightley clearly characterizes her mode of discourse; he says, " 'Another thing must be taken into consideration too--Mrs. Elton does not talk *to* Miss Fairfax as she speaks *of* her. We all know the difference between the pronouns he or she and thou, the plainest-spoken amongst us' " (257). In conception and in diction, Mr. Knightley's comments anticipate Martin Buber's I/Thou-I/It distinction. As unreserved as Mrs. Elton may be in talking *of* Jane Fairfax, nevertheless, she treats her as an object--a she (It) rather than a full and equal subject--a Thou. Furthermore, Mrs. Elton's licentious "openness" is not confined to Jane. Her repeated references to "Knightley" produce disgust in Emma: " 'Insufferable woman!' . . . 'Worse than I had supposed. Absolutely insufferable! Knightley!--I could not have believed it. Knightley!--never seen him in her life before, and call him Knightley! . . .' " (250). Similarly, Emma wonders "how she [Mrs. Elton] speaks of the Coles--what she calls them! " (259), and Emma further comments on Mrs. Elton's particular brand of loquacity:

> I have no faith in Mrs. Elton's acknowledging herself the inferior in thought, word, or deed; or in her being under any restraint beyond her own scanty rule of good-breeding. I cannot imagine that she will not be continually insulting her visitor with praise, encouragement, and offers of service; that she will not be continually detailing her magnificent intentions . . . . (260)

Notwithstanding some of the novel's explicit affirmations of openness, be it an "open temper" (259), an "open manner" (241), or every thing that is "all open" (425), or "decided and open" (418), the reader is encouraged here to see that in practice, openness has both its legitimate limits and its proper expressions. Mrs. Elton's openness violates these parameters; hence, her unreserve has its marked short-comings; clearly, her openness is not an absolute virtue; indeed, it is usually a vice--and in this, she is not alone.

Frank Churchill too is another character who, on the face of it, shows a good deal of openness. Of course, in retrospect the reader knows that in fact he is hiding a great deal but, nevertheless, he is *not* reserved. He may be irresponsible, insensitive, and duplicitous in those matters connected to his relationship with Jane, but in general he is otherwise quite open.[157] And Frank's openness is not lost on others; indeed, it proves to be one of his most attractive features. For example, Emma "felt immediately that she should like him" since he has "a well-bred ease of manner, and a readiness to talk . . ." (170). And her original response to Frank's "manner" is soon reaffirmed by Mrs. Weston's favorable impression that "He appeared to have a very open temper" (184).

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[157] The only critic I am aware of that makes a similar claim about Frank's openness is John Peter Rumrich; he writes, "Despite his open character, many readers suspect him of hidden motives--perhaps evil ones. But the man himself, regardless of

Still, with Frank, as with Miss Elton, openness neither insures personal integrity nor guarantees moral conduct. "Frank Churchill, in all the certainty of his own self" (286), is unabashedly "frank" with others, but his frankness often lacks consideration for the feelings of others--be it in his duty to his father and step-mother, in his toying with Emma's affections, or in his insensitive behavior with Jane. And although they may sometimes come from a measure of jealousy towards Frank, Mr. Knightley's comments about his character and conduct seem right on the mark:

> 'No, Emma, your amiable young man can be amiable only in French, not in English. He may be very "aimable," have very good manners, and be very agreeable; but he can have no English delicacy towards the feelings of other people: nothing really amiable about him.' (134-135)

And later, when Frank thoughtlessly pains and distresses Jane

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his plot-producing secret, exists without concealed luggage waiting to spill open and reveal his true motivation. Frank simply is the way he acts." See, "The Importance of Being Frank." *Essays in Literaure.* Vol 8, #1 (Spring 1981). Reprinted in *Modern Critical Interpretations: Jane Austen's "Emma."* Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1987, 97.

during the alphabet letters game by foisting the name *Dixon* on her, the narrator (speaking from Mr. Knightley's point of view) explicitly underscores Frank's want of feeling: "This gallant young man . . . seemed to love without feeling" (314). Frank *is* very agreeable, even gallant, but his openness suffers from a deeper lack of feeling.

Similarly, Emma's view of Frank, though in her estimation favorable, does not differ substantially from Mr. Knightley's:

> 'My idea of him is, that he can adapt his conversation to the taste of every body, and has the power as well as the wish of being universally agreeable. To you he will talk of farming; to me, of drawing or music; and so on to every body, having that general information on all subjects which will enable him to follow the lead, or take the lead, just as propriety may require, and to speak extremely well on each; that is my idea of him.' (135)

Emma and Mr. Knightley certainly differ on how to interpret Frank's ability to be open with "every body," but they do concur on the essential features of his unreserved demeanor. Basically, Frank's unreserve takes the form of trying to be all things to all people, of trying to be "universally agreeable." And it is odd that this kind of openness in Frank should meet with Emma's approval, for such openness is censured by her when it comes to Mr. Weston. We read of Emma that, "She liked his open manners, but a little less of open-heartedness would have made him a higher character.--General benevolence, but not general friendship, made a man what he ought to be" (287).[158]

Another character who may be considered quite open is Miss Bates. Although more amusing and less repugnant than Mrs. Elton's talk, Miss Bates's speeches do show a similar lack of reserve. Miss Bates little considers what she says, and she often speaks even when she knows she ought to keep silent--for example, in her disclosure concerning Mr. Knightley's last apples: "I wanted to keep it from Jane's knowledge; but unluckily, I had mentioned it before I was aware" (215). As Miss Bates herself says later, ". . . I know I do sometimes pop out a thing before I am aware. I am a talker, you know; I am rather a talker; and now and then I have let a thing escape me which I should not" (312). But it is not simply that Miss Bates is a "talker"; the telling feature of her talk is, as her comment intimates, her lack of awareness. Her talk reveals a general deficiency not so much of moral knowledge as of awareness. This is a lack not so much of an awareness of when to speak and when to keep silent--although it is this as well--but a lack of awareness of her own excessive openness. In Miss Bates's case, this may be a kind of failure in self-knowledge, but it is also a failure to recognize the performative nature of speech--that saying something is a kind of action that often affects the world.[159] Her speech often blurs the vital distinction between openness and reserve; in fact, in her actual performance of speech, there is often no distinction between openness and reserve *at the moment of speech*, no awareness of the moral constraints that ought to regulate speech.

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[158] As Emma's perception of Mr. Weston's "open manners" suggests, he is yet another character who seems to be quite open. And his brand of unreserve curiously aligns him with Mrs. Elton. As Marylea Meyersohn (1990) argues, Mr. Weston and Mrs. Elton "speak the same language: presentation of self. When Mrs. Elton and Mr. Weston . . . converse in chapter 18 . . . we have a lesson in how not to converse . . . These two strivers violate all the rules of talking and listening. Each sspeaks only to tell his or her story, she of her sister at blessed Maple Grove, he of his son at the Churchills' . . . She interrupts him; he seizes the opportunity to break in when she has a slight coughing fit. And then at last, 'they were interrupted,' and Mr. Weston having 'said all that he wanted, soon took the opportunity of walking away' " (44).

It is this lack of regulation, not a lack of morality, that makes her speech such an unfortunate blend of "what is good and what is ridiculous," as Emma says of her (339). The narrator, too, notes that Miss Bates "was a great talker upon little matters . . . full of trivial communications and harmless gossip" (18). Often, Miss Bates's speeches are almost stream of consciousness--or, more precisely, stream of *unconsciousness* (see for example, 157 or 290-291). But it is noteworthy that when Miss Bates is *aware* of the implications of her talk, she is able to exercise more rationality and more reserve, as when she is protecting Jane. For example, during Emma's conciliatory visit, Miss Bates is quite up to the delicate task of keeping Emma from seeing Jane, but more importantly, she is able to explain truthfully Jane's reluctance to see anyone in a way that not only avoids giving Emma offence, but in a way that also secures Emma's compassion and even a measure of self-examination of her own past sensations towards Jane:

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[159] I use the term "performative" here in the general sense offered by J. L. Austin. For an analysis of the intricacies of "performatives," see his book *How to Do Things with Words.* 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

> Emma was most sincerely interested. Her heart had been long growing kinder towards Jane; and this picture of her present sufferings acted as a cure of every former ungenerous suspicion, and left her nothing but pity; and the remembrance of the less just and less gentle sensations of the past . . . . (343-44)

Similarly, when Jane is in need of escape from Frank's thoughtless construction of the name "Dixon" during a word game at Hartfield, it is to Miss Bates that she turns for assistance: "Her face was averted from those who had made the attack, and turned towards her aunt" (315). Evidently, Miss Bates is fully *aware* of the awkward position Jane has been placed in and how Jane must feel. Hence, Miss Bates's rescuing speech is (for her) remarkably clear, concise, and effective:

> 'Ay, very true, my dear,' cried the latter, though Jane had not spoken a word--'I was just going to say the same thing. It is time for us to be going indeed. The evening is closing in, and grandmamma will be looking for us. My dear sir, you are too obliging. We really must wish you good night.' (315)

Again, when Frank selfishly urges Jane to sing another song (even though "her voice grew thick," Miss Bates, acting on Mr. Knightley's notice, "in her real anxiety for Jane, could hardly stay even to be grateful, before she stept forward and put an end to all further singing" (206).[160] Certainly, when the situation is such that her awareness is sufficiently engaged, Miss Bates's talk can show a laudable balance of discretion and utility. But as we have seen, for the most part, she is otherwise open in a way that neither the novel nor the characters in it sanction.

So with Miss Bates, as with Mrs. Elton, Frank Churchill, and Mr. Weston, we see that openness is not an absolute good (just as reserve is not an absolute evil). How, then does one decide on when to be reserved and when to be open? Is there a rule or a "law" governing the exercise of openness and reserve? Is dialogical speech equivalent to open speech? *Emma* does offer some insights that can help to answer these questions, but first I want to examine some of what Martin Buber has said on the subject.

In *The Knowledge of Man*, Buber makes some incisive, if not provocative, points about openness and reserve. He writes, "Where the dialogical word genuinely exists, it must be given its right by keeping nothing back. To keep nothing back is the exact opposite of unreserved speech" (76). At first, this statement seems odd; is it true that to keep nothing back is the exact opposite of unreserved speech? On the face of it, keeping nothing back would seem to be *equivalent* to unreserved speech. How then do these notions differ? The answer would seem to depend on what is meant by "keeping nothing back," and what is meant by "unreserved speech." Buber is not explicit on the meaning of these two phrases, but he does offer some clues. He writes that

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[160] I am indebted to Marylea Meyersohn (1990) for drawing my attention to the first two examples and to Miss Bates's ability to be rational and brief when in defense of Jane. However, Ms. Meyersohn's perspective differs from my own in that she sees Miss Bates's speeches mainly as a function of her speaking without *anxiety*. She writes, "Her [Miss Bates's] desire to protect Jane enables her to speak without anxiety. When the spinster becomes protector, she is momentarily rational--and brief" (44).

> if genuine dialogue is to arise, everyone who takes part in it must bring himself into it. And that also means that he must be willing on each occasion to say what is really in his mind about the subject of the conversation. And that means further that on each occasion he makes the contribution of his spirit without reduction and without shifting his ground. Even men of great integrity are under the illusion that they are not bound to say everything 'they have to say' . . . Everything depends on the legitimacy of 'what I have to say.' (75-76)

What Buber seems to be saying here--and it is affirmed in *Emma*--is that unreserved speech is unrestricted, unqualified. And this is significantly different from keeping nothing back since that kind of openness *is* subject to restrictions, to qualifications. "Keeping nothing back" is restricted to that which the speaker "has to say," and this is further qualified by the legitimacy of what has to be said. So in "keeping nothing back," the speaker must be willing to say "what is really in his mind," but he also must be able to judge whether or not he really "has to say" what is on his mind, and further, he must be able to judge whether or not what he really has to say is legitimate.

So, whether or not "to keep nothing back is the exact opposite of unreserved speech" is not really important; what is important is that keeping nothing back is *sufficiently* dissimilar to unreserve to make a difference with respect to practice. That is, in practice, in dialogue between people, "To keep nothing back" may, in fact, mean being "reserved" in the sense that this kind of "openness" sometimes requires the legitimate curtailing of speech. So one might be *open* to the other; one may be *willing* to say what is really on one's mind, but nevertheless have good reasons to keep silent. To be truly open to another may well entail being open to the other's need of *not* being spoken to, to the other's need to just be heard or simply to be present with another. As Buber himself notes in *The Knowledge of Man*,

> it is not necessary for all who are joined in a genuine dialogue actually to speak; those who keep silent can on occasion be especially important. But each must be determined not to withdraw when the course of the conversation makes it proper for him to say what he has to say. (76)

Once again, the notions of speaking when it is proper and when something has to be said is reaffirmed by Buber. Keeping these qualifications in mind, we can now consider some of the more explicit references to openness and reserve in *Emma*.

When the word "reserve" occurs in the novel, it is almost always used in connection to Jane Fairfax, and it is most often a complaint about Jane leveled by Emma. For example, although Mr. Knightley had once told Emma that she did not like Jane Fairfax "because she saw in her the really accomplished young woman, which she wanted to be herself," nevertheless, Emma imputes their lack of friendship to Jane's "coldness and reserve" (148). Similarly, when Jane, her grandmother, and aunt visit Hartfield, Emma thinks Jane "was disgustingly, was suspiciously reserved" (150). And later, when Emma explains to Mr. Knightley why she and Jane are not "intimate," Emma reproaches herself a little, but Jane's reserve seems to be her main complaint: "And then, [there is] her reserve--I never could attach myself to any one so completely reserved" (182).

Mr. Knightley's reply shows a similar antipathy towards reserve, but he expresses his distaste for reserve in terms of its effecting the diminution of desire: " 'It is a most repulsive quality, indeed,' said he. 'Oftentimes very convenient, no doubt, but never pleasing. There is safety in reserve, but no attraction. One cannot love a reserved person" (182). And similarly, Mr. Knightley later faults Jane on the grounds that "She has not the open temper which a man would wish for a wife" (259).

Notice that neither Emma nor Mr. Knightley explicitly censure reserve on moral grounds, but rather, they show a distaste for reserve based primarily on what seems to be personal, even aesthetic grounds. Emma's reply to Mr. Knightley seems to confirm this: " 'Not till the reserve ceases towards oneself; and then the attraction may be the greater. But I must be more in want of a friend, or an agreeable companion, than I have yet been, to take the trouble of conquering any body's reserve to procure one' " (182). Clearly then, reserve *in itself* is not deplorable; rather, it is deplorable to those persons who perceive themselves to be on the receiving end of reserve.

Both Mr. Knightley and Emma's comments reveal a paradoxical lack of openness to those who are reserved. Both find reserve unattractive (especially if aimed at them), and both show little willingness to overcome the reserve of another--"One cannot love a reserved person"--"I must be in more want of a friend . . . to take the trouble of conquering any body's reserve." If openness is a goal, then the overcoming of reserve should be a concomitant goal. But this is not the case with respect to Mr. Knightley or Emma. As we have seen, neither exerts much energy in trying to overcome Jane's reserve, and similarly, neither exerts much, if any, energy in trying to overcome the reserve of the one person with whom each is in close and constant contact: Mr. Woodhouse.

Mr. Woodhouse is also quite reserved. Granted, he is often rather open in his tedious comments about gruel and draughts, but otherwise he is reserved both in temperament and in speech. Not only is Mr. Woodhouse unable "to meet her [Emma] in conversation, rational or playful" (5), he is also little able to meet others in speech since "neither wine nor conversation was any thing to him" (110). Mr. Woodhouse's speeches usually take the form of a kind of judgemental afterthought, a kind of parasitical decree derived from others' talk or his own insecurities--about food, socializing, the weather, marriage, other people, and so forth. As the narrator notes, "Mr. Woodhouse, [was] always the last to make his way in conversation . . ." (174). But nowhere in the novel does Emma or Mr. Knightley endeavor to overcome either Mr. Woodhouse's reserve *or* his openness with respect to trivial matters.

The conclusion that these examples point toward is that openness and reserve are not ethical absolutes to be found on opposite ends of an evaluative spectrum, but rather, they are fluctuating points of reference on a moral continuum that must ultimately find their validity in light of the specific context in which they are found. Whether one's word is held back or given openly depends not on any universal moral axiom, but on the needs of the present situation. And the needs of the present situation are, in turn, subject to the dialogic interplay between what has already been said and what has not been said--between one's own word as response and the anticipated response of another to one's word. Bakhtin puts it this way:

> The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the answer's direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word. Such is the situation in any living dialogue. (*DI,* 280)

We can safely infer from Bakhtin's comments that the relation between openness and reserve is a dialogical one. Hence, there can be no Kantian categorical imperative to substantiate the employment of one or the other in any given situation.

Now as we saw earlier, what *constitutes* openness and what *constitutes* reserve essentially comes down to the matter of saying what has to be said, and further, to the legitimacy of what has to be said. And this, of course is a matter of determining the "atmosphere of the already spoken" and of the future "answering word." Moreover, as we saw, Bakhtin points out that the truth of an event is not to be found in its content--simply in what is said or what is done per se--but is to be found in the unique *position* of each participant, and in the "actual concrete ought" which each person bears at the unique moment in which the event occurs. In other words, according to Bakhtin, there is no *rule* for determining when to speak and what to say--to repeat, it is a matter of "orientation," a matter of "position," of "atmosphere," and the "actual concrete ought" of the moment.

But some questions still seem to remain: How does one decide on when to be reserved and when to be open? How does one know if one's word needs to be said and if it is legitimate? How does one determine one's "position" and one's "actual concrete ought" in any given situation? Neither Martin Buber nor Mikhail Bakhtin engage these questions. But if we look at the special kind of self-knowledge that *Emma* implicitly underwrites, we begin to see Jane Austen's answer. And true to the dialogical spirit of her imagination, the answer is not to be found in an authoritative rule, in a universal law, or in a moral axiom; the answer is to be found simply and profoundly in human sensitivity.

C. Sensitivity as Self-Knowledge

> For both Tolstoy and Bakhtin, novels, the most prosaic of prosaic forms, occupy a special place in ethical education. For good or ill, they are powerful tools for enriching our moral sense of particular situations. They locate obligation in eventness--still incompletely of course, but much more fully than other available forms of representation. (Morson and Emerson, 1990)

Jane Austen, it seems, anticipated both Leo Tolstoy and Mikhail Bakhtin in her understanding that ethics cannot be reduced to any simple, a priori code of conduct that could be invoked in any circumstance--in her understanding, that is, that the real operation of ethics is to be found in "eventness," in particular situations. And as I have argued, it is precisely in the relation between openness and reserve that one finds much of the moral "eventness" in *Emma*. Further, I want to reiterate that Jane Austen also seemed to recognize that in speech, there is no absolute rule or code which can dictate the nature and direction of actual exchanges between people; in *Emma*, context is crucial, for actual exchanges are open, largely unpredictable, and often unfinalized. Jane Austen, I think, would concur with Bakhtin's remark that "A context is potentially unfinalized; a code must be finalized. A code is only a technical means of transmitting information; it does not have cognitive, creative significance. A code is a deliberately established, killed context."[161] But the question remains, if there is essentially no rule or code to guide one in the *application* of moral knowledge, how does one *act* morally? We saw earlier that part of the answer lies in self-government, but how does one know how and in what way to govern oneself?

In *Emma,* it is finally human sensitivity that is shown to be the operative mechanism in employing self-government. It is human sensitivity that has both cognitive and creative significance.[162] It is human sensitivity that enables one to apply one's moral knowledge and to do so creatively, that is, in a way that is appropriate to the unique situation. And this should really come as no surprise since the presence or absence of sensitivity has been an underlying but telling criterion of evaluation with respect to many of the characters in the novel.

Think again of Miss Bates and of the radical shift in her speech when the situation warrants it. When she is aware of Jane's precarious position, she is able to speak with laudable effectiveness, tact, and brevity. That is to say, when Miss Bates is amply *sensitive* to another's situation, she is, in turn, sensitive to the effect of her words and to the anticipated response to her speech, and thus, her speech manifests both cognitive and creative significance. This, of course, is almost the diametrical opposite of her usually trivial, almost unconscious speech.

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[161] M. M. Bakhtin. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (147).

[162] Cognition, of course, has to do with the process of knowing, including perception, memory, judgement and observation, etc. Sensitivity, then, may be seen as the responsive application of cognition.

Think again of Frank Churchill; apart from his the duplicity involved in his secret engagement to Jane Fairfax, his most telling fault is a lack of sensitivity (or "feeling" as the narrator puts it, 314). He is repeatedly insensitive to the feelings of others--his father, his fiancee, and Emma. In reading Frank's letter, for example, one of Mr. Knightley's harshest criticisms of Frank's behaviour is in his entire want of sensitivity to the position in which he had placed Jane:

> This is very bad.--He had induced her to place herself, for his sake, in a situation of extreme difficulty and uneasiness, and it should have been his first object to prevent her from suffering unnecessarily.--She must have had much more to contend with, in carrying on the correspondence, than he could. (405)

Similarly, Mr. Knightley alludes to Frank's insensitivity when he remarks to Emma that Frank "has had great faults, faults of inconsideration and thoughtlessness . . . " (406). And in turn, Mr. Knightley himself is praised by Emma largely in terms of his sensitivity: "Mr. Knightley, always so kind, so feeling, so truly considerate for every body . . . " (409). If this kind of sensitivity is the hallmark of practical moral conduct, what evidence do we have that Emma's educative process brings her to this kind of self-knowledge?

In answering this question, we must first note that Jane Austen does not use the term "sensitivity" in *Emma*. But I submit that arguably, it is the concept that best functions as an umbrella term for a number of words that Jane Austen uses to express various facets of applied moral self-knowledge. Some of the terms subsumed in the notion of sensitivity include "propriety," "kindness," "discretion," "understanding," "judgement," "sensibility," "thoughtfulness," "consideration," "delicacy," and "feeling." None of these words alone sufficiently captures the peculiar human attribute that enables one to appropriately apply one's moral knowledge in the unique and essentially unrepeatable situations that life constantly offers. Sensitivity does. As we saw, there is no code that can tell us when to be open or when to be reserved--or in how open or how reserved we ought to be; therefore, sensitivity becomes crucial for moral conduct, for it is the codeless guide, the informing spirit, that enables us to *apply the moral knowledge that we already possess.*

As we might expect, it is Mr. Knightley, in his role as teacher, that first intimates that something beyond knowledge of the right is needed in dealing with others and that reserve may not always be a shortcoming. Consider the following discussion with Emma:

> 'you [Emma] are not often deficient; not often deficient either in manner or comprehension. I think you understand me, therefore.'
>
> An arch look expressed--'I understand you well enough;' but she [Emma] said only, 'Miss Fairfax is reserved.'
>
> 'I always told you she was--a little; but you will soon overcome all that part of her reserve which ought to be overcome, all that has its foundation in diffidence. What arises from discretion must be honoured.' (152)

Here, Mr. Knightley suggests that Emma is usually deficient neither in her overt behaviour (manner) nor in her knowledge of right (comprehension). He further points out that reserve may be laudable if it derives from discretion, that is, if it arises from another person's own employment of sensitivity. And Mr. Knightley also intimates that one must employ sensitivity in judging another, that is, one must be attuned to the source (foundation) of another's reserve--whether it arises from "diffidence" or from "discretion." Mr. Knightley gives no rule or a priori moral law; rather, he suggests the importance of sensitivity. And what is intimated here is made much more explicit at the celebrated Box Hill excursion.

The Box Hill affair is, perhaps, the most salient example of Mr. Knightley's pedagogical relation with Emma, and it is crucial in that it marks a genuine turning point in Emma's education. The issue in question, of course, concerns Emma's hurtful reply to Miss Bates' facetious remark: " 'Oh very well . . . then I need not be uneasy . . . I shall be sure to say three dull things as soon as ever I open, shan't I ?' " Emma responds, " 'Ah! ma'am, but there may be difficulty. Pardon me--but you will be limited as to number--only three at once.' " (335). Although silent during this exchange, Mr. Knightley approaches Emma about her remarks at the first opportune moment:

> While waiting for the carriage, she found Mr. Knightley by her side. He looked around, as if to see that no one were near and then said,
>
> 'Emma, I must once more speak to you as I have used to do: a privilege rather endured than allowed, perhaps, but I must still use it. I cannot see you acting wrong, without a remonstrance. How could you be so unfeeling to Miss Bates? How could you be so insolent in your wit to woman of her character, age, and situation?--Emma, I had not thought it possible.'
>
> Emma recollected, blushed, was sorry, but tried to laugh it off.
>
> 'Nay, how could I help saying what I did?--Nobody could have helped it. It was not so very bad. I dare say she did not understand me.'
>
> 'I assure you she did. She felt your full meaning. She has talked of it since. I wish you could have heard how she talked of it--with what candour and generosity . . .' (339)

In this short passage, there are a number of important insights into the pedagogical relation between Mr. Knightley and Emma that are worth considering.

First, I think that we should notice Mr. Knightley's circumspection in approaching Emma when she was alone and as soon as possible after the offence. That Mr. Knightley admonishes Emma in private reveals his sensitivity to her feelings. Unlike Emma's treatment of Miss Bates, Mr. Knightley shows that he is sensitive to how Emma would feel if chastised in public. Secondly, Mr. Knightley's initial remarks to Emma reveal something of the special pedagogical relation he has with Emma. Rather than asserting his authority (which he could legitimately do since he has the advantage of "sixteen years' experience" over Emma, 89), Mr. Knightley is careful to ask Emma's indulgence and to make explicit his concern.

And Mr. Knightley's first two questions about Emma's being unfeeling and insolent not only focus on the particular offence (so that the subject of the conversation is absolutely clear); they also help establish his credentials as a perceptive judge of the situation. The point is that here we get a little object lesson in how to conduct ourselves properly towards someone who is in error or in need of counsel. Mr. Knightley is neither unfeeling nor insolent in his behaviour, and thus, he displays the very sensitivity that he wishes to encourage in Emma. As usual, Mr. Knightley teaches by example, and as usual the reader is educated along with Emma.

We should also note that initially, Mr. Knightley's "lesson" is conducted in Socratic fashion, in the form of questions. In so doing, he simultaneously informs Emma of the character defects involved in the offence, and further, he encourages self-examination on Emma's part. But it is also important to recognize that when Mr. Knightley says "I cannot see you acting wrongly . . . " it is the first and only time in the novel that he explicitly charges Emma with a moral offence; hence, this seems to be a momentous point in the novel. But what really was the offence?

Emma continues to rationalize her conduct, "you must allow, that what is good and what is ridiculous are most unfortunately blended in her," but Mr. Knightley's response is telling:

> 'They are blended,' said he, 'I acknowledge; and, were she prosperous, I could allow much for the occasional prevalence of the ridiculous over the good. Were she a woman of fortune, I would leave every harmless absurdity to take its chance, I would not quarrel with you for any liberties of manner. Were she your equal in situation--but, Emma, consider how far this is from being the case. She is poor; she has sunk from the comforts she was born to; and, if she live to old age, must probably sink more. Her situation should secure your compassion. It was badly done indeed!--You, whom, she had known from an infant, whom she had seen grow up from a period when her notice was an honour, to have you now, in thoughtless spirits, and the pride of the moment, laugh at her, humble her--and before her niece, too--and before others, many of whom (certainly

> *some*), would be entirely guided by *your* treatment of her.
> (339)

What is of special note here is that Mr. Knightley does not berate Emma for the *content* per se of her remark; in fact, he acknowledges the truth of Emma's protest concerning Miss Bates. What concerns Mr. Knightley most, and this is crucial, is that Emma has been "unfeeling," "thoughtless"--insensitive. Mr. Knightley does not censure Emma for what she has said, but for being insensitive in saying it. That is, he explains that if the *context* were different, "were she prosperous . . . Were she a woman of fortune . . . Were she your equal in situation," he could have made allowances for the remark. But Emma has been entirely insensitive to Miss Bates' situation, to her feelings, and to the response of others; thus, "It was badly done, indeed . . . it is very far from pleasant . . . " (339-40). In a context that demands Emma's "compassion," she has shown a disturbing want of sensitivity.

Mr. Knightley's remarks do have the desired effect on Emma, for her "reform" is expressed not so much as a new understanding of right and wrong, but as a new sensitivity to the truth that she already knows and to the effect of her insensitivity on another:[163] "The truth of his representation there was no denying. She *felt* it at her heart. How could she have been so brutal, so cruel to Miss Bates!" (Italics mine, 340). And although

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[163] Anne Ruderman (1996) has also noted that "Mr. Knightley's reprimands hit home because they accord with her [Emma's] own sense of right." See "Moral Education in Jane Austen's *Emma*," in *Poets, Princes, And Private Citizens* (276).

Emma is still under some illusions about others (Jane Fairfax, Frank Churchill, Harriet Smith) and about herself, nevertheless, this encounter proves to be a real turning-point in her education since her *character* begins to show significant change from this point on. And most importantly, this change in Emma is manifested largely in terms of more scrupulous self-examination and, ultimately, in increased sensitivity. For example, we read that "Time did not compose her. As she reflected more she seemed to feel it more" (340). Emma begins to feel "kinder towards Jane," and to have "pity" for her (343-44); she begins to have "pensive meditations" (348); she begins to become "acquainted with her own heart" (369), and, for Emma, "To understand, thoroughly understand, her own heart, was the first endeavour" (374). Certainly, those important revelations that come after the Box Hill encounter help refine Emma's sensitivity, but it is the Box Hill encounter with Mr. Knightley which most profoundly affects her character so that she may be educated by what follows.

And as I have suggested, what follows is, in large measure, a complete reversal of Emma's previous insensitivity. Not only does Emma seek to make amends to Miss Bates for her insensitive behaviour, her *attitude* is significantly altered, and she has a new found sensitivity to the urgings of her own conscience--to what she has known all along:

> She had often been remiss, her conscience told her so; remiss, perhaps, more in thought than fact; scornful,

> ungracious. But it should be so no more . . . She would not be ashamed of the appearance of penance, so justly and truly hers . . . 'The ladies were at home.' She had never rejoiced at the sound before, nor ever before entered the passage, nor walked up the stairs, with any wish of giving pleasure, but in conferring obligation, or of deriving it, except in subsequent ridicule. (341-42)

This new-found sensitivity to the feelings of others and to the dictates of her own conscience is a salient feature of Emma's character in the rest of the novel. For example, Emma's attitude and behaviour towards Jane is quite radically altered. Notice, too, how much of her reform is expressed in terms of a heightened sensitivity to her own behaviour and to the feelings of another:

> It was a more pressing concern to show attention to Jane Fairfax . . . She had scarcely a stronger regret than for her past coldness; and the person, whom she had been so many months neglecting, was now the very one upon whom she would have lavished every distinction of regard or sympathy. She wanted to be of use to her; wanted to show a value for her society, and testify respect and consideration. (352)

And Emma's "resolve" here is not just a passing whim as was her earlier "resolution . . . of being humble and discreet, and repressing imagination all the rest of her life . . . and endeavor[ing] to prove her own affection [to Harriet] in some better method than match-making" (128). Emma now *acts* in accordance with her conscience and with a fine sensitivity to Jane's feelings and welfare; Emma also endeavors to establish a new *relation* with Jane, a new *openness* in conversation as opposed to the past "coldness" of her own reserve:

> Emma listened with the warmest concern; grieved for her more and more, and looked eager to discover some way of being useful. To take her--be it only an hour or two--from her aunt, to give her change of air and scene, and quiet rational conversation, even for an hour or two, might do her good; and the following morning she wrote again to say, in the most feeling language she could command, that she would call for her in the carriage at any hour that Jane would name. (353)

But again, this does not mean Emma is *finally* and *fully* educated, for the education of character is never finalized; it is an ongoing process, and demands fresh and unique sensitivity with each new situation that arises. Emma still has illusions to be dispelled and lessons be to learned. The revelation of Harriet's designs on Mr. Knightley, for example, will bring Emma to ask herself "How to understand it all! How to understand the deceptions she had been practising on herself, and living under!-- The blunders, the blindness of her own head and heart! " (373). Still, Emma's education in sensitivity is well under way, and it is for this reason that she can finally recognize and openly assess her relation with Mr. Knightley. And it is a relation that promises to be fully open and reciprocal, a dialogical relation:

"But here there was nothing to be shifted off in wild speculation on the future. It was all right, all open, all equal. No sacrifice on any side worth the name. It was a union of the highest promise of felicity . . ." (425).

In closing, I want to reiterate some of the notable achievements manifested in Jane Austen's *Emma*. Jane Austen has anticipated some of the important thought of Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin in her rendering of education and in her examination of openness. Her novel exhibits a fine understanding of the need for a dialogical relation in the educative process, and even more telling, of the need for something beyond instruction in ethics for the full education of *character*. And Jane Austen's further recognition of the need for human sensitivity in light of the absence of any final rule for applying moral knowledge is, in hindsight, quite remarkable. Jane Austen shows an understanding, unique in her time, of the unfinalizability of ethics, and of the dialogic nature of truth.

Similarly, *how* Jane Austen manages to render this insight is without equal in the early 19th century. Indeed, her novel reveals telling examples of polyphony--of allowing the text and the characters in it an autonomy of voice--in that there is often a dialogical relation, a juxtapositioning, between overt pronouncements by the narrator and characters and what actually occurs in the various exchanges in the novel. For as we have seen, the goal of openness and the repudiation of reserve are each shown to have their proper limitations and their appropriate expressions; well over a hundred years before Bakhtin, Jane Austen teaches us that context is crucial, both in conversation and in ethics. In this important regard, Jane Austen surpassed Socrates in a vital point of philosophy, for the understanding of the need for sensitivity about when to speak and when to keep silent is one that Socrates apparently never reached. As Socrates says in the *Apology*, "There gentlemen, you have the true facts, which I present to you without any concealment or suppression . . . I am fairly certain that this plain speaking of mine is the cause of my unpopularity" (24a4-6). Jane Austen, it seems, well knew both the complexity involved in expressing truth and the sensitivity required in human relations; as the narrator so astutely puts it, "Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human disclosure; seldom can it happen that something is not a little disguised, or a little mistaken . . . though the conduct is mistaken, the feelings are not" (391).

Chapter Five

George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda: Towards a Culture of the Dialogic*

> There is nothing I should care more to do, if it were possible, than to rouse the imagination of men and women to a vision of human claims in those races of their fellow-men who most differ from them in customs and beliefs . . . Can anything be more disgusting than to hear people called 'educated' making small jokes about eating ham, and showing themselves empty of any real knowledge as to the relation of their own social and religious life to the history of the people they think themselves witty in insulting? They hardly know that Christ was a Jew. And I find men educated at Rugby supposing that Christ spoke Greek. To my feeling, this deadness to the history which has prepared half our world for us, this inability to find interest in any form of life that is not clad in the same coat-tails and flounces as our own lies very close to the worst kind of irreligion. The best that can be said of it is, that it is a sign of the intellectual narrowness--in plain English, the stupidity, which is still the average mark of our culture.[164]

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[164] Letter to Harriet Beecher Stowe, written in October of 1876, the year of publication of *Daniel Deronda.* Gordon S. Haight, ed., *The George Eliot Letters.* 9 vols. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1954-78, VI, 301-02.

I want to begin with a seemingly trivial premise but one that runs counter, in a number of ways, to the general critical appraisal of *Daniel Deronda*: George Eliot knew what she was doing in writing *Daniel Deronda*.[165] (I ask the reader to keep this premise in mind as it will, I hope unintrusively, inform much of the discussion that follows). Now if we think about *Daniel Deronda* in light of the letter above, we ought to be struck by some of the ideas and concerns in the letter that, in various forms and in various ways, figure prominently in the novel: "rouse the imagination"; "fellow men"; "differ . . . in customs and beliefs"; "relation"; "social and religious life"; "educated"; "real knowledge"; "deadness"; "history"; "stupidity." These notions all lead up to and are involved with an overall concern that is expressed in the last word of this part of the letter: "culture."

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[165] A sampling of the critical responses that view George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* as a failure in some crucial way should certainly include F. R. Leavis's famous recommendation (subsequently modified) that "As for the bad part [ie, the "Jewish part"] of *Daniel Deronda,* there *is* nothing to do but cut it away." *The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad.* Markham, Ontario: Penguin Books, 1948, 143. Leavis's division of the novel into "good" and "bad" parts is accepted by the vast majority of critics, seemingly without respect to their particular theoretical or ideological leanings. There is little point in citing the numerous critics who accept and in some way use Leavis's distinction, but for some examples of attempts to defend the "Jewish part" of the novel, see Maurice Beebe's "Visions are Creators: The Unity of *Daniel Deronda,*" *Boston University Studies in English,*1 (Autumn, 1955), 166-77; D. R. Carroll's "The Unity of *Daniel Deronda,*" *Essays in Criticism* , 9 (1959), 369-80; Harold Fisch's "*Daniel Deronda* or *Gwendolen Harleth,*" *NCF,* 19 (1965); and Sara M. Putzell-Kora's "The Role of the Prophet: The Rationality of Daniel Deronda's Idealist Mission," *NCF,* 37 (1982), 170-87.

In order to understand properly George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda,* it must be considered in its entirety, with an eye to the forms these ideas and concerns take and with an attention to how they are rendered. Indeed, I suspect that much of the displeasure with the novel derives, in large part, from the critical tendency to consider one or another of its elements--its philosophy, characterization, themes, structure, plot, psychology, and so forth--mostly *in isolation* from the rest of the work. Hence critics, I think, have tended (excuse the cliche) to fail to see the forest for the trees.[166]

What I am proposing here, then, is not simply a reading of a single theme or idea in *Daniel Deronda,* but an exploration of an overall *world view* which is rendered in the novel, both in its form and in its content.[167] This world view, as I see it, is a profoundly dialogical one, encapsulating many of the dialogical elements we have already seen intimated in *Pamela, Pride and Prejudice* and *Emma,* and further developing and combining many of these elements in order to express a higher "vision" of human relations. Not only does George Eliot's novel exhibit many of the features that Bakhtin claimed for the dialogic novel; it also explores a number of interrelated preoccupations connected to a dialogical world-view. Moreover, *Daniel Deronda* finally, and I think crucially, reveals a kind of unification of George Eliot's fiction and *her* philosophy in its overall offering of a world view that may understood as a "culture of the dialogic."[168]

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[166] Understandably, George Eliot was upset by the critical response to the novel. Indeed, she felt it necessary to state explicitly that in *Daniel Deronda* she "meant everything in the book to be related to everything else there." *Letters,* VI, 290.

[167] Bakhtin points out that "world views" are absolutely integral to novelistic discourse, residing both in the authors and in characters. About authors he writes, "all languages of heteroglossia, whatever the principle underlying them and making each unique, are specific points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each characterized by its own objects, meanings and values. As such they may all may be juxtaposed to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one another and be interrelated dialogically . . . first and foremost in the consciousness of people who write novels" (*DI,* 291-92). About

A. A Dialogical Approach

"Men can do nothing without the make-believe of a beginning," George Eliot tells us in the first line of the epigraph to chapter one of the novel. Of course, George Eliot is not suggesting (as some critics seem to have inferred about the "Jewish part" of *Daniel Deronda*) that in literature or in life we should court illusions, play make-believe, or dream up fairy-tale,

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characters he writes, "The speaking person in the novel is always, to one degree or another, an *ideologue,* and his words are always *ideologemes.* A particular language in a novel is always a particular way of viewing the world" (*DI,* 333).

[168] I am indebted to Professor Garry Watson for bringing my attention to some of the (broadly speaking) cultural concerns in George Eliot. I am likewise indebted to his suggestive essay " 'Doing As One Likes': The Need for Criticism in the Service of Culture" (*The Compass,* #8, Winter 1980, 79-99) for offering fruitful insights into how one might think about and approach George Eliot's novels.

utopian worlds.[169] Her next point that "Even Science, the strict measurer, is obliged to start with a make-believe unit . . ." helps clarify her meaning. George Eliot is pointing out that any human endeavor--any system of thought--must begin with a founding principle, an axiom, a premise, a point of departure *that is not epistemologically certain*, that is prior to and so outside of the epistemological purview of the system itself.[170] Hence, we are to understand that no system of thought is a priori superior to another; no system of thought occupies a privileged epistemic position by virtue of its pretensions to foundational authority. George Eliot begins *Daniel Deronda,* then, by underwriting a dialogical approach to human endeavor while undermining the monological approach. Seen in Bakhtinian terms, she is destabilizing the grounds of monologism by recognizing the fictionality, the pretence, of "ready-made truths," and this is precisely one of the insights that she wants to encourage in her readers as well.[171]

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[169] For example, in *The Sympathetic Response: George Eliot's Fictional Rhetoric,* (London: Associated Univ Presses, 1981) which often shows very little sympathetic response for *Daniel Deronda,* Mary Ellen Doyle writes that "Despite all the historic seriousness of Zionism, Deronda's sailing away to the East with his perfect wife seems a voyage into never-never land" (161). Similarly, Carole Robinson calls the Jewish elements in the novel "the Jewish fantasy." See "The Severe Angel: A Study of *Daniel Deronda,*" *ELH,* 31 (1964), 288.

[170] Felicia Bonaparte makes virtually the same observation in "*Daniel Deronda:* Theology In A Secular Age," *Religion and Literature,* 25, #3 (1993), 20.

[171] We should recall here that central to Bakhtin's thinking is

Now if we return to the premise that George Eliot knew what she was doing in writing *Daniel Deronda,* the question for us becomes not so much one of unity or of deciding which "part" is good and which "part" is bad, but rather, the question becomes one concerned with an account of what George Eliot actually did do in writing *Daniel Deronda.*[172] And an important clue, a "beginning" to the answer of this question, is to be found in the epigraph to the first chapter. I would suggest that one of the first things George Eliot did do is to subtly invite the reader to approach her novel without preconceived ideas concerning what the novel *is*, what the novel should *do*, and what the novel should be *about.* That is, the epigraph encourages the reader to approach *Daniel Deronda* with a spirit of openness, to leap "*in medias res*" with an attitude of faith--with "the make-believe of a beginning"--without "ready-made truths." In short, the epigraph that begins George Eliot's dialogical experiment encourages a dialogical approach to the reading of the novel. The education of the reader has begun, but it is not simply an education in an idea, but an education in an approach to life, in a world view that the novel itself will advance.

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the understanding that "The dialogic means of seeking the truth is counterposed to *official* monologism, which pretends to *possess a ready-made truth*" (*PDP,* 110).

[172] Part of this task entails the attempt to understand the novel as George Eliot understood it. This attempt is in keeping with Bakhtin's observation that "The first task [of criticism] is to understand the work as the author himself understood it, without exceeding the limits of his understanding." *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,* 144.

Now I think that George Eliot encourages this approach in her readers, in part, because her seemingly disparate "experiments" in *Daniel Deronda, when considered in their entirety*, are sufficiently radical that they challenge some of the conventional boundaries of the nineteenth-century novel, requiring of the reader a dialogical orientation, an unconventional openness to new possibilities with respect to form and content, in order to understand and hopefully appreciate her work.[173]

Even a cursory perusal of both the detractors and the defenders of *Daniel Deronda* will reveal a plethora of positions and attitudes with respect to the novel. And on one level, this is as it should be, for *Daniel Deronda* itself suggests a number of different readings,[174] since it is, in Bakhtin's terms, a site of social heteroglossia. As Michael Gardiner has pointed out, "social heteroglossia enters the [dialogic] novel under the aegis of a 'unique artistic system'; that is, through a number of thematic and stylistic strategies (parody, 'character zones', indirect speech, 'hybridization', incorporated genres, etc.)"[175] that allow language, in Bakhtin's words "to be used in ways that are indirect, conditional, distanced" (*DI,* 323).

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[173] George Eliot explained that her "writing is simply a set of experiments in life--an endeavor to see what our thought and emotion may be capable of--what stores of motive, actual or hinted as possible, give promise of a better after which we may strive--what gains from past revelations and discipline we must strive to keep as something more sure than shifting theory." *The George Eliot Letters,* ed. Gordon S. Haight, 7 vols. New Haven, 1954-56, 6:216-7 Quoted in John P. Kearney, "Time and Beauty in *Daniel Deronda*: 'Was she beautiful or not?' " *NCF,* 26, #3 (1971), 286-306. George Eliot's notion of her novel as a "set of experiments" anticipates Bakhtin's understanding of the novel as that which "conducts experiments and gets solutions in the language of another's discourse." *The Dialogic Imagination,* 347.

[174] As Barbara Hardy has written, *Daniel Deronda* "is a love-story, a psychological study in human relationships and individual growth, a challenging moral argument, and an analysis of contemporary Victorian Society." See, *The Collected Essays of Barbara Hardy,* Vol 1. Sussex: The

And it is perhaps this very "indirect, conditional, distanced" quality of the elements of social heteroglossia in *Daniel Deronda* that has troubled those readers who have expected from it the kind of so-called "classical realist text" that *Middlemarch* has come to represent.[176] *Daniel Deronda* is a realist text, but it is, like Dostoevsky's description of his own art, a realism "in the higher sense."[177] Like Dostoevsky, George Eliot is interested in portraying "the depths of the human soul," the "man in man," not simply in order to analyze heroic, aberrant,

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Harvester Press, 1987, 109.

[175] Gardiner, (1992), 41.

[176] As David Lodge has noted, J. Hillis Miller has acknowledged *Middlemarch* as " 'the masterwork of Victorian realism,' " while Colin MacCabe's *James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word* "incorporates an influential theory of the 'classic realist text', which George Eliot is taken to exemplify." See Lodge's *After Bakhtin: Essays on Fiction and Criticism.* London: Routledge, 1990, 45.

[177] Bakhtin quotes Dostoevsy's famous remark: "With utter realism *to find the man in man . . .* They call me a *psychologist; this is not true.* I am merely a realist *in the higher sense*, that is, *I portray all the depths of the human soul*" (*PDP*, 60; see also 251).

or even mundane psychology, but in order to offer an intelligible account of the nature and grounds of spiritual development--for the individual, for a society, and perhaps, for a nation. What, then, are some of the salient elements involved in the account of spiritual development that is offered in *Daniel Deronda*? Or put another way, what preoccupations are connected with or comprise the dialogical world-view presented in the novel?

B. Spiritual Development and Orientation

1) Relation and Pedagogy

It should come as no surprise that one of the preoccupations that is connected with spiritual development or a dialogic world-view is relation. Of course, there are many forms and nuances of relation, but one of the most important and fundamental relations for personal and collective growth is the pedagogical relation. We saw that both Samuel Richardson and especially Jane Austen reveal a considerable concern with the pedagogical relation--a concern, we might say, sufficiently important to override predictable gender politics. In *Pamela,* written by a man, we have a main character who is a woman but who teaches a man, and in *Emma,* written by a woman, we have a main character who is a man, but who teaches a woman. But in *Daniel Deronda,* written by a woman using a man's name, we have a number of pedagogues,[178] and we have a concomitant extension of the network as well as a further complication of the levels of pedagogic relations. Of course, the primary pedagogical relation in the novel is between Gwendolen and Daniel, but it is certainly not a conventional relation, pedagogic or otherwise.[179]

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[178] Although she is highly critical of the pedagogic relations in the novel, Carole Robinson does notice that "the structure of *Daniel Deronda* presents itself as a chain of discipleships . . .". See Robinson (1964), 294.

Contrary to what readers of the nineteenth-century novel might expect, we do not find any romantic relation between Gwendolen and Deronda that leads to their marriage. Neither do we find common traits in each character that would "naturally" bring them together, nor do we find dissimilar traits in each character that would "naturally" complement one another--as we find, for example, in Elizabeth Bennet and Mr. Darcy. Rather, we find two people who are almost polar opposites brought into dialogue with one another.[180] Put in Bakhtinian terms, we find two world-views represented by two "ideologues" who are not merely contrasted, but brought into a dialogical relation.[181] We need to ask, then, what are the special characteristics of Gwendolen and Daniel's relation? And what does their relation mean for them and for the larger meaning of the novel?

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[179] In rather conventional (if not cynical) feminist rhetoric, Robinson (1964) views "Gwendolen at the feet of Daniel" (294). Similarly, Eileen Sypher seems to accept this reductive formulation but further argues that "*Daniel Deronda* can be read as a text that not merely makes visible the terrible power of the patriarchy through the decimation of Gwendolen, but, more importantly, as a novel that profoundly, if subtly, destabilizes this patriarchal hierarchy of the the male savior/tutor and his female victim student." See "Resisting Gwendolen's 'Subjection': *Daniel Deronda's* Proto-Feminism," *Studies in the Novel,* 28, #4, (Winter, 1996), 507. See also, Susan Meyer's " 'Safely To Their Own Borders': Proto-Zionism, Feminism, and Nationalism In *Daniel Deronda," ELH,* 60, #3 (1993), 733-58.

[180] Numerous critics have commented (often disparagingly about Deronda) on the differences between Gwendolen and Daniel. A fair summary of some of the general differences between them can be found in Peter K. Garrett's *The Victorian Multiplot Novel: Studies in Dialogical Form.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. Garrett writes, "Gwendolen's is the isolation of the spoiled child; her 'potent charm' and 'inborn

Although some critics have complained of a lack of credibility or substantiality in Gwendolen and Daniel's first "meeting,"[182] the kind of dialogue that is manifest between them in their initial exchange of glances is not only realistic, but realistic in a Dostoevskian "higher" dialogical sense. Consider Bakhtin's description of Dostoevsky's dialogical portrayal of character:

> In Dostoevsky, consciousness . . . is always found in intense

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energy of egoistic desire' (4) enable her to dominate her little world, and her self-absorption is broken only by momentary spasms of fear when faced with something beyond her limited knowledge and control. Deronda is located at the opposite end of George Eliot's moral scale. His distress at his supposed illegitimacy leads not to withdrawal but to a sense of 'fellowship' with other suffering; he combines 'a meditative yearning after wide knowledge' with 'a subdued fervour of sympathy, an activity of imagination on behalf of others' " (168).

[181] David Carroll takes the contrary view. He claims that *Daniel Deronda* "abandons the technique of depicting character as an embodied world view." See, *George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 273.

[182] Doyle (1981), for example, asserts that "Only a 'rescuing angel,' not a man, could not merely disconcert a pretty gambler with his staring but also cause her to start losing." Doyle terms this and other elements in the novel an "aura of the supernatural" (162).

> relationship with another consciousness. Every experience, every thought of a character is internally dialogic, adorned with polemic, filled with struggle, or is on the contrary open to inspiration from outside itself--but it is not in any case concentrated on its own object; it is accompanied by a continual sidewards glance at another person. (*PDP,* 132)

Bakhtin's remarks could almost have been written with the opening scene of *Daniel Deronda* in mind. No words are exchanged between Gwendolen and Daniel[183]; rather, the "depths" of their souls are portrayed insofar as their consciousnesses are rendered "in intense relationship" with each other.

The first paragraph of the novel begins the scene with an inner debate in Deronda's consciousness occasioned by a kind of "continual sidewards glance" at Gwendolen.[184] And Gwendolen is *both* a kind of "inspiration from outside" Deronda and the source of his inner "struggle." She kindles in Deronda what the novel itself terms an "inward debate," consisting of five concurrent questions about Gwendolen and about her effect on him. So Gwendolen first appears to Deronda as a kind of ontological question mark as well as an epistemological problem, a "sore spot" with the effect of "unrest rather than of undisturbed charm."[185] The first paragraph effectually narrows the problem of knowledge (introduced in the epigraph) to the other. In so doing, it intimates that knowledge is primarily a relational problem and that its consideration in the novel will be connected to other human beings--not merely to "Science" or to "Poetry" (36).

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[183] Of course, there is nothing "supernatural" in this kind of "dialogue"; there is no special *access* to another's thoughts or the like. We are reminded by Bakhtin that "The consciousnesses of other people cannot be perceived, analyzed, defined as objects or as things--one can only *relate to them dialogically.* To think about them means to *talk with them"* (*PDP,* 68).

[184] Bakhtin makes some relevant observations about "inner speech" in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.* He writes that "each individual . . . enters Raskolnikov's inner speech not as a character or a type . . . but as a symbol of a certain orientation to life and an ideological position . . . It is enough for a person to appear in his field of vision . . . every person touches a sore spot in him and assumes a firm role in his inner speech" (238).

Although the other initially appears as a simple question of physical attraction or aesthetics, "Was she beautiful or not beautiful?" it quickly becomes apparent that the other poses an epistemological problem with moral, ontological, and relational implications: "Was the good or the evil genius dominant in those beams? . . . Why was the wish to look again felt as coercion and not as a longing in which the whole being consented?" (36).[186] Here, then, we have a subtle positing of some of the central problems that will concern the novel as it moves toward an apprehension of the culture of the dialogic.

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[185] George Eliot, *Daniel Deronda,* ed. Barbara Hardy. New York: Penguin, 1984, 35. Further references are to this edition and will appear in parenthesis in the text.

[186] I think that George Eliot's use of the phrase "evil genius" is no accident, for it is the same phrase Descartes uses in his *Meditations,* a work, of course, very much concerned with epistemological problems and the *cogito.* Hence, the phrase alerts attentive readers to some of the underlying concerns that will follow.

For one thing, *Daniel Deronda* further examines and complicates the notion of relation that can be found in Richardson and Austen. And this expanded consideration of relation is first to be found precisely in the "the gaze" or "the look." As I have noted, some may balk at the idea of a kind of intimate connection being established through an exchange of looks, but again, George Eliot knew what she was doing, for the notion of the gaze perfectly captures some of the fundamental elements involved in the dialogical relation. We should notice, for example, keeping in mind Bakhtin's remarks about "intense relationship" of consciousnesses, that the two do not only *exchange* glances but *meet* on some fundamental level.[187] We read that "her eyes met Deronda's, and instead of averting them as she would have desired to do, she was unpleasantly conscious that they were arrested--how long?" (38). In the exchange of looks, Daniel and Gwendolen are *confronted* by one another. Since both of them do not merely continue to scan the room, but permit their looks to be arrested by the other, an unfolding of consciousness begins between them; a human relation has begun. As Martin Buber explains in *The Knowledge of Man,* even when "two strangers exchange glances" or when two opponents encounter each other, if there is a change in the other's "attitude--that is, when something, however imperceptible, happens between the two, no matter whether it is marked at the time by any feeling or not" (64), there is a kind of interhuman contact that is the beginning of relation. And as Buber further explains, "The sphere of the interhuman is one in which a person is confronted by the other. We call its unfolding the dialogical" (Ibid, 65).

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[187] Exchanges and meetings via "the gaze" will recur numerous times at crucial junctures in the novel, indicating the importance George Eliot places on this kind of human interaction. Notice, for example, that in Daniel and Mirah's first meeting that Mirah "looking round with a frightened glance, met Deronda's face. It was but a couple of moments, but that seems a long while for two people to look straight at each other," and this exchange occasions in Deronda "an outleap of interest and compassion towards her" (227-8). And immediately before Mirah utters her first words to Deronda, we read "she did not speak for a few moments which were a renewal of their former gaze at each other" (230). Similarly in the moments leading up to Gwendolen's acceptance of Grandcourt's "proposal," we read Gwendolen "looked straight at Grandcourt, whose long, narrow, impenetrable eyes met hers, and mysteriously arrested them . . . All the while they were looking at each other" (346-7). And when Daniel finally realizes his "strong relation" to Mordecai, we read "the two men, with as *intense a consciousness* . . .felt themselves alone . . . and turned face to face, each baring his head from an instinctive feeling that they wished to see each other fully" (552, italics mine). See also, 416, 464, 473, 481, 494-5, 536, 643, 724, 735, 759, 765, 818, and 835.

Here as elsewhere in the novel, the gaze denotes an initial opening of the self to the other. It foregrounds, for example, an attitude toward the other that Deronda will continually exhibit and Gwendolen will need to learn. The "look" anticipates a mode of being, then, an orientation crucial to "genuine dialogue." Certainly, Deronda could well have had an entirely different attitude towards Gwendolen and towards her problems--especially those problems that were self-made. The reader could little fault Deronda if he had chosen to have nothing to do with

Gwendolen once he had learned more of her character and actions. Or perhaps even worse, Deronda could have merely tolerated her as a moral inferior, which, in effect, would be to dismiss her as a potential equal. But this is not the orientation toward the other that Deronda exhibits and that the novel values. Deronda's orientation towards Gwendolen and others is the one that Dorothea comes to achieve in *Middlemarch* when she recognizes that Casaubon "had an equivalent centre of self."[188] George Eliot is certainly aware of alternative orientations to the other, for we see them at work in other characters, but Deronda repeatedly chooses to take Gwendolen seriously, to open himself to her, and to treat her as "an equivalent centre of self," even when it is difficult for him and, perhaps, only marginally deserved by her.[189]

But just as Deronda initially felt a measure of "coercion" in his desire to look again at Gwendolen, so Gwendolen feels "unpleasantly conscious" at their "meeting." What is important to notice here is that George Eliot almost immediately problematizes "meeting." Indeed, throughout the novel, the opening of the self to another is shown to be a complicated matter, sometimes involving a momentary element of unwillingness, often devoid of comfort, and fraught with potential danger as well as potential good. To see the negative potential of the look in sharper focus, we need only attend to the narrator's comments in the passage that discusses Gwendolen's acceptance of Grandcourt (cited above): "At this moment his strongest wish was to be completely master of this creature . . . And she--ah, piteous equality in the need to dominate . . ." (346). But we need also to note, however, that this episode does not really involve an authentic opening of the *self* to the other on the part of Gwendolen or Grandcourt. This is because they each treat the other, to borrow Kant's phrasing, not as ends-in-themselves but as means. In their mutual will to dominate the other, they objectify each other and so, in fact, close rather than open themselves to authentic relation. This is one form of the monologic orientation that fails to recognize the other as "an equivalent centre of self."

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[188] George Eliot, *Middlemarch,* ed. W. J. Harvey. New York: Penguin, 1986, 143. Subsequent references will be noted parenthetically in the text. Garrett (1980) also notes that "*Daniel Deronda* demonstrates . . . what we have already observed in *Middlemarch,* the equivocal significance of equivalent centers" (179).

[189] Later in the novel, the difficulty for Daniel in the pedagogic relation is made explicit when the narrator comments on Gwendolen's "reverence" for him: "Young reverence for one who is also young is the most coercive of all . . . But the coercion is often stronger on the one who takes the reverence" (485). Similarly we read that "Gwendolen knowing of that woman [Lydia Glasher] and her children, marrying Grandcourt, and showing herself contented, would have been among the most repulsive of beings to him [Deronda]; but Gwendolen tasting the bitterness of remorse for having contributed to their injury was brought very near to his fellow-feeling" (489).

Here then, the novel reveals an awareness of an attitude to the other that can impinge on the dialogical potential of the gaze (and of relation).[190] This kind of thinking would later find expression in the beginning of the fourth section of "Part Three" of Jean Paul Sartre's treatise on ontology, *Being and Nothingness*. There, in the section entitled "The Look," Sartre writes, "This woman I see coming toward me, this man who is passing by in the street, this beggar whom I heart calling before my widow, all are for me *objects*--of that there is no doubt."[191] Grandcourt, of course, consistently exemplifies this kind of attitude, almost deliberately cultivating it as a feature of his aristocratic conceits. Even when he harbors a kind of jealousy towards Gwendolen and Deronda's relationship, "He had not

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[190] Sypher (1996) notices the gaze in *Daniel Deronda,* but she sees it solely in terms (reminiscent of Michel Foucault's

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Discipline and Punish) of a "surveillance motif" in which Gwendolen must "suffer" the gaze of men. Sypher's failure to distinguish between Deronda's gaze and that of Grandcourt reveals something of the very kind of cynical thinking that the novel itself repudiates. For example, it seems Sypher's "politics of suspicion" cannot distinguish between tyranny and kindness. It does not seem to see the difference between Grandcourt's forcing of Gwendolen to where "his" diamond necklace and Deronda's redeeming of the necklace her father had given her. Sypher writes, "When Gwendolen . . . pawns her necklace . . . her *father* gave her (it is men who give women necklaces in this novel--to signify ownership? to threaten strangulation?) . . . In a bold move that reveals both his (this time) secret scrutiny of Gwendolen as well as his gender politics (his affiliation with her father and his repudiation of her independent economic transaction), Deronda repurchases the necklace . . ." (511).

[191] In a passage likely directed at Sartre's attitude, Buber writes, "It is well known that some existentialists assert that the basic factor between men is that one is an object for the other. But so far as this is actually the case, the special reality of the interhuman, the fact of the contact, has largely been eliminated. It cannot indeed be entirely eliminated." *The Knowledge of Man*, 64.

repented of his marriage; it had really brought more of aim into his life, new *objects* [i.e., Gwendolen] to exert his will upon" (645, italics mine).

Grandcourt represents a kind of Nietzshean "will-to-power" in his "delight in dominating" (389), and in his "satisfaction in the mastery" of others (616). He is a sort of immoral "superman" who dehumanizes the other: "he had the courage and confidence that belong to domination . . . [he was] perfectly satisfied that he had held his wife with bit and bridle" (744). Willfully closed to authentic relation, Grandcourt cannot, will not, open himself to the address of the other. As the text reminds us, it was "Impossible to look more unconscious of being addressed than Grandcourt" (157). It is no surprise, then, that his dehumanization of others turns back upon him; thus, he is himself a "remnant of a human being" unable to "call out the tender affections in daily companionship" (456).[192] This is a way of saying that Grandcourt fails to relate to anyone dialogically. As Bakhtin also reminds us, "There can be no dialogic relationship with an object" (*Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,* 111). In objectifying others, he is given in kind and receives the very images he projects on others.

This is part of the reason *he* seems to become an object for others. Not only does he become a "blank" to Gwendolen (480); as well, as Raina (1985) notes, "Grandcourt's non-human status is consistently suggested by the imageries associated with him" (376). As Raina also points out, these images are often of "biologically cold-blooded" creatures such as alligators, lizards, crabs, and boa constrictors. In light of this context, Bakhtin's comments are apropos of the monological dynamic we find in Grandcourt's dealings with others:

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[192] For one of the most recent discussions centered primarily on Grandcourt, see Badri Raina's "*Daniel Deronda*: A View Of Grandcourt," *Studies in the Novel,* 17, #3 (1985), 371-382.

> The consciousnesses of other people cannot be perceived, analyzed, defined as objects or things--one can only *relate to them dialogically . . . otherwise they immediately turn to us their objectivized side*: they fall silent, close up, congeal into finished, objectivized images. (*PDP*, 68)

Clearly, Grandcourt exemplifies that orientation to the consciousnesses of others that perceives them as objects or things. Of course, there is more to Grandcourt than that, as we will see later, but suffice it to say for now that George Eliot does not simply leave us with a negative example. It is not only one of the tasks of *Daniel Deronda* to expose precisely this sort of objectification of the other; it is also one of its primary purposes to counter this form of monological attitude by revealing some of the crucial constituents of a dialogical relation and of a dialogical world view.

The exchange of looks between Daniel and Gwendolen, for example, introduces yet another aspect of the dialogical relation in general and of the pedagogical relation in particular that the novel will reveal to be important: the decentering of the other. Dialogical relations, we learn, are not necessarily always agreeable. Both Deronda's feelings of "unrest" and "coercion" and Gwendolen's unpleasant feelings denote a decentering of consciousness *in each*. Each is affected by the other, jarred out of the self into a new awareness of the other *in relation* to the self. Granted, the decentering of consciousness is subtle here, but the dynamic is felt, and it will intensify with each of their subsequent encounters.

Similarly, that "Deronda's gaze seemed to have acted as an evil eye" so that Gwendolen's "stake was gone" (38) is not meant to show any magical power in his look, but rather to suggest the efficacy of the look to alter the consciousness of the other: "Many were now watching her, but the sole observation she was conscious of was Deronda's" (39). We understand that Gwendolen's losing is not *caused* by Deronda, but her confident egoism is certainly thrown off track, effectually decentered by his look. Indeed, that Gwendolen begins to lose at gambling as she becomes conscious of Deronda's gaze is an apt representation of the potential of the gaze, and by extension the potential of relation, to affect the other--even when the other is steeped in an activity almost paradigmatic of selfish egoism and mercenary intent.[193]

Later, this same dynamic of decentering will be a salient feature of the pedagogical relation between Gwendolen and

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[193] For a discussion of the role of gambling in the novel, see Wilfred Stone's "The Play of Chance and Ego in *Daniel Deronda*," *NCF*, 53, #1 (1998), 25-55. Stone does not see gambling as a controlling metaphor, but he does recognize "gambling as an intellectual and moral issue [that] saturates the book" (25).

Daniel; furthermore, it will be, in some measure, a reciprocal decentering indicative of their first "meeting." Deronda's pedagogic relation to Gwendolen is largely in the Socratic mode. Like Socrates' vexation of his interlocutors, Daniel's dialogues with Gwendolen are often disconcerting to her, just as was their first "meeting." It is perhaps no coincidence that while at the gaming- table, Gwendolen perceives "a smile of irony in his [Deronda's] eyes as their glances met" (39-40), and that later, when her necklace is returned and she suspects Deronda, she thinks "it was another way of smiling at her ironically, and taking the air of a supercilious mentor. Gwendolen felt bitter tears of mortification . . . No one had ever before had dared to treat her with irony" (49).[194]

Once again, George Eliot gives subtle hints to the reader as to her purpose. This time she intimates something of the nature of the relation between Gwendolen and Daniel. The connection between mentorship and irony would likely raise the popular nineteenth century image of the proto-typical ironic teacher: Socrates.[195] Of course, their subsequent relation is not one of passing acquaintance, neighborly contact, or romance. Neither are their conversations really about money, manners, or matrimony, although these matters do arise as the ostensible subject of their conversation (see, for example, 464-5, 624, and 421). The focus of their relation is virtually the same as the focus of Socratic philosophy; first and foremost they are concerned with "the examined life."[196]

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[194] This kind of consciousness of Deronda is not just a momentary one; later, we read that when Gwendolen "had dreamed that she might be the heroine of the gaming-table, it was with the understanding that no one should treat her with the less consideration, or presume to look at her with irony as Deronda had done" (316). And while talking to Grandcourt, she gives a "sidelong glance at Deronda, and saw his eyes fixed on her with a look so gravely penetrating that it had a keener edge for her than his ironic smile . . . a keener edge than Klesmer's judgment" (376).

[195] See note # 90 above. We may also note here that George

Deronda's decentering influence on Gwendolen's consciousness, his role as her teacher, and the reciprocal nature of their relation are repeatedly made explicit in the novel. We read, for example, that

> Deronda had lit up her attention with a sense of novelty: not by words only, but by imagined facts, his influence had entered into the current of that self-suspicion and self-blame which awakens a new consciousness . . . her feelings had turned this man, only a few years older than herself, into a priest . . . Those who trust us educate us. And perhaps in that ideal consecration of Gwendolen's, some education was being prepared for Deronda. (485)

Similarly, when Gwendolen and Deronda meet during Gwendolen's

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Eliot does reveal her awareness of Socrates in the novel. At one point the narrator refers to "the opinion of Socrates" (426), and at another she shows her familiarity with the story surrounding Socrates death (as rendered in the *Apology, Crito,* and *Phaedo*): "If we want to avoid giving the dose of hemlock or the sentence of banishment in the wrong case, nothing will do but a capacity to understand the subject matter on which the immovable man is convinced" (569).

[196] See *Republic I* (352d5-6); *Gorgias* (487e6-488a1); and *Apology* (30a7-b1).

first visit at the Abbey, "some consciousness arrested her, and involuntarily she turned her eyes toward Deronda . . . and their eyes met--to her vexation, for it seemed to her that by looking at him she had betrayed the reference of her thoughts" (473). And as their relation grows, Gwendolen becomes more aware of and sensitive to Deronda's pedagogic influence in her life:

> He seemed to her a terrible-browed angel from whom she could not think of concealing any deed so as to win an ignorant regard from him : it belonged to the nature of their relation that she should be truthful, for his power over her had begun in the raising of self-discontent which could be satisfied only by change. (737)

In fact, the description of what Gwendolen actually becomes aware of in her relation with Deronda is also a remarkably cogent and detailed description of some of the primary features of a dialogical relation. She is open with Deronda, unable to "think of concealing any deed" from him. Nor does she seek "an ignorant regard" from him; that is, she seeks authentic relation with him. Similarly, "it belonged to the nature of their relation that it should be truthful," and truthfulness, as Martin Buber suggests, is one of the cornerstones of dialogical relation (see, for example, *The Knowledge of Man,*75). And finally, we also see that this relation involved a measure of self-discontent for Gwendolen, the impetus for the "examined life," and that it "could only be satisfied by genuine change." In a similar vein, Buber explains that "the inmost growth of the self is not accomplished, as people like to suppose today, in man's relation to himself, but in the relation between the one and the other" (Ibid, 61).

But Deronda's decentering influence on Gwendolen's consciousness should not be mistaken as coercion or imposition. Martin Buber is careful to point out the difference between "imposing oneself on someone and helping someone to unfold" (Ibid, 74). He notes that the one must not "wish to impose himself on the other," but that "the demand that one should influence the other in his unfolding . . . is, however, an element that is suited to lead to a higher stage of the interhuman" (Ibid, 74). Indeed, as Gwendolen's teacher, Deronda is interested only in influencing her towards the good, helping her to see reality and to come to self-knowledge, for she is "walking amid illusions" (402). He urges her, for example, as "One who has committed irremediable errors" to "be scourged by that consciousness into a higher course than is common" (506). And Deronda ultimately hopes that she will reach "a higher stage of the interhuman" by becoming "among the best of women, such as make others glad that they were born" (840).

Making others "glad that they were born" entails the kind of orientation that Deronda himself exhibits. It entails having to do with the other. It entails an openness to otherness and a willingness to meet with the other in his or her own particularity--as does Deronda with Gwendolen, with Mirah, with Hans, and with Mordecai.

Deronda himself, however, expresses his unease at the possibility of adversely interfering with, rather than advantageously influencing, Gwendolen's life. At one point, Deronda even voices his concerns to Gwendolen in terms that imply his pedagogical role and his fear of interfering: " 'I seldom find I do any good by my preaching. I might as well have kept from meddling.' " But Gwendolen's reply affirms the efficacy of Deronda's relation with her, revealing the positive effects of his influence: " 'Your saying that I should not go on being selfish and ignorant has been some strength to me . . . it is you who will decide; because you might have made me different by keeping as near to me as you could, and believing in me' " (624).

Finally, however, Deronda's decentering influence is seen to have a crucial effect on Gwendolen, "something spiritual and vaguely tremendous" jarring her out of the narrow confines of her own egoism: "she was for the first time feeling the pressure of a vast mysterious movement, for the first time being dislodged from her supremacy in her own world" (876).[197] Gwendolen's egoism had prevented her from achieving any genuine dialogue and thus any real reciprocity with others, but the shattering of her egoism through Deronda opens the possibility of her entering into the dialogical sphere. And at the end of the novel, Gwendolen seems to be entering into this stage of moral development; for her, the culture of the dialogic seems finally to be a possibility.

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[197] Robin Riley Fast notes that Gwendolen's "recognition of Deronda as a mentor . . . contribute[s] to the possibilities of spiritual growth." See "Getting to the Ends of *Daniel Deronda,*" *The Journal of Narrative Technique,* 7 (1977), 208.

But to retrace our steps, we should note that, in a sense, Daniel is also vexed by Gwendolen and the unspoken pedagogical bond between them. Even late at night while he is engaged in his "Jewish" pursuits--the study of Hebrew--he finds himself decentered "with the consciousness that he . . . had thought of nothing but Gwendolen and her husband" (466). In their earlier conversation, the topic had soon turned from music to more serious matters (464), and now this "unaccountable" exchange weighs heavily on Deronda's mind, disturbing him deeply, and causing him to vent his frustrations and to examine his own pedagogical relation to Gwendolen:

> 'What is the use of it all?' thought Deronda, as he threw down his grammar, and began to undress. 'I can't do anything to help her--nobody can, if she has found out her own mistake already. And it seems to me that she has a dreary lack of ideas that might help her . . . but what do I know of her? There may be a demon in her to match the worst husband, for what I can tell.' (466)

Gwendolen remains something of a "problem" to Deronda throughout the novel, but it is telling that his own doubts and reservations never cause him to turn away from her: "Her evident confidence in his interpretation of her appealed to him as a peculiar claim" (500). And far from being an angel without mixed feelings or moral struggles, Deronda is revealed as fully human.[198] As a teacher and as a man he too is subject to annoyances and difficulties, and he too has lessons to learn:

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[198] One finds such views, for example, in E. A. McCobb's "*Daniel Deronda* As Will And Representation: George Eliot and

> He was conscious of that peculiar irritation which will sometimes befall the man whom others are inclined to trust as a mentor--the irritation of perceiving that he is supposed to be entirely off the same plane of desire and temptation as those who confess to him. Our guides, we pretend, must be sinless : as if those were not often the best teachers who only yesterday got corrected for their mistakes. (520)

So, what helps make Deronda an exemplar of a dialogical world view is that despite internal and external impediments, he consistently treats the other as a thou--as "an equivalent centre of self." He consistently opens himself to otherness, and crucially, he views other people not as objects to be acted upon but as *subjects who address him.* Even when Deronda is irritated or angry at another, he is *conscious* of his own irritation and anger; he is *aware,* that is, of how the other may affect or decenter him. In short, he has self-knowledge in connection to the other. But he does not permit his own awareness of the other's effect on him to count as a reason to *reject* otherness. Rather, he views differences as an opportunity to better understand himself and the other--as a kind of invitation to mutual development. This is one of marks of a dialogical orientation, and it reveals a kind of moral intelligence.

Schopenhauer," *Modern Language Review,* 80 (1985). McCobb sees Deronda in terms of "ethical sublimity" (542). And Stone (1998) asserts Deronda is "above envy, lust, or egoism" (28n).

Similarly, what makes Deronda stand out as a teacher--to even seem like a priest--is his dialogical orientation to others. For example, even when Gwendolen's claim on him is difficult for him, even when she is "bent on confession," and "he dreaded hearing her confession" (754), he opens himself to her; he listens to her address, and he responds to her need of another. " 'I will not forsake you' " he tells her, even though "all the while he felt as if he were putting his name to a blank paper which might be filled up terribly" (755).[199] Deronda shows responsibility toward the other. He recognizes in Gwendolen the "counterbalancing struggle of her better will" (761), and he sees in her "the precious sign of a recoverable nature . . . which had been the awakening of a new life within her" (762). Viewing her appeals to him as "sad revelation[s] of spiritual conflict" (759), Deronda accepts the responsibility of helping Gwendolen actualize her potential to achieve "a new life." In this respect he is the kind of educator who

> lives in a world of individuals, a certain number of whom are always at any one time committed to his care. He sees each of these individuals as in a position to become a unique, single person, and thus the bearer of a special task of existence . . . He sees every personal life as engaged in such a process of actualization, and he knows from his own

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[199] Given this and other examples of the personal and relational difficulties Deronda faces, I am a little perplexed by comments such as "Daniel's only dilemmas are abstractions" (Robinson 1964, 288), or "Daniel remains *merely*--for many of us, at any rate--a philosophical postulate" (Raina 1985, 372).

> experience that the forces making for actualization are all the time involved in a microscopic struggle with counterforces. He has come to see himself as a helper of the actualizing forces. (*The Knowledge of Man,* 73)

In addition, we should note, too, that Deronda's relation with Gwendolen also reveals something of the reciprocal potential of a dialogical orientation, not just as a decentering dynamic but also as a means for spiritual growth--that "something spiritual" that moves Gwendolen "from her supremacy . . . into self-humiliation" (876). Because of his openness to Gwendolen's claims on him, because of his willingness to meet with Gwendolen's often difficult "dependence on his goodness" (880), "some education was being prepared for Deronda" (485). In fact, Deronda does derive some palpable spiritual benefit from his relation with her: "Certain words of Gwendolen's in the past had come back to him with the effectiveness of an inspiration: in moments of agitated confession she had spoken of her mother's presence as a possible help" (751).

Gwendolen, in turn, needs to enter into the dialogical stream of life in order to grow spiritually. As Deronda suggests, she needs, for one thing, to attend to her own muted consciousness of reciprocity: " 'You are conscious of more beyond the round of your own inclinations--you know more of the way in which your life presses on others, and their life on yours' " (508). Indeed, eventually Gwendolen does begin to enter this dialogic stream, for she "had learned to see all her acts through the impression they would make on Deronda" (737), and she finally comes to the realization, as she says in her letter to him, that "it shall be better with me because I have known you" (882). Gwendolen then, comes to see herself and the world through another, through dialogue with Deronda. This is one of the fundamental features of a dialogical orientation. As Bakhtin writes,

> The very being of man (both internal and external) is the *deepest communion. To be* means *to communicate. . .* To be means to be for another and, and through the other, for oneself . . . looking inside himself, he looks *into the eyes of another* or *with the eyes of another.* (*PDP,* 287)

Of course what each contributes to their relationship and what each brings from it is unique to their own particular character and needs, but nevertheless, there is a reciprocal potential for spiritual enrichment in their relation, as well as a reciprocal growth in their orientation to the other and through the other.[200]

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[200] Clearly, Deronda's personal growth is not as explicit as Gwendolen's, but it is certainly implied. That he repeatedly *answers* her address to him and *overcomes* the difficulties it involves speaks volumes as to the personal struggles he faces and conquers. Consider, for example, the following: "In Deronda's ear the strain was for the moment a continuance of Gwendolen's pleading--a painful urging of something vague and difficult, irreconcilable with pressing conditions, and yet cruel to resist . . . hints had made him alive to the dangers that his own disposition might have neglected; but that Gwendolen's reliance on him was unvisited by any dream of his being a man who could misinterpret her was as manifest as morning, and made an appeal which wrestled with his sense of present dangers, and with his foreboding of a growing incompatible

As we have seen, part of Deronda's dialogical orientation involves his openness. Again, even given the difficulties that this openness may entail, it is nevertheless a feature that the novel clearly advocates because it is "openness which is the sweet fresh air of our moral life" (445). Certainly Gwendolen's need for "inmost growth" in her moral life--for spiritual development--also entails, in part, the need for her to learn the kind of openness that Deronda so well exemplifies. And she does begin to learn something of this openness through her relation with him.

On the simplest level, we see Gwendolen's openness in her repeated willingness to confess herself to Deronda. Time and again, Deronda is the recipient of Gwendolen's confessions, but this kind of openness is, for the most part, unidirectional: "when they looked at each other--*she* seemed to take the deep rest of confession" (464, italics mine). This is not to say (as we saw earlier) that Deronda is not affected by Gwendolen's confessions or that he does not benefit somewhat from them. But this is to say that the reciprocity in this aspect of their relation is limited, and in any case, confession in and of itself is only part of the kind of full openness that the novel promotes.[201] Put

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claim on him in her mind" (625).

[201] Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth gives a central place to confession in *Daniel Deronda*. She writes, that "The link between Gwendolen and Deronda . . . is the intimacy of confession," and that "The confessional relationship at the center . . . sets the tone for the novel . . . ." *George Eliot*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1985, 121. Similarly, Marijke Rudnik-Smalbraak sees confession as one of the central themes in George Eliot's

another way, Gwendolen's confessions are not ends in themselves, but rather one manifestation of a larger orientation that involves much more. She herself muses over the "spiritual tie" that binds her to Deronda, and wonders what has been demanded of her: "Acceptance of rebuke--the hard task of self-change--confession--endurance" (842). The point is that the kind of openness that Gwendolen needs to achieve is only partially fulfilled in her confessions. Confession, as the passage suggests, is only one thread in the "spiritual tie" with Deronda.

2) Moral Intelligence and the Forms of Stupidity

The dialogical sense of openness that Gwendolen needs entails more than merely confessing certain faults or errors, and it means more than even "telling all." The sense of openness that the novel advances is a much more expansive orientation to the world and to one's place in it. Notwithstanding the risk of sounding elitist, I suggest that the kind of openness that *Daniel Deronda* proposes may best be understood as moral intelligence.

In order to put moral intelligence into relief so as to better understand what it is and why it is so important for a dialogical

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work, and she rightly notes that " 'confession', provided it occur mutually, reciprocally, is an enactment of the existential dialogic *par excellence."* See, "The One And Another: George Eliot's Dialogic Incarnations," *Neophilologus,* 77, #3 (July 1993), 503. Suffice it to say that I think Ms Ermarth overestimates the importance of confession in *Daniel Deronda,* and Ms. Rudnik-Smalbraak's point, although generally correct, is only partially applicable to the novel insofar as the confessions between Gwendolen and Deronda are only partially reciprocal.

world-view, it will be useful to examine some forms of orientation that are clearly antithetical to it. In *Middlemarch* we read that "We are all of us born into moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves" (243).[202] Here, George Eliot provides an important insight applicable to *Daniel Deronda.* Moral stupidity, we should notice, is not intellectual deficiency, or even necessarily a lack of knowledge --either about the self, about the other, or about the world. We need only think of Grandcourt to understand this. After all, Grandcourt clearly exhibits a kind of negative intelligence--he knows who he is; he knows what he wants; and he knows how to manipulate others to get it. So by this account, even knowing oneself and knowing what one desires *can* be a significant component of what George Eliot describes above as "moral stupidity." More precisely, then, moral stupidity is an orientation, a world-view, intimately connected (for the lack of better terms) to egoism and self-aggrandizement.

This orientation in Gwendolen--"her favorite key of life" as it is called--is summed up in her "doing as she liked" (173). This "doing as she liked" is reiterated in the novel in various forms. The phrase, of course, recalls the description of "Emma doing just what she liked; highly esteeming Miss Taylor's judgement, but directed chiefly by her own" (*Emma,* 3). But in *Daniel Deronda,* Gwendolen's "doing as she liked" is shown to be a manifestation of a much deeper spiritual malaise than that diagnosed in Emma Woodhouse. Gwendolen's orientation is much closer to that of George Eliot's other "spoiled child," Rosamond Vincy, in *Middlemarch.*[203] Of Rosamond, we read, "What she liked to do was to her the right thing and all her cleverness was directed to getting the means of doing it" (630). Here again, we see a *kind* of intelligence at work--a "cleverness" in the service of self-gratification--but this kind of intelligence is but the mark of a more insidious moral pathology. Here, as in *Daniel Deronda,* George Eliot diagnoses a serious ethical disorder--the monological tendency to conflate personal desire with moral right.

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[202] I am indebted to Garry Watson's " 'Doing As One Likes': The Need for Criticism in the Service of Culture" for bringing my attention to this passage and for suggesting the general line of argument with respect to "doing as one likes."

More pernicious than Emma's adolescent egoism, Gwendolen's variety of egoism, like Rosamond's, is typical of "the spirit of the age," the orientation that puts not only self-interest, but the actual self above virtually all else. It is the orientation that informs the utilitarian credo of the greatest happiness for the greatest number;[204] it is the orientation that underlies the Benthamite perspective that Gradgrind's "philosophy" represents in Dickens' *Hard Times.* Two telling examples from Gwendolen's early years capture the spirit of her egoism. One one occasion when Gwendolen was a "healthy young lady," she refused to fetch her ailing mother medicine for her pain. Gwendolen, we are told, was too cozy in her own bed and "objected to step out into the cold," and so "Mrs. Davilow went without the medicine" (53). Similarly, Gwendolen's selfishness rears its perverse head when, as a child, she "strangled her sister's canary-bird in a final fit of exasperation at its shrill singing which had again and again jarringly interrupted her own" (53). Here we find two acute examples of putting the "supreme self" and its desires above and beyond the feelings and welfare of others. But more telling, these acts also show Gwendolen to be capable of actually harming others in the pursuit of her own comfort--a capability that will be revealed again in her choice to marry Grandcourt. Hence, this orientation is shown to have physical manifestations and palpable effects: clearly, attitude matters, for it affects the world.

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[203] It is probably no coincidence that Gwendolen is to play the part of Rosalind in an extemporized *As You Like It* (188).

[204] Bonaparte (1993) remarks that Gwendolen's egoism is "the philosophy of the age" (25), and she connects it to "Jeremy Bentham's hedonistic calculus . . . on which John Mill based Utilitarian self-interest" (26).

And in this respect, the parallels to Rosamond's orientation are again telling. She too considers her desires as paramount and seems to see "the world as an udder to feed" her "supreme" self:

> In fact there was but one person in Rosamond's world whom she did not regard as blameworthy, and that was the graceful creature with blond plaits and with little hands crossed before her, who had never expressed herself unbecomingly, and had always acted for the best--the best naturally being what she best liked. (716)

Gwendolen too, in her own "clever" way, learns to deflate the promptings of conscience and to deflect personal blame:

> Gwendolen's nature was not remorseless, but she liked to make her penances easy, and now that she was twenty and more, some of her native force had turned into a self-control by which she guarded herself from penitential humiliation. There was more show of fire and will in her than ever, but there was more calculation underneath it. (53-54)

It is not that Gwendolen is without conscience; rather, Gwendolen's compunction is "guarded," hemmed in by self-considerations; she is not totally closed to the voice of conscience, but she is much more subservient to the dictates of her own "supreme self." For example, even though "She had taken pains to buy a white mouse for her sister in retribution," she "inwardly excus[ed] herself on the ground of a peculiar sensitiveness which was the mark of her general superiority" (53).

Gwendolen is a divided self, then, for in having to "guard" herself from her own conscience--her own higher self--she, in fact, becomes a prisoner of protean desire: "the alternate dip of counterbalancing thoughts begotten of counterbalancing desires had brought her into a state in which no conclusion could look fixed to her" (341). But unlike Rosamond, Gwendolen has enough moral intelligence to perceive vaguely that her code of "doing as she liked" has no necessary connection to the good, even her own good, since this code of self-gratification is unpredictable. In considering whether or not to marry Grandcourt, for example, Gwendolen is aware that "doing as she liked--seemed to fail her, and she could not foresee what at a given moment she might like to do" (173).[205] Similarly, Gwendolen has inklings of her divided self, and so begins to fear her own protean nature. For doing as she liked always meant, like her "penances," taking the easiest path--making herself at ease.

But with respect to Grandcourt, the cracks in her code, like those in her "supreme self," begin to show. As we read, although "on the whole she wished to marry him; he suited her purpose; her prevailing, deliberate intention was, to accept him," nevertheless, Gwendolen wonders whether or not she will "fulfil her deliberate intention"; hence "She began to be afraid of herself, and to find out a certain difficulty in doing as she liked" (174). Almost by definition desire is capricious, and so an orientation founded solely on meeting its demands is peculiarly liable to collapse back on the self, dulling the sensibilities to purposes deeper than whim. As the narrator explains in another context, "We object less to be taxed with the enslaving excess of our passions than with our deficiency in wider passion; but if the truth were known, our reputed intensity is often the dulness of not knowing what to do with ourselves" (281).

Moreover, Gwendolen's own desire fails her, further exacerbating the cracks in her code and causing existential dread:

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[205] Kearney (1971) asserts of "doing as she liked" that "It is one of the major possibilities of the novel that Gwendolen will adopt this code, but she is safeguarded by her terror of losing control" (290-91). Kearney cites only the above passage in support of his claim. My view is that the text is overwhelmingly clear that Gwendolen does, in fact, fully "adopt" this code.

> Gwendolen's appetite had sickened. Let her wander over the possibilities of her life as she would, an uncertain shadow dogged her. Her confidence in herself and her destiny had turned into remorse and dread; she trusted neither herself nor her future. (484)

Gwendolen is adrift, therefore, not only because she marries Grandcourt, but also because she does not know what else to do. Granted, Gwendolen, like Ibsen's Hedda Gabbler, has very little outlet to pursue any "wider passion," but her own egoism curtails rather than augments her possibilities. There is a sense of truth in Gwendolen's claim that " 'if the world were pleasanter, one would feel what was pleasant. Girls' lives are so stupid: they never do what they like' " (101). George Eliot's treatment of Gwendolen underlines this problem, but it also reveals how an orientation such as "doing as she likes" can make a bad situation worse--a serious difficulty virtually insurmountable.

To reiterate, Gwendolen's enslaving passion is doing as she likes, but this orientation narrows rather than broadens her horizons--her potential for "wider passion." It is no coincidence that when Gwendolen's "supreme self" is dealt the final blow of Deronda's departure (in her mind *from her*) that "the world seemed getting larger round poor Gwendolen," and she comes to perceive something of the added insularity of life that her code has created, and so feels "more solitary and helpless in the midst" (875).

Gwendolen is resolved "that she was going to do just as she liked," and if she chose to take Grandcourt that "she would have him know that she was not going to renounce her freedom" and live the narrow life of other women (168). Of course, herein lies the irony of Gwendolen's initial attraction to Grandcourt. She is attracted to him, in large part, because she thinks that she can easily dominate him, that she will be able to do as she likes in her married life. She presumes that Grandcourt has no intense desires, and so she thinks she will be free to pursue her own:

> He [Grandcourt] did not appear to enjoy anything much. That was not necessary : and the less he had of particular tastes or desires, the more freedom his wife was likely to have in following hers. Gwendolen conceived that after marriage she would most probably be able to manage him thoroughly. (173)

When Gwendolen does accept Grandcourt, "doing as she liked" is again part of the equation. As she tells her mother, " 'Everything is settled. You are not going to Sawyer's Cottage. I am not going to be inspected by Mrs Mompert, and everything is to be as I like' " (350). But in doing as she likes in accepting Grandcourt, Gwendolen's ability to do as she likes is actually curtailed: "Any romantic illusions she had had in marrying this man had turned on her power of using him as she liked. He was using her as he liked" (649). Gwendolen's hard learned lesson is that doing as she likes is imprisoning rather than liberating.

But of course the most critical and debilitating imprisonment, as I have intimated, is not to Grandcourt, but to the code of her own egoism. This is why Deronda never advises Gwendolen to leave Grandcourt; he is aware that her marriage is but a conspicuous symptom and not the actual disease. When Gwendolen asks him to counsel her, " 'You must tell me then what to think and what to do; else why did you not let me go on doing as I liked' " (501), Deronda does not address the immediate symptom, but the underlying moral malaise:

> 'Look on other lives besides your own. See what their troubles are, and how they are borne. Try to care about something in this vast world besides the gratification of small selfish desires. Try to care for what is best in thought and action--something that is good apart from the accidents of your own lot.' (501-02)[206]

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[206] Eileen Sypher (1996) writes of Deronda that "one of the pervasive yet unspoken dimensions of his teaching to Gwendolen is that she must not leave her husband." And of the passage I cite above, she writes "Eliot's other narrators and texts typically support this view, even when it comes at women's expense . . . it reappears here in the mouth of a relatively weak and ineffective character . . . with clearly problematic gender politics" (510). Conflating the problem of selfishness with gender politics is, I think, missing the very point about moral stupidity that George Eliot is trying to expose. Similarly, Ms Sypher lumps together Gwendolen's "desire to control rather than be controlled by her husband; her desire to be able to provide for her mother and sisters; and her desire to improve her education and her moral sense" (508). It seems to me that the failure to distinguish between the illegitimate and damaging "desire to control" and the legitimate and laudable desires in the second two clauses is again missing the very point the novel is trying to make about "doing as she likes."

Again, at their next meeting, Deronda diagnoses Gwendolen's problems as moral in nature: "It is the curse of your life . . . that all passion is spent in that narrow round, for want to ideas and sympathies to make a larger home for it" (507), and he reaffirms the spiritual focus of his advice, counselling " 'the higher, the religious life, which holds enthusiasm for something more than our own appetites and vanities . . . the higher life . . . a region in which the affections are clad with knowledge' " (507-08). By George Eliot's account, then, a large part of moral stupidity involves narrow selfishness--a deadness to all that is not the self--and "doing as one likes" is shown to be a particularly virulent form of this spiritual sickness. But this malaise takes other forms in the novel as well; ennui is one of them.

Grandcourt, of course, is the character most prominently associated with ennui. He is "a man whose grace of bearing has long been moulded on an experience of boredom" (394). Typical of his orientation to life, his first words in the novel are " 'I used to think archery was such a bore' " (146). Grandcourt usually speaks "in a superficial interrupted drawl suggestive of chiefly of languor and *ennui*" (162); he thinks "most things are bores" (171), and even as part of his marriage proposal he says, "I should not hope to win you by making myself a bore" (346).

However, Grandcourt is not without a forceful, palpable presence. He "may even show sudden impulses which have a false air of daemonic strength," but this is only because of a "want of regulated channels for [his] soul to move in" (194). In other words, Grandcourt's impelling forcefulness comes not from any inward source of character but from a void--an existential lack--a gap, if you will, between his empty, ennui-ridden self and the external world.[207] In this regard he is the antithesis of relation. Without a regulated channel for his soul to move in, he is a solipsist trapped by his own will. And without any inner content except the raw will to dominate, Grandcourt, as we saw earlier, becomes a kind of "blank" to Gwendolen "in everything but this, that he would do just what he willed . . ." (480).

Arguably, Grandcourt is George Eliot's most fully realized monological character. A mixture of forceful passivity, negative will, and the need to dominate, Grandcourt's "will must impose itself *without trouble*" (396, italics mine). Steeped in solipsistic ennui, his monologic approach desires ease in dominance; therefore, he cannot tolerate any kind of reply from the other that does not accord with his own will. As Gwendolen perceives it, "She had been brought . . . to kneel down like a horse under training for the arena" (365). So Grandcourt does not really want a genuine *response* from the other at all; it is the appearance of a response that he most desires--in the form of submission: "In any case she [Gwendolen] would have to submit; and he enjoyed thinking of her as his future wife, whose pride and spirit were suited to command everyone but himself" (365). Hence, Grandcourt personifies what Bakhtin sees as the "monologic approach" to the other, for he is "finalized and deaf to the other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any *decisive* force" (*PDP,* 293).

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[207] Kierkegaard remarks that "*The demonic is the contentless, the boring*. . . Boredom, extinction, is precisely a continuity in nothingness." See *The Concept of Anxiety*. Edited and Translated by Reidar Thomte. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, 132-33. Similarly, as Raina (1985) notes, Eric Fromm points out that the sadist exerts "power over people because he lacks the power *to be*" (376-77).

Grandcourt's is the perverse "satisfaction in the mastery" of the other (616), in the "pleasure in mastering" (365). He takes a "delight in dominating" (389), and "he himself was not jealous of anything unless it threatened his mastery . . . " (370). His "do-nothing absolutism" (732) is infectious, therefore, and not simply a passive and less pernicious form of ennui. At one point, Gwendolen becomes aware "that a sort of lotos-eater's stupor had begun in him and was taking possession of her" (172). And so with Grandcourt, George Eliot most clearly shows the adverse affects of a monological orientation with respect to others. Its harm is not restricted to the self but spreads insidiously to others, dragging them down with it and blunting all genuine relation:

> day followed day with that want of perceived leisure which belongs to lives where there is no work to mark off intervals; and the continual liability to Grandcourt's presence and surveillance seemed to flatten every effort to the level of the boredom which his manner expressed : his negative mind was as diffusive as fog, clinging to all objects, and spoiling all contact. (648)

But we should note that others in the novel are susceptible to the ills of ennui as well.[208] Gwendolen, we may recall, remarks in the first chapter of the novel, "I am always bored" (42), and in the second chapter we read that "She had gone to the roulette-table not because of passion, but in search of it" (45). Significantly, Gwendolen's boredom is connected to her "doing as she likes."[209] For example, Gwendolen complains to her mother, " 'You often want me to do what I don't like,' " and when her mother asks, " 'You mean, to give Alice lessons?' " Gwendolen replies " 'Yes. And I have done it because you asked me. But I don't see why I should else. It bores me to death . . . ' " (58). And Gwendolen's early notion of matrimony is that "a woman could not do what she liked . . . [and so] was consequently dull" (68). Certainly the word "dull" is an apt cognate for boring since it connotes the lack of sensitivity, the blunted feeling, and the aimless stupidity that characterize the soul-sickness of ennui. Gwendolen is "not used to anything except being dull" (147), so it is little surprise that she suffers from a "*sick* motivelessness" (318, italic mine).

The cure for this malaise is to be found in connection to the other--in taking responsibility for immersing oneself in the larger dialogue of social intercourse. In regarding others' lives (like Deronda does) as having a "peculiar claim" (500) on one's own, one is actively struggling against the solipsistic tendency that informs ennui. One is, in other words, fighting the monological orientation to the other. We may recall,

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[208] Gwendolen is also similar to Rosamond in her susceptibility to ennui. As E. A. McCobb (1985) notes, "Gwendolen's pursuit of illusory satisfaction arises from 'utter ennui' , a condition briefly attributed to Rosamond Vincy some four years previously." McCobb also notices that "Gwendolen's ennui has obvious affinities with Grandcourt" (545).

[209] My view here differs substantially from Kearney (1971), who claims Gwendolen is generally "able to prevent boredom and despair by her code of 'doing as she likes' " (290).

> Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another *I* with equal rights (*thou*). With a monologic approach (in its extreme or pure form) *another person* remains wholly and merely an *object* of consciousness, and not another consciousness. (*PDP,*292-3)

In counselling Gwendolen to take on "duties" and to regard her life as "a debt" (839), Deronda is, in effect, urging her to resist the monological approach, to "Look on other lives besides [her] own" (501), to "know more of the way [her] life presses on others, and their life on [hers]" (508). He adds that far from making life dreary, this orientation will mean a better life for Gwendolen: "once beginning to act with that penitential, loving purpose . . . there will be unexpected satisfactions . . . You will find your life growing like a plant" (839). For as Deronda further points out, "What makes life dreary is the want of motive." And Deronda's advice is efficacious not just because of the validity of its *content.* In speaking to Gwendolen, in responding to her address--"Is that the best I can do?" (839)--Deronda is being dutiful towards her; he is engaging in the very dialogical orientation that he is encouraging in her. And "The words were like a touch of a miraculous hand to Gwendolen . . . So potent in us is the infused action of another soul" (840).

In one sense, Deronda, too, is susceptible to a kind of ennui, but his tendency toward inaction is better understood in terms of an overly reflective disposition and a too diffuse sympathy .[210] Deronda cannot be mistaken to have "that want of sympathy [which] condemns us to a corresponding [moral] stupidity" (658) such as we see so clearly in Grandcourt and, to some extent, in Gwendolen. We may recall Deronda's "disposition was one in which everyday scenes and habits begat not *ennui* or rebellion, but delight, affection, aptitudes . . ." (208). It is precisely everyday scenes and habits that Grandcourt finds most boring, but not so with Deronda, in whom "there was a fervour which made him easily find poetry and romance among the events of everyday life" (246). Unlike Grandcourt's "do-nothing absolutism," "Deronda's demerits were likely to be on the side of reflective hesitation" (220). Furthermore, in contrast to Grandcourt's orientation, which sees others either as objects of his mastery or obstacles to his will, "hatred of innocent human obstacles was a form of moral stupidity not in Deronda's grain" (215).

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[210] Kearney (1971) notes that "For him [Deronda] also Grandcourt's ennui is a possibility" (292), and Garrett (1980) writes that "Deronda's passivity and need for motivation link him with Grandcourt" (174). In my view, both writers overemphasize Deronda's link to Grandcourt. As I will show, it is not really "Grandcourt's [kind of] ennui" to which Daniel is susceptible.

Deronda's sympathy is, perhaps, his most prominent feature.[211] As the narrator tells us,

> Daniel had the stamp of rarity in a subdued fervour of sympathy, an activity of imagination of behalf of others, which did not show itself effusively, but was continually seen in acts of considerateness that struck his companions as moral eccentricity. (218)

But, it must be understood that what the novel describes as sympathy is not to be equated merely with some fairly narrow concept such as pity or compassion (although it may include these). The concept has a wider frame of reference and a deeper significance than suggested by words like feeling, sorrow, agreement, or understanding. As George Eliot suggests in her essay "The Natural History of German Life: Riehl," sympathy is "that attention to what is apart from ourselves, which may be called the raw material of moral sentiment."[212] Similarly, in a letter to Charles Bray, George Eliot writes of her "conviction that our moral progress may be measured by the degree in which we sympathize with individual suffering and individual joy."[213] It is hardly a novel observation in George Eliot criticism to point out how pervasive and important that the concept sympathy is in her work, but what seems to be unrecognized is that (as George Eliot understood it) sympathy or "fellow-feeling" is virtually identical with a dialogical approach to the other.[214]

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[211] Robinson (1964) takes the untenable position that the effect of Deronda's sympathy (among other "ideas") is "pernicious" (286). Further, she sees the adverb "coldly" as typifying Deronda, and she writes, "The emotion to which Daniel inadvertently confesses is the difficulty of sympathy, rather than sympathy itself. It is for this reason he strikes us as spurious" (284). It is true that Deronda admits the difficulty of sympathy, but if anything, this makes him far *less* spurious. He reveals the human difficulty of maintaining sympathy. This supports rather than undermines George Eliot's realism, and it also shows that like Buber and Bakhtin, she understands that a dialogical orientation is a goal and a task, and not an essentialist "essence."

[212] "The Natural History Of German Life: Riehl," in George Eliot, *Essays and Leaves From and Note-Book.* New York: The

The "attention" to others that sympathy involves is at the very heart of a dialogical orientation; it is at the heart of the novel as well.[215] Sympathy is more than a feeling or an attitude; it is a moral *orientation*; it is a *world-view*, a *way* of interacting with and addressing external reality. It is a matter of *relation,* in short, of moral intelligence. It is sympathy, for example, that makes Deronda responsive to Gwendolen's address: "It was not vanity--it was ready sympathy that made him alive

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American News Company, 1884?, 133.

[213] *Letters of George Eliot,* ed. Gordon Haight. (Yale University Press, 1955), II, 403. Quoted in Robison, 1964.

[214] Although he does not refer to sympathy but to George Eliot's perspectives on the self, and although he does not refer to dialogism, Richard Freadman does recognize that "*Deronda* looks forward . . . to the humanist mysticism of such a writer as Martin Buber." Freadman also notes that Buber's thought emphasizes the relational aspect of the "I". *Eliot, James And the Fictional Self: A Study in Character and Narration.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986, 85.

[215] Again, Robinson (1964) sees sympathy in the novel in a highly pejorative way. She writes, "the ideology of sympathy and the contrast between 'social' and 'selfish' interests , are the rocks upon which the novel founders" (298).

to . . . her behaviour towards him" (466). Grandcourt, by contrast, is a man whose "relations in life are carried on without . . . sympathetic feeling" (479). Deronda, however, relates to others in a dialogical way, "thinking himself imaginatively into the experience of others" (570). Similarly, in opposition to the monologic attitude that "pretends to *possess a ready-made truth"* (*PDP,*110), Deronda exhibits the quintessential dialogical approach to truth; he is able to see from different points of view, from the perspective of others. By repeatedly "seeing things as they probably appeared to others" (412), Deronda's orientation exemplifies Bakhtin's point that "Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born *between people*. . ." (Ibid,110). Deronda's prevalent orientation, then, is clearly dialogical. But this does not mean that he is constantly engaged in actual dialogues, as though speaking in and of itself were the sole mark of the dialogical. George Eliot understood, it seems, that "dialogic relationships are a much broader phenomenon than mere rejoinders in a dialogue, laid out compositionally in the text" (*PDP,* 40).

Once again, we need to note that the dialogic approach is not without difficulty. The novel repeatedly reveals relation to be an ongoing task--a sometimes problematic goal--and as an expression of the dialogic orientation, sympathy is not without its own inherent complications. For example, Deronda's "keen sympathy made him susceptible to the danger that another's heart might feel larger demands on him than he would be able to fulfill" (835). Like Jane Austen's understanding of the limits of openness, George Eliot reveals her understanding of the dangers of a too "many-sided sympathy, which threaten[s] to hinder any persistent course of action" (412) and of the hazards of "wandering in mazes of impartial sympathy" (814). Far from reifying sympathy into a static "ideology" or "religion," *Daniel Deronda* reveals that even this critical aspect of the dialogical orientation has its parameters of operation and expression. So in *Daniel Deronda,* even a paramount dialogical impulse like sympathy is itself shown in a dialogical light. For example, the narrator tells us, "A too reflective and diffuse sympathy was in danger of paralysing in him [Deronda] that indignation against wrong and that selectness of fellowship which are the conditions of moral force" (413). We do not see sympathy from a single perspective--it is not revealed as a "ready-made" absolute or expressed as the "ultimate word" of narrative authority (see *PDP,* 293). It is not that the dialogical orientation that sympathy expresses is wrong or that the "moral sentiment" it involves is relative; on the contrary, the novel overwhelmingly affirms its value. What we are to recognize, I think, is that there is no single mode of consciousness--sympathy included--that can embrace the entire diversity of human reality. For George Eliot, as for Bakhtin, there is no absolute (Kantian) categorical imperative.

But as we have seen, there are orientations to the other that tend to affirm human life and orientations that tend to depreciate it. We might briefly note that like Jane Austen, George Eliot also sees wonder an important constituent of a dialogical orientation. Deronda is open to wonder; Grandcourt is not. Grandcourt's objectification of the other and his deadening ennui prevent him from opening himself to the world of possibilities: he is incapable of wonder. For example, since Grandcourt is impervious to virtually everything outside the purview of his own concerns and will, Gwendolen's spiritual struggles are unintelligible to him: "Grandcourt could not indeed fully imagine how things affected Gwendolen: he had no imagination of anything in her but what affected the gratification of his own will" (616). Grandcourt's incapacity to experience wonder is, perhaps, one of the fundamental reasons that he is (arguably) George Eliot's most irretrievable soul. But for all her faults, Gwendolen *is* capable of experiencing wonder.[216]

Gwendolen, we read, "wondered at her own contradictions" (615). She is able to see even herself as an object of curiosity and unknown possibilities. At times, "All Gwendolen's consciousness was wonder" (189), and at other times she looks at herself in the glass, "with wonder that she could be so miserable" (477). Although undeveloped and often blocked, she also reveals something of the (dialogical) impulse to see from another's point of view; she thinks of Deronda, "often wondering what were his ideas about things" (607). Similarly, Gwendolen is subject to awe and the kind of Kierkegaardian "dread" that is normally a feature of spiritual sensitivity: "She wondered at herself . . . she unwillingly recognized . . . that liability of hers to fits of spiritual dread, though this foundation of awe within her had not found its way into connection . . . with any human relations" (94). As we have seen, relation with Deronda will help her to find a connection with the other and so with her own spiritual potential, but this would not be possible without the "foundation of awe" within her. The "certain awe and exceptional trust" Gwendolen has for Deronda will be crucial to her future spiritual growth. Without wonder, then, Gwendolen would surely not be open to his dialogical influence. And finally, without her ability to experience wonder, to understand "the awful face of duty" in Deronda's leaving, she would not be "dislodged from her supremacy in her own world" (876). Without wonder, then, the hope for Gwendolen's full development would fade. She would, in all likelihood, fail to immerse herself in the culture of the dialogic.

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[216] Felicia Bonaparte (1993) also notices that Gwendolen has the capacity to experience wonder. Bonaparte writes that "there are dimensions in her that augur other possibilities. She is sensitive to mystery. She is still able to feel 'awe' " (25).

C. A Culture of the Dialogic

> The dialogic orientation of a word among other words (of all kinds and degrees of otherness) creates new and significant artistic potential in discourse, creates the potential for a distinctive art of prose, which has found its fullest and deepest expression in the novel.

(*The Dialogic Imagination,* 275)

I want to conclude, first, by reiterating that it is my view that in *Daniel Deronda* we find a kind of unification of George Eliot's fiction and philosophy in her offering of a world-view that may be understood as a culture of the dialogic. What I am proposing, then, is a different way of understanding the novel. Thomas Kuhn, we may recall, argues that science adopts new paradigms when current ones can no longer account for new evidence, shifting perspectives, and competing models. I think George Eliot does something analogous in *Daniel Deronda*; she offers an alternative paradigm for human relations, and this paradigm is dialogical in nature. I say "alternative" because her paradigm is not exactly new; as we have seen, there are striking elements of the dialogic and of Socratic philosophy in Samuel Richardson and Jane Austen. But George Eliot offers an alternative in *Daniel Deronda* in the sense that dialogical concerns are much more front and centre; moreover, not only do they *inform* much of the novel; they are also the *subject* of much of the novel.

If we return briefly to the letter that begins this chapter (225 above), and attend once more to the words I have highlighted, we see some of the general conceptual material that frames George Eliot's culture of the dialogic in *Daniel Deronda.* We might note first that *Daniel Deronda* certainly arouses in its readers a vision of fellow-men "who most differ from them in customs and belief." We may be resistant to the vision for any number of reasons, but we cannot help but notice it. Of course the so-called "Jewish part" of the novel is most explicitly the focus of the "vision," but this "part" is, I think, a particular consideration of otherness in service of a larger "vision" or world view.[217]

The "Jewish part" is crucial in that it incisively addresses a particular attitude and an overall monological orientation. Although the "English part" exposes many forms of monological orientation, the "Jewish part" also directly challenges the reader. The forms of moral stupidity that are manifested in racial and religious prejudice are challenged by the novel's treatment of Jewish people.[218] Here, the dialogical function of decentering that we saw *in* the novel is aimed at the reader *by* the novel.

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[217] This is not to say that George Eliot did not mean to address actual attitudes and beliefs with respect to Jewish people; she does, but in so doing she also challenges the entrenched monological attitudes of her milieu.

[218] The treatment of Jewish people and Judaism has been seen both as idealistic and as condescending. For those who see the Jewish characters as idealized, see Barbara Hardy, who thinks them "simplified and idealized." "Introduction," in *Daniel Deronda,* ed. Barbara Hardy, New York: Penguin, 1984, 15. See also Garrett (1980) and Deirdre David, *Fictions of Resolution in Three Victorian Novels,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. David, however, also sees some anti-Semitic elements in the treatment of the Cohens and in Deronda's going East, as does Susan Meyer in " 'Safely To Their Own Borders': Proto-Zionism, Feminism, And Nationalism in *Daniel Deronda,*" *ELH,* #3 (1993), 773-758. For a defense of Deronda's adoption and promotion of Judaism see, Sara M. Putzell-Korab's "The Role of the Prophet: Daniel Deronda's Idealist Mission," *Nineteenth-Century Fiction,* 37, #2 (1982), 170-187. Putzell-Korab writes, "Whether flabby or firm, idealism certainly informs the "Jewish half" of the novel. Eliot presents it, moreover, as a rational idealism based

That *Daniel Deronda* challenges anti-Semitism is not a new observation, but what is important to recognize is that the challenge is much broader, and that it includes the "English part" of the novel. In a sense, the two "parts" are in a kind of dialogue with each other, the "English part" exposing the forms of moral stupidity and the "Jewish part" offering some forms of moral intelligence.[219] As we saw, objectification of the other, doing as one likes, egoism and ennui are forms of moral stupidity that the novel reveals to be particularly odious and harmful--and particularly English.[220] But we need to avoid the misunderstanding that the "Jewish part" is an alternative *model* in the sense of something to be copied, in the sense of something that can be stated in a code or formulated as a law. A culture of the dialogic is antithetical to the kind of "experience" which has "petrified into maxims and quotations" (195). The contribution of the "Jewish part" to the "paradigm" offered by the novel--especially as it is expressed in Deronda--is that it reveals an alternative *orientation* to the world. The novel is not proposing Judaism or "going East" as answers to life's questions or as a

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in a rationalist literature and consistent with contemporary nationalist movements and German idealism" (171).

[219] Carroll (1959) remarks on the "reciprocal effects" of the two "parts" of the novel, and he notes that "Paradoxically, Deronda's acceptance of his public role is the factor which finally brings Gwendolen to a real self-knowledge" (377).

[220] McCobb (1985) notes that "involvement in British culture, and commitment to it, are the very things questioned in *Daniel Deronda*" (543).

cure to the forms of moral stupidity--after all, Grandcourt's experience of "a season or two in the East" was with "tiger-hunting or pig-sticking" (147). Rather, the "Jewish part" expresses a *dialogic impulse*--one of many possibilities--for being in the world. It is mostly by contrast, then, that a culture of the dialogic becomes apparent in the novel.

Take, for one example, the treatment of the notion of reverence in the novel. We are not told that reverence is a virtue, or even explicitly urged to be reverent. Rather, we are shown a world view that includes reverence and one that does not. Granted, we are told that Mirah has a "reverential gratitude" towards Deronda (622), and Deronda, in turn, has a "reverential . . . interest in Mordecia and Mirah" (604). Similarly, Deronda has "a bent of his nature towards a reverential tenderness" (697) and "a reverential pity for spiritual struggle" (568). But it is not these descriptions that capture a reverential attitude or even establish its value. Rather, what reverence means is revealed in its relation to the larger orientation of the characters. For instance, when Deronda is at the Abbey and enters the stables which were once a chapel, "Deronda . . . oddly enough had taken off his felt hat and stood holding it before him as if they had entered a room or an actual church" (473). Observing him, Grandcourt asks " 'Do you take off your hat to the horses?' . . . with a slight sneer" (474). Here we see two approaches to the world--one is reverential, one is not. This little detail also suggests a kind of attitude to culture itself. Deronda is sensitive to the past; he does not have the "deadness to history" George Eliot refers to in her letter. In contrast, with utilitarian practicality, Sir Hugo makes the past into a stable, and Grandcourt sneers at the signs of reverence to the past. The reader is free to choose which orientation he or she values. Bakhtin points out that "What is realized in the novel is the process of coming to know one's own language as it is perceived in someone else's language, coming to know one's own belief system in someone else's belief system" (*The Dialogic Imagination,* 365). In perceiving the "dialogue" between these orientations, the reader's own belief system may be clarified and challenged.

Taken in its entirety, what *Daniel Deronda* stands for is not a commitment to any one "truth," but a relation to the world --a participation in the greater dialogue that is life. The novel frequently refers to "pathways," and what it finally advocates is the conscious choice of a path--what others have called the philosophical life, the examined life, or the life of dialogue. Here is Bakhtin:

> The dialogic nature of consciousness, the dialogic nature of human life itself . . . Life is by its very is nature dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit . . . He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium.

(*PDP,* 293)

George Eliot's philosophy as expressed in the novel is not to be found in any philosophical system but in her affirmation of a philosophical orientation to the other and to the world--in her affirmation of immersion into the "world symposium," into a culture of the dialogic.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

It is, perhaps, one of the perennial problems of academic studies that they tend to curtail or even demolish opposing views rather than include them in a larger theoretical structure. Invariably, one is compelled to offer one's position vis a vis a text in a forcefully competitive way in order to situate it distinctively in opposition to other interpretive paradigms. At times, this study has deferred to this tendency, but it is hoped that this will be understood as an occasional, necessary lapse rather than as a goal. Indeed, my intention here has been to show that a larger, more inclusive "theoretical structure" may be applied to some of the works of Samuel Richardson, Jane Austen, and George Eliot. Moreover, it should now be clear that this structure--Socratic philosophy and dialogism--*ought* to be applied to these works, since these works themselves, in pervasive and crucial ways, both contain and offer as a paradigm salient elements of Socratic philosophy and of dialogism. Understood in the light of Socratic philosophy and dialogism, our critical appreciation and our conventional understanding of these writers should be fundamentally challenged and substantially enhanced.

More specifically, this study has shown that Samuel Richardson's *Pamela,* Jane Austen's *Emma* and *Pride and Prejudice,* and George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* are permeated not merely with moral lessons or moral axioms, but also with a particular moral philosophy, a particular world-view, one that is thoroughly Socratic in nature. Like Socratic philosophy, these novels, in various ways, show an overwhelming attention to moral matters and a consistent concern with the right conduct of life. Further, in keeping with the Socratic orientation towards doing philosophy, these writers eschew any systematic ethics in favor of a dialogical approach to the moral life. For example, although Pamela's orientation is clearly Christian, her actual spiritual growth is rendered in terms of a dialogue with a seemingly demonic other--Mr. B--and her subsequent "victory" is not the paradigmatic Christian victory of light over darkness, but the hard-won achievement of genuine dialogue with an aberrant other. Similarly, Mr. B's "reformation" comes through dialogue with another--with Pamela--and is not so much a reformation of any "natural" self, but the reformation (reforming, remaking) of a monological world view that blindly treats the other as an object of possession or gratification; Mr. B's reformation is actually a change in world-view, a radical paradigm shift from monologism to dialogism.

We saw some similar dynamics at work in *Pride and Prejudice.* Elizabeth does not come to self-knowledge through the workings of any religious or philosophical system, but through an ongoing "dialogue" with Mr. Darcy; she moves from a monological orientation to a dialogical one, from a narrow epistemic tunnel-vision to a broadened capacity to experience wonder and to divine new possibilities. Like Pamela and like

Gwendolen Harleth and Emma Woodhouse, Elizabeth is moved towards "the examined life," not by theories, or ideas, or religion, or romance, or philosophies per se; she is moved by her exchanges with an other. Like Gwendolen and Emma, Elizabeth experiences the Socratic chastening of shame before she is able to see reality aright. But we saw that the end result of Elizabeth's growth is not epistemological certainty or even "philosophical enlightenment" as such, but moral self-awareness, the paramount goal of Socratic philosophy: "Know Thyself."

In this regard, each novelist has also revealed a concern with the nature of the educative process. Again, each writer seems to hold fast to a dialogical sense of the pedagogical relation, for pedagogy *is* first and foremost a *relationship* for Richardson, Austen, and Eliot. Each of these writers explores, to a greater or lesser extent, the nature of the pedagogic relation. And each of these writers offers something closely akin to a Socratic model of the pedagogic relation. Rarely does one character in *Pamela*, *Pride and Prejudice*, *Emma*, or *Daniel Deronda* take on the strictly conventional role of a teacher as one who imparts knowledge from a privileged epistemic position. Indeed, those characters whose primary role is a pedagogical one resemble Socrates' notion of the pedagogue as a "midwife" more than the later Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king.

Similarly, the pedagogic relation in these novels is thoroughly dialogical, repeatedly reciprocal. Mr. B and Pamela learn from each other. Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy's education is a reciprocal one. Gwendolen learns from Deronda, but conversely, Deronda learns from her. Emma is schooled by Mr. Knightley in a very special way; as Socrates often does with his interlocutors, Mr. Knightley "vexes" Emma into self-examination in order to encourage her to bring about a congruent relation between her own moral centre and her actual behaviour towards others. But in each novel, the primary mode of pedagogical relation is a dialogical one: in these novelists, education comes from relation; that is to say, education comes across rather than down.

So in Samuel Richardson, Jane Austen and George Eliot, we have repeatedly seen the features of Socratic dialogism at work. Not only is the right conduct of life the focus, life is seen in terms of an unfinished task, of an ongoing dialogical process between the one and the other. Far from positing the kinds of essentialist conceptions of human nature that postmodern theorists have tended to ascribe to these writers, these novelists reveal subjectivity to be a problematic construction--one that is invariable and unfinished--but one that is ultimately connected to the "task" of relation with others. Otherness is never taken for granted, either as a certain guarantor of spiritual development or as a special source of spiritual malaise. Otherness is constantly treated as an invitation to possibilities, usually to self-examination and relation. However, these writers also recognize the reality that for some, otherness is taken as an opportunity for objectification, selfishness, and egoism. Neither pessimists nor optimists per se, these writers share neither in the philanthropic excesses of the Romantics nor in the misanthropic tendencies of the postmodernists. To borrow Dostoevsky's description of his own art, Richardson, Austen, and Eliot are more "realist[s] in the higher sense" by virtue of their shared fidelity to the variations and possibilities inherent in the human condition.

These writers also tend to emphasize the positive potentialities of otherness, and so otherness is often viewed as a source of philosophical meaning, a kind of occasion for the shared search for knowledge in the moral arena. More than this, however, it is recognized as the one locus for full and authentic human being. We have seen that for these writers, as for Buber, "Human life and humanity come into being in genuine meetings" (*The Knowledge of Man,* 59), and for these writers, as for Bakhtin, "To live means to participate in a dialogue," since "The very being of man (both external and internal) is *the deepest communion. To be* means *to communicate"* (*Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* 293, 287). This is why for these writers, as for Buber and Bakhtin, genuine dialogue entails a recognition of the other as a full and autonomous subject. Genuine dialogue recognizes difference; it does not deny difference its legitimate existence, but it regards difference as a mutual opportunity for growth and as a source of new possibilities for being in the world.

Furthermore, each of these writers clearly holds to a dialogical sense of truth--the foundation of Socratic philosophy and the hallmark of the dialogical novel. One may recall that this does not entail ethical or epistemological relativism on their part. What it does entail is a far more sophisticated conception of truth in these writers than has generally been recognized. These novelists anticipate Bakhtinian thought in their understanding that truth comes out of an intermingling and meeting of various consciousnesses, and they anticipate his insight that only through dialogical exchanges can the various forms of monologism be defeated. Repeatedly, these novelists underwrite the need for multiple perspectives, authentic exchanges, and genuine dialogue in order for truth to come to light. Each of the novels considered in this study anticipates and affirms Bakhtin's insight that "Truth is not born nor is it to be found in the head of an individual person, it is born *between people* collectively searching for the truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction" (*Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,*110).

So Mr. B's objectification of the other is defeated insofar as he is able to enter into a dialogic relation with Pamela. The monological world view that Elizabeth expresses is fractured through the "penetrated word" of Mr. Darcy. Emma's insensitivity is overturned through the internally dialogized words of Mr. Knightley's reprimand. Gwendolen begins to enter into the dialogic stream of life as she learns "to see all her acts through the impression they would make on Deronda" (737). The dialogical conception of truth we find in these writers again undermines the postmodern tendency to see Richardson, Austen, and Eliot as apologists and ideologists who express the dominant ideologies of their time, race, gender, class and culture. Rather, what we find are complex thinkers, literary philosophers, if you will, whose writing adheres to and expresses an ancient, if mostly forgotten or ignored, conception of how truth comes about between human beings. Rarely do we find monological "ready-made truths" in these writers, and when such "truths" seem to appear, they are usually offered in a spirit of Socratic irony or in a context that presents them as propositions in need of critical testing and evaluation. So, in a sense, these writers belong to a "great tradition" even older than the one Dr. Leavis has defended, one that is only very recently coming to be recognized as that of the dialogical novel.

I began this study by claiming that D. H. Lawrence's assertion that "philosophy and fiction got split" was not true for those novelists whose work indicates, like Socrates' philosophy, that philosophy is to be connected with human life, and human life is to be concerned with morality. But the novels of Samuel Richardson, Jane Austen, and George Eliot go much deeper into the complexities involved in human relations than my claim about morality may suggest. These writers do indeed unify philosophy and fiction insofar as they repeatedly reveal, scrutinize, evaluate, and give voice to many of the fundamental questions of the philosophical *life.* Each writer, in his or her own way, takes up the ancient philosophical task of education of the reader, a task now generally held in disfavor, but one that is, in my view, central to great literary art as well as to meaningful philosophy.

These writers repeatedly affirm a philosophical orientation to life in considering crucial aspects of our moral life--objectification, egoism, moral stupidity, subjectivity, monologism and dialogism, the examined life and self-knowledge, the other and relation, reality and illusion, truth and error--all these and more are offered for our consideration and finally for our edification. But we should now recognize that the greatness of these writers also lies in their unique and compelling treatment of these subjects, a treatment that is often radical in its apprehension of Socratic philosophy and of a dialogic orientation to the world.

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